Abstract

Summary

The problems of economic development spare no country. For Vietnam, this issue is made more difficult because of the country's enrollment in a 30-year war which left a legacy of incalculable destruction. The demanding task of development therefore has to be stimultaneously managed alongside the equally formidable challenge of post-war reconstruction. Above all, Vietnam has to tackle enormous problems requiring immediate decisions within a fixed ideological framework that imposes constraints upon the choices and manoeuvres available.

This study is essentially an examination of the dilemma and options faced by the Vietnamese leadership in planning reconstruction and development within the paramaters of socialism. Chapters I and II trace the problems posed and approches adopted by the decision-makers from 1954 to 1974 and after liberation from 1975 to 1979. In each period, the pressing difficulties of a war-time situation as well as post-war conditions have compelled Vietnamese leaders to make frequent shifts in policies in response to immediate circumstances. But the ultimate goal of building a centrally-planned society which satisfies every individual according to his needs is neither neglected nor forgotten. Nonetheless, in the short-term, intractable realities dictate tactical compromises to create a workable economy before proper socialist construction can be effected. Chapter III looks at the confluence of forces which left Vietnamese planners in September 1979 with few expedient choices -- and official endorsement was accorded to a new approach which appears to depart from orthodox courses acceptable within the socialist framework.