Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Seeking Perspective on a Slow-Burn Civil War
- 2 The Culture of the Army, Matichon Weekly, 28 May 2010
- 3 Thoughts on Thailand's Turmoil, 11 June 2010
- 4 Truth and Justice When Fear and Repression Remain: An Open Letter to Dr Kanit Na Nakorn, 16 July 2010
- 5 The Impact of the Red Shirt Rallies on the Thai Economy
- 6 The Socio-Economic Bases of the Red/Yellow Divide: A Statistical Analysis
- 7 The Ineffable Rightness of Conspiracy: Thailand's Democrat-ministered State and the Negation of Red Shirt Politics
- 8 A New Politics of Desire and Disintegration in Thailand
- 9 Notes towards an Understanding of Thai Liberalism
- 10 Thailand's Classless Conflict
- 11 The Grand Bargain: Making “Reconciliation” Mean Something
- 12 Changing Thailand, an Awakening of Popular Political Consciousness for Rights?
- 13 Class, Inequality, and Politics
- 14 Thailand's Rocky Path towards a Full-Fledged Democracy
- 15 The Color of Politics: Thailand's Deep Crisis of Authority
- 16 Two Cheers for Rally Politics
- 17 Thai Foreign Policy in Crisis: From Partner to Problem
- 18 Thailand in Trouble: Revolt of the Downtrodden or Conflict among Elites?
- 19 From Red to Red: An Auto-ethnography of Economic and Political Transitions in a Northeastern Thai Village
- 20 The Rich, the Powerful and the Banana Man: The United States’ Position in the Thai Crisis
- 21 The Social Bases of Autocratic Rule in Thailand
- 22 The Strategy of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship on “Double Standards”: A Grand Gesture to History, Justice, and Accountability
- 23 No Way Forward but Back? Re-emergent Thai Falangism, Democracy, and the New “Red Shirt” Social Movement
- 24 Flying Blind
- 25 The Political Economy of Thailand's Middle-Income Peasants
- 26 Royal Succession and the Evolution of Thai Democracy
- Index
- Plate section
10 - Thailand's Classless Conflict
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Contributors
- 1 Introduction: Seeking Perspective on a Slow-Burn Civil War
- 2 The Culture of the Army, Matichon Weekly, 28 May 2010
- 3 Thoughts on Thailand's Turmoil, 11 June 2010
- 4 Truth and Justice When Fear and Repression Remain: An Open Letter to Dr Kanit Na Nakorn, 16 July 2010
- 5 The Impact of the Red Shirt Rallies on the Thai Economy
- 6 The Socio-Economic Bases of the Red/Yellow Divide: A Statistical Analysis
- 7 The Ineffable Rightness of Conspiracy: Thailand's Democrat-ministered State and the Negation of Red Shirt Politics
- 8 A New Politics of Desire and Disintegration in Thailand
- 9 Notes towards an Understanding of Thai Liberalism
- 10 Thailand's Classless Conflict
- 11 The Grand Bargain: Making “Reconciliation” Mean Something
- 12 Changing Thailand, an Awakening of Popular Political Consciousness for Rights?
- 13 Class, Inequality, and Politics
- 14 Thailand's Rocky Path towards a Full-Fledged Democracy
- 15 The Color of Politics: Thailand's Deep Crisis of Authority
- 16 Two Cheers for Rally Politics
- 17 Thai Foreign Policy in Crisis: From Partner to Problem
- 18 Thailand in Trouble: Revolt of the Downtrodden or Conflict among Elites?
- 19 From Red to Red: An Auto-ethnography of Economic and Political Transitions in a Northeastern Thai Village
- 20 The Rich, the Powerful and the Banana Man: The United States’ Position in the Thai Crisis
- 21 The Social Bases of Autocratic Rule in Thailand
- 22 The Strategy of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship on “Double Standards”: A Grand Gesture to History, Justice, and Accountability
- 23 No Way Forward but Back? Re-emergent Thai Falangism, Democracy, and the New “Red Shirt” Social Movement
- 24 Flying Blind
- 25 The Political Economy of Thailand's Middle-Income Peasants
- 26 Royal Succession and the Evolution of Thai Democracy
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
On 26 February 2010, Thailand's Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision against former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. It ruled that the businessman-cum-politician had abused his power by enacting policies during his six-year tenure of office (2001–06) that directly benefited his family-owned communications companies at the state's expense. The verdict called for the seizure of US$1.4 billion of the US$2.3 billion worth of Thaksin's and his family's assets frozen after the military toppled his government in a 2006 coup. Thaksin reacted to the decision by calling it “unfair”; he later claimed that it was a reflection of the “double standards” in Thai society that favour the rich over the poor.
Two weeks later, Thaksin's affiliated pressure group, the red-shirtgarbed National United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD), mobilized over 100,000 protestors, mainly from the country's northern and northeastern provinces, in Bangkok to protest the court decision and call upon Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to dissolve parliament and hold new elections. Within four days, the numbers at the UDD's protest site had fallen off significantly, dipping on March 16 to around 20,000, including hundreds of red-shirt-wearing street vendors. Thaksin was quoted in the local media imploring politicians in the Thaksinite Phuea Thai Party to boost protestor numbers. He claimed that the government had “bribed” UDD demonstrators to quit the rally.
Protestor numbers, first at the UDD's original Phan Fa bridge site and later at the heart of the Ratchaprasong luxury shopping district, waxed and waned dramatically, depending on the time of day and on planned protest activities. By late April, there were frequently fewer than 2,000 people milling around the largely vacant protest site in the mornings and early afternoons. That ebb and flow raised important questions about whether the protest was populated in the main by politically awakened poor rural farmers, who in their economic plight often slept on the streets of the protest site, or instead by the middle classes, who had the means to stay in hotels or the option of returning home after attending rallies after work on weekdays or on the weekends. The fluctuating and often low numbers also gave the lie to the notion that the UDD was an organic social movement rooted in rural Thailand, as popularly portrayed in the mass media and by the UDD itself.
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- Bangkok, May 2010Perspectives on a Divided Thailand, pp. 108 - 119Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2012