Book contents
- Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum
- Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Why Powers?
- Chapter 1 The Need for Powers
- Chapter 2 The Reality of Pure Powers
- Part II What Are Powers Like?
- Works Cited
- Index
Chapter 2 - The Reality of Pure Powers
from Part I - Why Powers?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 October 2022
- Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum
- Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Figures
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Part I Why Powers?
- Chapter 1 The Need for Powers
- Chapter 2 The Reality of Pure Powers
- Part II What Are Powers Like?
- Works Cited
- Index
Summary
This chapter explores possible differences between powerful qualities and pure powers, argues for the Pure Powers Model, and discusses the problem of being for pure powers. It is argued that powerful qualities are modally indistinguishable from pure powers but have a denser nature. Since pure powers are ontologically simpler than powerful qualities yet equally explanatorily relevant to modality, we should reject powerful qualities. After rejecting the Powerful Qualities Model, the reality of pure powers is defended. If pure powers are to provide a stable basis for physical modality, the problem of their being or grounding during periods of nonmanifestation needs resolution. It is argued that pure powers are self-grounded. A regress argument advanced by Stathis Psillos, which challenges the self-grounding of pure powers, is deflected. Lastly, Point Theory is developed to explain the self-grounding of pure powers.
- Type
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- Information
- Causal Powers and the Intentionality Continuum , pp. 42 - 74Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2022