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References

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 July 2018

Randall G. Holcombe
Randall G. Holcombe
Affiliation:
Florida State University
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Political Capitalism
How Political Influence Is Made and Maintained
 , pp. 279 - 290
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2018

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