Book contents
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume I
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 China to ad 180
- 2 Teispid and Achaemenid Persia (c. 550–330 bc)
- 3 Ancient Greece
- 4 Philip II, Alexander III and the Macedonian Empire
- 5 Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
- 6 China ad 180–1127
- 7 Ancient Rome
- 8 The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
- 9 The Sassanian Empire’s Strategies
- 10 The Rashidun, Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) Caliphates
- 11 Byzantine Strategy (ad 630–1204)
- 12 Strategies in the Wars of Western Europe, 476–c. 1000
- 13 Latin Christendom in the Later Middle Ages
- 14 Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ad 1206 to 1368
- 15 Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
- 16 Pre-Columbian and Early Historic Native American Warfare
- 17 Ottoman Expansionism, 1300–1823
- 18 Strategy in the Wars of Pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19 Strategies of the Mughal Empire
- 20 China, 1368–1911
- 21 Early Modern Europe: The Habsburgs and Their Enemies, 1519–1659
- 22 Naval Strategies
- 23 The Strategy of Louis XIV
- 24 Hohenzollern Strategy under Frederick II
- 25 American Warfare in the Eighteenth Century
- Summary of Volume I
- Further Reading
- Index
5 - Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2025
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- The Cambridge History of Strategy
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Maps
- Contributors to Volume I
- Preface and Acknowledgements
- Introduction to Volume I
- 1 China to ad 180
- 2 Teispid and Achaemenid Persia (c. 550–330 bc)
- 3 Ancient Greece
- 4 Philip II, Alexander III and the Macedonian Empire
- 5 Ancient Rome: Monarchy and Republic (753–27 bc)
- 6 China ad 180–1127
- 7 Ancient Rome
- 8 The Gupta Empire (ad 400–500)
- 9 The Sassanian Empire’s Strategies
- 10 The Rashidun, Umayyad (661–750) and Abbasid (750–1258) Caliphates
- 11 Byzantine Strategy (ad 630–1204)
- 12 Strategies in the Wars of Western Europe, 476–c. 1000
- 13 Latin Christendom in the Later Middle Ages
- 14 Chinggis Khan and the Mongol Empire, ad 1206 to 1368
- 15 Hindu and Buddhist Polities of Premodern/Early Modern Mainland South-East Asia (1100–1800)
- 16 Pre-Columbian and Early Historic Native American Warfare
- 17 Ottoman Expansionism, 1300–1823
- 18 Strategy in the Wars of Pre-colonial Sub-Saharan Africa
- 19 Strategies of the Mughal Empire
- 20 China, 1368–1911
- 21 Early Modern Europe: The Habsburgs and Their Enemies, 1519–1659
- 22 Naval Strategies
- 23 The Strategy of Louis XIV
- 24 Hohenzollern Strategy under Frederick II
- 25 American Warfare in the Eighteenth Century
- Summary of Volume I
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
Rome transitioned from being a central Italian city state with predominantly local concerns of peer-polity competition and survival to the conquest of Italy and then to pre-eminence in the Mediterranean and beyond. The context in which strategic decisions were made varied considerably as Rome’s capacity for military and diplomatic action developed, the nature of the threats that it faced changed and its international horizons and opportunities expanded. Equally, the development and formulation of strategic priorities rested on a complex interplay between the state’s political and religious institutions and authorities and individuals and interest groups, making consistent and coherent long-term strategic policy almost impossible. For the most part, the Roman state proved adept at acting opportunistically to enhance its power, in response to external events and internal impulses. Its objectives therefore were not static but arose in a complex competitive inter-state environment of dangerous rivals to Roman power. A fundamental element in their success lay in the evolution of the structural capacity of the Roman state for military mobilisation, of both its own population and that of allies. Despite a predominantly militia army of annually raised legions and annual magistrates, Rome displayed a formidable ability to prosecute warfare within diverse theatres of operation, by land and sea, and to employ an effective mix of coercion and generosity to obtain support, co-operation, and collusion from allies and to undermine the resolve of enemies.
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- The Cambridge History of Strategy , pp. 98 - 123Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2025