Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- About the Author
- Foreword by Anthony Short
- Contents
- List of tables and charts
- Map of Malaya 1948
- Acknowledgments
- Prologue
- Chapter one The nature of the Malayan Emergency
- Chapter two The Malayan Security Service and the evolution of the Special Branch
- Chapter three The Special Branch takes over (1948–49)
- Chapter four The principles of intelligence collection
- Chapter five Agents of change (1949–52)
- Chapter six The rise of the Special Branch (1950–52): Sir William Jenkin
- Chapter seven The Special Branch and the Briggs Plan
- Chapter eight General Templer, Colonel Young and the Special Branch: the implementation of the Briggs Plan
- Chapter nine The Special Branch comes of age (1952–56)
- Chapter ten ‘The weather has been horrible’—the Special Branch and communist communications: a case study
- Chapter eleven The Special Branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier (1948–60): a case study
- Chapter twelve Conclusion: the end of the Emergency (1957–60)
- Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary
- Note on transliteration
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- About the Author
- Foreword by Anthony Short
- Contents
- List of tables and charts
- Map of Malaya 1948
- Acknowledgments
- Prologue
- Chapter one The nature of the Malayan Emergency
- Chapter two The Malayan Security Service and the evolution of the Special Branch
- Chapter three The Special Branch takes over (1948–49)
- Chapter four The principles of intelligence collection
- Chapter five Agents of change (1949–52)
- Chapter six The rise of the Special Branch (1950–52): Sir William Jenkin
- Chapter seven The Special Branch and the Briggs Plan
- Chapter eight General Templer, Colonel Young and the Special Branch: the implementation of the Briggs Plan
- Chapter nine The Special Branch comes of age (1952–56)
- Chapter ten ‘The weather has been horrible’—the Special Branch and communist communications: a case study
- Chapter eleven The Special Branch on the Malayan–Thai frontier (1948–60): a case study
- Chapter twelve Conclusion: the end of the Emergency (1957–60)
- Abbreviations, acronyms and glossary
- Note on transliteration
- Bibliography
- Index
- Plate section
Summary
The Malayan Emergency was a name given by the British colonial government to the uprising of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) which lasted from 1948 to 1960. The objective of the CPM was to establish a Communist People's Democratic Republic of Malaya. In all but name, it was a War remarkable for the fiercely-fought counterinsurgency operations fought in the Malayan jungle between the government security forces and the CPM's guerrilla army, the Malayan National Liberation Army. The jungle fighting was waged concurrently with the political struggle for the hearts and minds of the Malayan people. Coming so soon after the end of the Second World War, the Emergency had wide-reaching effects and shook the country to its very foundations. Throughout the campaign, the Malayan Police played a vital part and, indeed, paid heavily for it as the police suffered more casualties (killed and wounded) than any of the other security forces.
The intelligence branch of the Malayan Police, the Special Branch, was recognised by the government as its supreme intelligence organisation. It was tasked with providing the government with political and security intelligence and made responsible, too, for providing the army with operational intelligence on which counterinsurgency operations could be mounted.
This is the story of the critical part played by the Special Branch in waging the intelligence war against the Communist Party of Malaya, which led to its defeat in July 1960 and the withdrawal of the remnants of its greatly-shattered forces into southern Thailand.
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- Chapter
- Information
- Malaya's Secret Police 1945–60The Role of the Special Branch in the Malayan Emergency, pp. xix - xxPublisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2008