Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Glossary
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The Formation of the Intelligentsia
- Chapter 3 Making Indonesia, Making Intellectual Political Traditions
- Chapter 4 Intelligentsia as the Political Elite of the New Nation
- Chapter 5 The New Order's Repressive-Developmentalism and the Islamic Intellectual Response
- Chapter 6 The Rise and Decline of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI)
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Chapter 5 - The New Order's Repressive-Developmentalism and the Islamic Intellectual Response
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Glossary
- Foreword
- Acknowledgements
- Chapter 1 Introduction
- Chapter 2 The Formation of the Intelligentsia
- Chapter 3 Making Indonesia, Making Intellectual Political Traditions
- Chapter 4 Intelligentsia as the Political Elite of the New Nation
- Chapter 5 The New Order's Repressive-Developmentalism and the Islamic Intellectual Response
- Chapter 6 The Rise and Decline of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia (ICMI)
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
They have treated us like cats with ringworm.
Mohammad Natsir (1972)The impetus for change in Islam has more often come from the bottom rather than from the top,
from the edge than from the center.
Richard W. Bulliet (1994)When the Sukarno regime crumbled in 1966, the rising new power began to designate the period of Guided Democracy as the Old Order [orde lama] and celebrate the new era as the New Order [orde baru]. Although Sukarno was still granted official status as the President of Indonesia until 17 October 1967, his real power declined after the 30 September movement [Gestapu] of 1965. The groundwork for the New Order regime was signalled by the issuing of Sukarno' controversial “mandate” on 11 March 1966 entrusting Lieutenant-General Suharto, the army commander since October 1965, with the task of coordinating the power of the government. This mandate came to be known as Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret [Supersemar, 11 March Letter of Instruction]. Suharto took over the command of national politics following massive army-backed anti-Sukarno and anti-communist student demonstrations in the national capital and other cities. On 12 March 1967, the Provisional People' Consultative Assembly [Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara, MPRS] appointed Suharto as the acting President of Indonesia.
To emphasize that this would be a new era, the new regime re-opened the public sphere but with some controls. All kinds of groups, individuals and publications who had been virtually silenced during guided democracy began to make themselves heard again. Conversely, those who had been so vocal during the Old Order period were silenced.
The rise of the New Order marked the ascendancy of the third generation of Indonesian intelligentsia. Members of this generation, who grew up during the Japanese Occupation and revolution, generally lacked exposure to Western academic training but were highly imbued with militaristic and nationalistic mentalities. The new regime was dominated by the military intelligentsia who had a long-standing aversion to the “unpatriotic” and disputatious politics of civilians.
Intellectuals of the PSI and Christian communities became the military' main partners in the formation of the New Order. Their decisive role owed much to their superior educational qualifications and the powerful influence of the PSI and Christian lobbies among the central army command.
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- Information
- Indonesian Muslim Intelligentsia and Power , pp. 326 - 415Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2008