3 - The defence burden, 1907–1914

Summary

Introduction: the economics and politics of Russian rearmament, 1907–1914

The war against Japan and the revolutionary assault on tsarist government left no political institutions unscathed and few shibboleths intact. The war and revolution – a ‘moment of truth’, in the words of Teodor Shanin – had exposed the hollowness of Russian imperial pretensions and underscored the vulnerability of the old regime to popular protest. Military catastrophe might have been expected to induce a prolonged diplomatic retreat. Other things being equal, defeat should have occasioned a distaste and certainly a retreat from anything resembling an active foreign policy. But things were not equal. It is true that leading officials within the old regime counselled moderation in foreign policy. The Ministry of Finances tried to rally support for a policy of restraint in government spending after 1905, which would have restricted the freedom of manoeuvre of the defence departments. But countervailing forces were at work to undermine this policy. France urged its ally to rebuild the Russian army, lest the pressure on Germany diminish. Within the imperial corridors of power, fresh initiatives were also being demanded. A new generation of naval officers seized the opportunity to formulate an ambitious programme for the Russian fleet. Crucially, the Tsar lent his support, backed by advisers who invoked the image of Peter the Great in the cause of naval rearmament. By 1910–12, Russia was committed to the creation of a powerful and modern fleet in the Baltic and the Black Sea.