Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-27T15:19:27.879Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

8 - Metaphysics Θ.7 and 8: Some issues concerning actuality and potentiality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 December 2010

James G. Lennox
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh
Robert Bolton
Affiliation:
Rutgers University, New Jersey
Get access

Summary

INTRODUCTION

In Metaphysics Η.6 Aristotle famously remarks:

What then is the cause of what is potentially F being actually F in the case of things that come to be over and above the efficient cause? For, nothing other is the cause of what is potentially a sphere being actually a sphere; rather this [i.e. the cause] is what it is to be for each of them singly.

(1045a30–3)

This passage and its immediate context can be interpreted in several ways. One interpretation, which I have defended elsewhere, runs as follows.

‘If we consider the issue of the unity of a composite in terms of

matter: form

potentiality: actuality

there is no longer a difficulty. What makes it the case that

potentiality: actuality

are paired in such a way as to form a composite unity is that they share a cause: what it is for each of them to be what they are (a formal cause).'

Consider an example: in the case of man the actuality, according to this view, is being alive in a given reason-involving way. This is what it is to be a man: the relevant formal cause. The matter in question is made what it is by this formal cause: it is what is capable of being alive in this way. When what is capable of being alive in this way is actually alive, there is a unified composite.

Type
Chapter
Information
Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle
Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf
, pp. 168 - 197
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2010

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×