Conclusion

Summary

This book has examined the involvement of preman organizations in securing ports and coastlines across three provinces in Indonesia, including Jakarta, North Sulawesi and the Riau Islands. The involvement of preman organizations in port security shows a continuation of Indonesia's old security practices from the times of Suharto's authoritarian regime. The main finding is that the involvement of preman organizations in port security is problematic and hinders Indonesia's transition to be a fully functioning democracy. The use of preman organizations for security by government authorities plays an instrumental role in strengthening the position of power these organizations have in society. An analysis of interviews, media reports and government documents shows that this position of power has not always been used by preman organizations for the betterment of society. This is the case even in areas where there is a great degree of acceptance by officials and societal actors of the role of preman organizations in security. The evidence in all empirical chapters in this book confirms that preman organizations have been involved in various unlawful activities, ranging from providing protection to businesses that violate laws to conducting violent attacks against the government security apparatus. These unlawful activities are the key source of tensions between preman organizations and the government.

Findings

There are six key findings of this book. First, the decision to use preman organizations for port security in Indonesia cannot be traced to a single decision made by the country's political leader or senior defence officials in response to terrorist threats in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and 2002 Bali bombings. The evidence shows that participation of preman organizations in monitoring and, on some occasions, physically guarding ports and coastal areas in the three case study regions—Jakarta, North Sulawesi and the Riau Islands—is a product of continued action by government bureaucracies at the national and local levels, and the history of these actions date back to Suharto's New Order era (Indonesian Ministry of Defense 2008, p. 86; Jakarta Post, 29 June 2006; Kemenkopolhukam 2006b, pp. 40, 57; Dewan Maritim Indonesia 2007b, p. 59; 2007a, p. 52; Kemenkopolhukam 2006a, pp. 29, 34–35; Marin 2005, p. 35; Suristiyono 2005, p. 49; Dewan Maritim Indonesia 2007c, pp. 4-8–4-9).