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179. - Teleology

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Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 January 2025

By
Don Garrett
Edited by
Karolina Hübner  and
Justin Steinberg
Karolina Hübner
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
Justin Steinberg
Affiliation:
Cornell University, New York
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Summary

The term ‘teleology’ – from the Greek telos, meaning end, purpose, or goal – was not coined until well after Spinoza’s death, and different authors have used the term in somewhat different ways. Spinoza himself writes not of teleology but of existing or acting “for the sake of an end [propter finem]”; of “striving” or “endeavor [conatus]”; and of being a “final cause [causa finalis].” The concept of a final cause derives ultimately from Aristotle, for whom final causes are just one of four kinds of cause (along with efficient, formal, and material causes) that stand in complex relations to one another. At a minimum, however, final causes explain by implicating something – an end, purpose, or goal – that is subsequent to what is explained. How best to characterize kinds of causes and the relations among them was an important question for many early modern philosophers, including Spinoza.

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Chapter
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The Cambridge Spinoza Lexicon , pp. 523 - 525
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2024

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References

Recommended Reading

Bennett, J. (1984). A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics. Hackett.Google Scholar
Carriero, J. (2005). Spinoza on final causality. Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 2, 105–47.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Garrett, D. (1999). Teleological explanation in Spinoza and early modern philosophy. In Gennaro, R. J. and Huenemann, C. (eds.), New Essays on the Rationalists (pp. 310–35). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Garrett, D. (2018). Nature and Necessity in Spinoza’s Philosophy. Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hübner, K. (2018). Spinoza’s unorthodox theory of the will. In Rocca, M. Della (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza (pp. 343–69). Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lin, M. (2006). Teleology and human action in Spinoza. Philosophical Review, 115(3), 317–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Manning, R. (2002). Spinoza, thoughtful teleology, and the causal significance of content. In Koistinen, O. and Biro, J. (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes (pp. 182–209). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Steinberg, J. (2011). Spinoza on human purposiveness and mental causation. History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, 14, 51–70.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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