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46. - Descartes’s Principles of Philosophy

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The DPP, along with CM, is the only work Spinoza published under his own name in his lifetime (1663). Evidence that Spinoza oversaw the publication is found in his letters to Lodewijk Meyer, Ep12a and Ep15. Meyer’s preface to the DPP is careful and explicit to claim that the DPP contains Spinoza’s presentation of Descartes’ Principles and that it does not necessarily represent Spinoza’s own beliefs (cf. Ep13, Ep15). Of the identified differences, Meyer claims that Spinoza disagrees with Descartes’s position on the substantiality of the soul, the distinction between the will and intellect, that the soul may withhold judgment, and that some concepts surpass human understanding (229–30; cf. Ep21, Ep31). Spinoza, despite the claim otherwise to present only Descartes’s thought, often tells readers that he finds that he “think[s] Descartes was too intelligent to have meant” what he otherwise claimed in his work (DPP1p7s).

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Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Bolton, M. Brandt. (1985). Spinoza on Cartesian doubt. Noûs, 19, 379–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Curley, E. M. (1977). Spinoza as expositor of Descartes. In Hessing, S. (ed.), Speculum Spinozanum: 1677–1977 (pp. 133–42). Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
Gilson, E. (1923). Spinoza interprète de Descartes. Chronicon Spinozanum, 3, 6887.Google Scholar
Gueroult, M. (1960). Le cogito et l’ordre des axioms métaphysiques dans le Principia philosophiæ cartesianæ de Spinoza. Archives de Philosophie, 23, 171–85.Google Scholar
Hubbeling, H. G. (1980). Spinoza comme précurseur du reconstructivisme logique dans son livre sur Descartes. Studia Liebnitiana, 12, 8895.Google Scholar
Lécrivain, A. (1978). Spinoza et la physique cartésienne. Cahiers Spinoza, 2, 93206.Google Scholar
Sibilia, G. (2014). El itinerario de Spinoza en 1663: Algunos problemas relativos a la temporalidad en Los principios de filosofía de Descartes, Los pensamientos metafísicos, y la ‘Carta sobre el infinito’. Praxis filosofíco, 38, 2751.Google Scholar

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