Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Pascal Lamy
- Foreword by Holger Standertskjöld
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- A Technical Note
- Introduction
- 1 Basic Principles
- 2 Institutions
- 3 Grand Designs
- 4 The Mechanics
- 5 The European Union's Role in the World
- 6 The Rationale Behind the Enlargements — Why it Worked?
- 7 Constraints — Risks — Challenge
- 8 Building Trust
- 9 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
6 - The Rationale Behind the Enlargements — Why it Worked?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword by Pascal Lamy
- Foreword by Holger Standertskjöld
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- A Technical Note
- Introduction
- 1 Basic Principles
- 2 Institutions
- 3 Grand Designs
- 4 The Mechanics
- 5 The European Union's Role in the World
- 6 The Rationale Behind the Enlargements — Why it Worked?
- 7 Constraints — Risks — Challenge
- 8 Building Trust
- 9 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
Central Issues in the Debate on Enlargement from the 1960s to 2006
The debate about enlargement drives home the central point that the European Union has always nourished a grand strategic design. It has had repercussions for the political and economic architecture of Europe. The European Union fast became the flywheel for Europe's politics and economics, thus attracting those European countries that had chosen not to join as founding fathers.
Overriding political reasoning explains why the adhering countries wanted to join:
• The United Kingdom joined in 1973, not because it really wanted to, but because the political leaders of Britain had come to the conclusion that staying outside the European Union, Britain would be confined to low economic growth, be marginalized economically with inevitable negative political repercussions for Britain's influence in Europe, relations with the United States, its role in the Commonwealth, and worldwide status in the long run. To a certain extent, Britain joined to preserve its place in the world and not because it was inspired by the ideas behind the European integration.
• Greece in 1980, and Spain plus Portugal in 1986, saw membership as a guarantee against a reversal of the democratization of their countries after the fall of dictators, and access to the EU markets, combined with economic assistance as a driver for economic growth. Politically their societies might have been thrown into chaos without the solidity brought along by membership.
• The EFTA countries (Sweden, Austria, Finland)2 took their decision after the end of the Cold War removed the raison d’être for neutrality, which they felt suited them during the military stand-off between NATO and the Warsaw Pact from 1949 to 1990. In the Cold War years they had been willing to live with the economic costs of staying outside the European Union. After the end of the Cold War, this was no longer the case.
• The Central and Eastern European countries grasped instantaneously that the European Union could and would give them the implicit security guarantee they wanted against a potential threat from Russia. After having seceded from the Soviet/Russian Empire, they feared the resurrection of the old imperial power. If such was to be the case, membership of the European Union would be convenient. An act of aggression would be against the European Union and not against isolated Central and Eastern European countries.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- European IntegrationSharing of Experiences, pp. 382 - 416Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2008