Chapter 2 - Tupong: If It Ain‘t Broke, Don't Fix It!

Summary

The most recent, eleventh Sarawak State Election (SSE11) demonstrates yet again the domination of PBB (United Bumiputera Heritage Party), part of the Barisan Nasional (BN, National Front) coalition, in Malay-majority areas. Tupong is one such area. The election in Tupong saw a two-pronged contest between the incumbent government party, represented by Fazzrudin Abdul Rahman of PBB, and Nurhanim Hanna Mokhsen of the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat (PKR, People's Justice Party). The former won with 79.1 per cent of the popular vote against 20.9 per cent; 8,055 votes set the candidates apart. This chapter examines Tupong as one of BN's strongest urban bastions.

Tupong is notable because it defies the assumption that election outcomes in the urban areas lean more toward the opposition – unlike in other Sarawak urban seats such as Padungan (a Chinesemajority seat) and Batu Kawa (a mixed seat). A possible explanation is that Tupong houses among the highest concentration of voters from Sarawak's newly emergent, urban, Malay-Muslim middle class, who are among the prime beneficiaries of state and federal BN affirmative action. As a political community, the Malays also have a close historical and social affiliation with PBB, the state BN majority component party. The community's mix of feelings of gratitude and affinity with PBB translates into the mass of voters supporting BN in Tupong. In this chapter, I argue that Tupong is an example of the pull of patronage politics, based on a variant of the politics of development often associated with more rural areas in Sarawak, by looking at campaign strategies and issues raised by BN and PKR during the SSE11 campaign period.

First, I outline the basic demography of Tupong, which is a rapidly developing, privileged, Malay-majority, urban area. Second, I discuss ‘the Adenan Factor’, which is a strong feel-good sentiment towards Sarawak's newly elected chief minister, Adenan Satem. The extent to which Fazzrudin's victory depended on Adenan's popularity hints at the prevalence of personalised, clientelist politics in the area. Third, I discuss PKR's ceramah (political speeches or rallies). Like Fazzrudin, Nurhanim also relied on her party seniors for boosting support, suggesting the pervasiveness of personality politics, whether rooted in charisma or in patron–client ties. This reliance on personal ‘pull’ was evident when PKR lost much of its audience for ceramah sessions due to the absence of PKR (and other opposition) national superstars.