Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Thai Language Convention
- List of Tables and Figures
- Abbreviations
- Foreword
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Rationale, Legitimacy, and Development
- 3 The Making of the Development Military
- 4 Establishing State-Dominated Mass Organization
- 5 Remobilization of the Royalist Mass Since 2006
- 6 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Preface
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 09 October 2021
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Thai Language Convention
- List of Tables and Figures
- Abbreviations
- Foreword
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Rationale, Legitimacy, and Development
- 3 The Making of the Development Military
- 4 Establishing State-Dominated Mass Organization
- 5 Remobilization of the Royalist Mass Since 2006
- 6 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
I grew up in an area adjacent to Bangkok's Ratchadamnoen Avenue, the centre stage of many significant events in modern Thai politics. I had the opportunity to witness several popular demonstrations, beginning with the 14 October 1973 uprising, and too many military coups d’état. Even before the generals made a public announcement, I knew we had another coup when the phone line at home was cut off and the area was swarming with soldiers and military trucks. Despite being familiar with this vicious cycle of civilian government and military rule, I refuse to accept that military rule is the norm for Thailand. It is frustrating to see the growing popularity of the military among a large section of people, the consolidation of military power, the increasing militarization of society in various aspects, the lack of accountability for those involved in violent crackdowns, and the impunity that the military and the rightist elite enjoy. Still, like the majority of Thai people, I have long overlooked the political apparatus of the military. Like most others, I paid attention to the military mainly when the country was under its rule.
The sweeping and heavy-handed attempts of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), the junta of the 22 May 2014 coup, to impose its version of security and order in civil space triggered my curiosity. The first unusual activities of the NCPO I noticed took place soon after the coup. For example, there were forced evictions of small farmers from the forest reserve areas, an obsession with management of traffic and street food in Bangkok, remobilization of many mass organizations, the resurfacing of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) in news headlines, and the establishment of ISOC-led popular surveillance mechanisms in Bangkok and the provinces. The longer the NCPO stayed in power, the more expansive and intensive the military's political control over civilian lives became, justified on grounds of the nation's internal security. I could not find a satisfactory answer to why all this happened. The matter was too important to ignore. I decided to dig for more information. This became my first research project on the Thai military, a topic I had never thought I would address, mainly because I do not enjoy the politics of cliques and classes, a dominant feature of Thai military studies, and partly because the military's machoism dulls my interest.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Infiltrating SocietyThe Thai Military's Internal Security affairs, pp. xviii - xxPublisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2021