2 - British Policy Across the Causeway, 1942–71: Territorial Merger as a Strategy of Imperial Disengagement

Summary

The loss of Singapore in 1942 haunted the British until their final withdrawal from east of Suez nearly thirty years later. In 1970 Sir Arthur de la Mare recollected how he had been beset throughout his term as Britain's high commissioner in Singapore with daily reminders of the disaster. The “smell of our ignominy still hangs in the air”, he wrote in his farewell despatch, and “it does not relieve me to recall that the military pomp and ostentation — not to say arrogance — with which we reoccupied Singapore was a sham and a fraud” since it could not “expunge the shame of 1942, and the uncomfortable knowledge that we returned on the back of the Americans”. De la Mare's sense of guilt was shared by many of his contemporaries who were responsible for the promotion of British interests and the enhancement of Britain's reputation in Southeast Asia. How could they regain national pride, local trust, and international respect? How could they atone for a great betrayal of subject peoples and Commonwealth allies? And, having done so, how could they conduct a final, but honourable, retreat from the empire?

The British desire to make amends for 1942 by way of a more constructive colonialism was nonetheless accompanied by a revival of imperial aspirations. In 1943–45 planners in London drew up a set of new arrangements for Britain's disparate Southeast Asian territories. These plans were designed, first of all, to enable recovery after the Japanese Occupation and to promote the economic development of a dollar-earning area. In addition, but no less importantly, they would rehabilitate British authority east of Suez and reinforce the link with Australasia. At the same time, foundations would be laid for a stable and eventually self-governing successor state (or states) through which Britain might play a world role at reduced cost. The Malayan Union scheme of 1946–48 was intended as the first stage of a “grand design” for the systematic consolidation of British interests that would culminate in the inauguration of Malaysia in September 1963. Central to its success was the close association of peninsular Malaya and the island of Singapore, and so intense was Britain's commitment to forging links across the causeway that Malaysia's first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, later complained that he “had no choice” but to give into British pressure for merger.