Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-m6dg7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-14T08:50:57.323Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

7 - 1914–1918: Self-Destruction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 May 2018

Get access

Summary

The Monarchy went to war in 1914 because the emperor and his advisors feared that not going to war would result in a loss of status and prestige, not only abroad but also at home, especially among irredentist South Slavs, and risked the disintegration and collapse of the Monarchy. The result of going to war was the disintegration and collapse of the Monarchy. Going to war, and then mismanaging it, produced the outcome it was meant to prevent. All those circles that had not been adequately squared, whether Germany, Hungary, Bosnia or Bohemia, to name just the most prominent, coalesced to produce a situation where there were just no circles left to square, where the Monarchy had run out of ad hoc solutions to deep-lying problems, and could no longer escape to fight another time. It was torn apart by its inability to choose between being a supra-national, multinational, polyglot, quasi-federated refuge for the small nations of Central Europe, and being a subordinate part of the great power complex of the greater German Empire. It had always benefited from being able to play both sides of this dichotomy at the same time – that is what made it a ‘European necessity’ – but the war, with all its distorted modernism, forced the Monarchy to make a choice between either supranational pluralism, or German (Hungarian) imperialism. It was a false choice, brought on by the war Austria-Hungary started; even so, the false choice was made and not made: the Monarchy threw in its lot with nationalist modernity in the form of the German Empire, ceased to be a ‘European necessity’, and by the time it once more reversed itself by seeking accommodation with nationalist modernity in the form of a federalisation, it was too late. The result was self-destruction.

The Decision for War

What caused the First World War or, more accurately, who caused the First World War has been for decades one of the most significant and controversial debates in Modern European History. After the war, the Western Allied version of events held that Germany bore the main ‘war guilt’.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×