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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Augustine’s Picture of Language and the Referential Conception of Linguistic Meaning
- 3 Names and Their Meaning, Sentences and Descriptions
- 4 Meaning and Use, Understanding and Interpreting
- 5 Ostensive Definition and Family Resemblance: Undermining the Foundations and Destroying the Essences
- 6 Metaphysics, Necessity and Grammar
- 7 Thought and Language
- 8 The Private Language Arguments
- 9 Private Ownership of Experience
- 10 Epistemic Privacy of Experience
- 11 Private Ostensive Definition
- 12 My Mind and Other Minds
- 13 The Inner and the Outer – Behaviour and Behaviourism
- 14 ‘Only of a Human Being and What Behaves like a Human Being …’: The Mereological Fallacy and Cognitive Neuroscience
- 15 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - I
- 16 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - II
- 17 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - III
- Abbreviations
- Further Reading
- Index
7 - Thought and Language
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Augustine’s Picture of Language and the Referential Conception of Linguistic Meaning
- 3 Names and Their Meaning, Sentences and Descriptions
- 4 Meaning and Use, Understanding and Interpreting
- 5 Ostensive Definition and Family Resemblance: Undermining the Foundations and Destroying the Essences
- 6 Metaphysics, Necessity and Grammar
- 7 Thought and Language
- 8 The Private Language Arguments
- 9 Private Ownership of Experience
- 10 Epistemic Privacy of Experience
- 11 Private Ostensive Definition
- 12 My Mind and Other Minds
- 13 The Inner and the Outer – Behaviour and Behaviourism
- 14 ‘Only of a Human Being and What Behaves like a Human Being …’: The Mereological Fallacy and Cognitive Neuroscience
- 15 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - I
- 16 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - II
- 17 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - III
- Abbreviations
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
Augustine's Picture Again
You will recollect that an integral element of the conception of meaning that Wittgenstein associated with Augustine's pre-reflective picture of language is the idea that language is connected to reality. Augustine remarked that
When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I perceived this, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point it out. This, however, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples […]. (Augustine - Confessions I-8)
So Augustine conceived of words being connected with things by means of ostension. We have already examined Wittgenstein's criticisms of that idea. Let me briefly remind you of some of his points and take the matter forward a little.
First of all, we must distinguish ostensive training from ostensive teaching. All initial language learning is a matter of training. Parents and siblings endlessly repeat words, encourage correct reactions and reinforce correct repetition. This is not explaining what words mean, but inculcating verbal responses and reactions. Ostensive teaching can play a role in language learning only once the child has already acquired substantial linguistic skills and is in the position to start asking ‘What is a so-and-so?’ and ‘What does such-and-such a word mean?’
∙ Second, we must note that the form of words ‘This is so-and-so?’ has two quite different uses. It may be used to make a true or false statement about the object that is pointed at – as when we are asked whether there is anything octagonal around, and in reply we point at a small side table and say ‘This ☞ is octagonal’. Alternatively, we might be asked what the word ‘octagonal’ means, and in reply we might point at the table and say ‘This ☞ is octago-nal’. In the first case, our description could be paraphrased ‘This ☞ table is octagonal’, but in the second case our ostensive utterance is not a description but a definition.
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- Information
- A Beginner's Guide to the Later Philosophy of WittgensteinSeventeen Lectures and Dialogues on the Philosophical Investigations, pp. 111 - 126Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2024