Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Notes on the Spelling of Proper Names
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Enframing Indonesian Concepts of National Security
- Chapter 2 Internal Operations and the Weak Infrastructural Power of the State
- Chapter 3 Strategy and Defence: The Indonesian Approach
- Chapter 4 Formulating a Comprehensive Approach to Defence and National Security Planning
- Chapter 5 Democratic Consolidation and Reform of the TNI in the Post-Suharto Era
- Chapter 6 Conclusion: Redefining National Security
- Appendix
- Law No. 3 of Year 2002 on National Defence
- Law No. 2 of Year 2002 on the Police Force of the Republic of Indonesia
- Text of Order to Develop a Security Plan
- The Report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili, Memo
- Number: M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999
- The Anti-Subversion Law (1963)
- 1959 National Emergency Law
- Government Regulation in Lieu of Legislation of the Republic of Indonesia No 1/2002
- List of Civilian Militias based on Political and Ideological Affiliations
- The Bill of Republic of Indonesia No. 32 Year 2004 on the Indonesian National Military
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
The Report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili, Memo
from Appendix
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Maps
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Notes on the Spelling of Proper Names
- Glossary and Abbreviations
- Introduction
- Chapter 1 Enframing Indonesian Concepts of National Security
- Chapter 2 Internal Operations and the Weak Infrastructural Power of the State
- Chapter 3 Strategy and Defence: The Indonesian Approach
- Chapter 4 Formulating a Comprehensive Approach to Defence and National Security Planning
- Chapter 5 Democratic Consolidation and Reform of the TNI in the Post-Suharto Era
- Chapter 6 Conclusion: Redefining National Security
- Appendix
- Law No. 3 of Year 2002 on National Defence
- Law No. 2 of Year 2002 on the Police Force of the Republic of Indonesia
- Text of Order to Develop a Security Plan
- The Report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili, Memo
- Number: M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999
- The Anti-Subversion Law (1963)
- 1959 National Emergency Law
- Government Regulation in Lieu of Legislation of the Republic of Indonesia No 1/2002
- List of Civilian Militias based on Political and Ideological Affiliations
- The Bill of Republic of Indonesia No. 32 Year 2004 on the Indonesian National Military
- Bibliography
- Index
- About the Author
Summary
Memo
Number: M.53/Tim P4-OKTT/7/1999
To: Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security
From: Assistant Coordinating Minister I/Home Affairs
Subject: General Assessment if Option I loses
Atta 3, chments: None
Date: July1999
The report of the Politics and Security Team in Dili, hereby respectfully submitted,is as follows:
For the past more or less 23 years that East Timor has been integrated with Indonesia, East Timor has noticeably and quickly progressed especially in the physical/material aspects. The infrastructure truly developed in a surprisingly short time but this was not accompanied by the mental/spiritual development of the society.
The armed resistance of the Security Disturbing Movement continued throughout and there was a tendency for it to expand further. Its regeneration has taken place in a good way, so that there has been a growth of resistance groups that are better educated and more militant, that are able to carry out clandestine activities so that their terrorizing is fairly effective and can attract, create, and politicize public opinion, to establish an anti-integration society. Openly, the anti-integration society could create a tense life, to the point that there was a large exodus especially of those not native to East Timor.
The pro-integration group, spread fairly widely in all the districts, was meanwhile asleep and became the target of the anti-integration group. The TNI was cornered,even terrorized by the anti-integration group. The situation became chaotic, to the point that the government thought that there was no use in keeping East Timor, since it was constantly creating problems, and out of this emerged Option 2.
The birth of Option 2 startled and woke up the pro-integration group that felt as if it would be wiped up if East Timor was released from Indonesia. Since the awakening of the pro-integration group was able to reverse the situation to become dominant very quickly. Although the security situation is already under control, the outsiders have not, perhaps can not, yet come back, except later if Special Autonomy wins in the Consultation.
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- Realpolitik IdeologyIndonesia's Use of Military Force, pp. 423 - 427Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2006