Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Formative Years (July 1910 to December 1941)
- 3 The BIA and the Resistance (January 1942 to August 1945)
- 4 Showing the British Out (September 1945 to December 1947)
- 5 Independence and Civil War (January 1948 to September 1950)
- 6 Relaxing and Rebuilding (October 1950 to March 1958)
- 7 Rehearsing and Reviewing (April 1958 to February 1962)
- 8 Coup d'Etat and Revolution (March 1962 to February 1964)
- 9 Cold War General (March 1964 to February 1967)
- 10 Preparation for Transition (March 1967 to February 1972)
- 11 Transition and Small Change (March 1972 to February 1978)
- 12 Purifying the Sangha, Unifying the Nation, and Maintaining Genuine Neutrality (March 1978 to February 1988)
- 13 Failure and Farewell (March 1988 to December 2002)
- Epilogue: What to Make of Ne Win?
- Appendix: Radio Address by Colonel Naywin (7–5–45), to the People of Burma
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
8 - Coup d'Etat and Revolution (March 1962 to February 1964)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 January 2018
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Tables
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The Formative Years (July 1910 to December 1941)
- 3 The BIA and the Resistance (January 1942 to August 1945)
- 4 Showing the British Out (September 1945 to December 1947)
- 5 Independence and Civil War (January 1948 to September 1950)
- 6 Relaxing and Rebuilding (October 1950 to March 1958)
- 7 Rehearsing and Reviewing (April 1958 to February 1962)
- 8 Coup d'Etat and Revolution (March 1962 to February 1964)
- 9 Cold War General (March 1964 to February 1967)
- 10 Preparation for Transition (March 1967 to February 1972)
- 11 Transition and Small Change (March 1972 to February 1978)
- 12 Purifying the Sangha, Unifying the Nation, and Maintaining Genuine Neutrality (March 1978 to February 1988)
- 13 Failure and Farewell (March 1988 to December 2002)
- Epilogue: What to Make of Ne Win?
- Appendix: Radio Address by Colonel Naywin (7–5–45), to the People of Burma
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
When you come into the presence of a leader of men, you know you have come into the presence of fire — that it is best not incautiously to touch that man — that there is something that makes it dangerous to cross him.
Woodrow WilsonGeneral Ne Win's assumption of power on 2 March 1962, while not unexpected, was nonetheless a surprise to many. It was executed in secrecy, and apparently even the deputy commander of the armed forces, Brigadier General Aung Gyi, was not informed until the next morning, though he must have been expecting it as early as November 1961, when he raised the prospect with colleagues. Others in the army, including Brigadier General Tin Pe, had been urging Ne Win to halt what they saw as a drift towards the dissolution of the Union of Burma. U Nu's cooperation with the Shan and Kayah traditional leaders in the Federal Seminar, and growing discontent in other minority areas caused by Nu's constitutional amendment making Buddhism the state religion, were creating political forces which many in the army felt the increasingly fractious Union Party government could not resist. Kachin Christians, led by former students fired by zeal for “Kachin national culture”, resented the installation of Buddhism as the state religion and the Shan Sawbwa, in the name of Shan “national determination”, were beginning to organize armed opposition to the government. The possibility of the Union Party splitting, as the AFPFL had done in 1958, became ever more likely, especially after Nu, the only person holding the party together, announced he would not run for office again after the next elections due two years hence (Silverstein 1977, p. 66). Planning for the corp commenced on 24 February, and twenty-eight officers were instructed as to what to do when the order for the coup was given. However, the date remained unknown until Ne Win gave the order (Mya Han and Thein Hlaing 2001, pp. 164–65).
Nu who was held incommunicado at Mingaladon from the middle of the night, initially believed that his detention was engineered by junior officers and soon Ne Win would come to his rescue (Nu 1975, pp. 141– 44). He, like many others, had false expectations, believing the past would be a guide to the future.
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- General Ne WinA Political Biography, pp. 255 - 308Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2015