Part I - The British Admiralty Delegation, Washington, D.C., March to September 1942

Summary

The First Sea Lord, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, had several motives for moving Cunningham from Alexandria to Washington. The fact that the United States was now a co-belligerent was to be welcomed but the American forces would now clamour for resources with more urgency and their shopping lists would be virtually endless; it was vital that the British should retain a major share of American industrial production. Secondly, America had been ushered into war most violently by the attack on Pearl Harbor (7 December 1941) and her other Pacific possessions; it was natural that the American people and their Navy would want to avenge themselves upon Japan, and leave Germany and Italy till later – an option which Britain could not countenance, for though she too had suffered greatly at Japan's hands, she knew that Germany alone possessed the strength to defeat her, while the collapse of Italy might well open a way to re-enter the European continent from the south. Finally, Admiral Ernest J. King, an enigmatic figure who seemed to the Royal Navy to embody anti-British features and appeared unlikely to be ‘a good co-operator’, became Chief of Naval Operations on 26 March. King's priorities seemed to be the rapid expansion of the U. S. Navy, the annihilation of the Japanese fleet, and the concentration of American naval effort in the Pacific. To counter this prospect, a forceful, resolute British Admiral who commanded respect in Washington for his fighting qualities and successes was required, someone who could engage the single-minded, dedicated and determined King on equal terms. No one in the Royal Navy fulfilled the criteria so completely as Cunningham.

Cunningham was most reluctant to go. He did not wish to leave his men and women in the Mediterranean in their hour of adversity. He was essentially a sea-going rather than a desk-bound admiral. He felt he lacked the qualities and interest required for astute maritime diplomacy, though he believed that he could match King's reputed toughness and bluntness [1]. Churchill was also most reluctant to let him go. He had become convinced that Admiral Sir John Tovey was too recalcitrant and too defensively-minded to continue as Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet and, though he had had sharp differences with Cunningham, too, he was attracted, as always, by the aura of aggressiveness about him.