Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-11T05:10:30.618Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Theoretical Framework

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2022

Torben Iversen
Affiliation:
Harvard University, Massachusetts
Philipp Rehm
Affiliation:
Ohio State University
Get access

Summary

Chapter 2 presents the (formal) theoretical framework and advances four arguments. First, whether or not majority support for public provision of insurance exists depends on the distribution of information. Second, some insurance is best provided via pay-as-you-go systems, but these involve a difficult time-inconsistency problem that private markets cannot solve. Some social insurance is therefore bound to remain almost entirely within the purview of the state. Third, people’s preferences regarding social insurance are also a function of the availability of private options. If social insurance is the only game in town, even those subsidizing the system will support it, leading to broad cross-class majorities. With private alternatives, the better-off will lower their support for public spending, which erodes the broad support public social policy programs traditionally enjoy. Fourth, parties continue to matter because they represent different risk groups, and we expect that partisan conflicts will extend into new areas, most importantly the regulation of information and how it may be used.

Type
Chapter
Information
Big Data and the Welfare State
How the Information Revolution Threatens Social Solidarity
, pp. 15 - 43
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2022

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×