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Part IV - Skeptical Voices

Null Results, Unintended Consequences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2020

Edited by
Judith G. Kelley  and
Beth A. Simmons
Judith G. Kelley
Affiliation:
Duke University, North Carolina
Beth A. Simmons
Affiliation:
University of Pennsylvania
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The Power of Global Performance Indicators , pp. 339 - 424
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2020

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References

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