Book contents
- Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40
- Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries
- Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Skepticism about Rules and Meaning
- 2 Putting Wittgenstein Back into Kripkenstein:
- 3 Answering Kripke’s Skeptic
- 4 Wittgensteinean Notions of Uniformity and Kripkensteinean Skepticism
- 5 Wittgenstein’s Naturalism and the Skeptical Paradox
- 6 Kripke and Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning
- 7 Semantic Normativity, Properly So Called
- 8 What Is the Skeptical Problem? Wittgenstein’s Response to Kripke
- 9 How Not to Brush Questions under the Rug
- 10 Quadders and Zombies
- 11 Communitarianism, Interpersonalism, and Individualism in Kripke’s “Skeptical Solution”
- 12 “Considered in Isolation”
- 13 The Meaning of Meaning Ascriptions
- Bibliography
- Index
10 - Quadders and Zombies
A Kripkean Argument against Physicalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 February 2024
- Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40
- Cambridge Philosophical Anniversaries
- Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40
- Copyright page
- Dedication
- Contents
- Contributors
- Acknowledgments
- Introduction
- 1 Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s Skepticism about Rules and Meaning
- 2 Putting Wittgenstein Back into Kripkenstein:
- 3 Answering Kripke’s Skeptic
- 4 Wittgensteinean Notions of Uniformity and Kripkensteinean Skepticism
- 5 Wittgenstein’s Naturalism and the Skeptical Paradox
- 6 Kripke and Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning
- 7 Semantic Normativity, Properly So Called
- 8 What Is the Skeptical Problem? Wittgenstein’s Response to Kripke
- 9 How Not to Brush Questions under the Rug
- 10 Quadders and Zombies
- 11 Communitarianism, Interpersonalism, and Individualism in Kripke’s “Skeptical Solution”
- 12 “Considered in Isolation”
- 13 The Meaning of Meaning Ascriptions
- Bibliography
- Index
Summary
In this chapter, I present a Kripkean argument against the materialist thesis that intentionality supervenes on the physical. The argument is inspired both by Kripke’s remarks on the essential nature of intentionality in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, and his argument against the identification of mind and body in Naming and Necessity. The argument turns on the metaphysical possibility of quadders and zombies, where quadders are minimal physical duplicates of us who mean quaddition rather than addition by “plus,” and where zombies are minimal physical duplicates of us whose thought and talk are altogether devoid of intentionality.
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- Kripke's Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language at 40 , pp. 181 - 200Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2024