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5 - Constitutional Structure

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2021

András Sajó
Affiliation:
Central European University, Budapest
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Summary

Illiberal democracy is a special constitutional arrangement: it is a plebiscitarian democracy unfolding the totalitarian potential within a democratic system. As a centralized power, it intends to perpetuate the rulers’ monopoly over the state, relying on the falsification of classical (liberal) constitutionalism. These features offer sufficient family resemblance to treat them together for the purposes of constitutional theory. Illiberal democracy takes an instrumental attitude to constitutional institutions. Amendments to the constitution take place according to the momentary interests of the political power, like in any democracy without extremely cumbersome amendment rules. The ultimate attachment to the spirit of the constitution, the idea of respecting an unamendable core, is missing. There is no commitment to underlying principles; appearances matter, not authenticity. Hence the inevitable duplicity and deceit in the constitutional and legal system of illiberal democracy. The constitution is not an entrenched, higher order law but a practical tool to solve emerging conflicts in an illiberal and nondemocratic way (imposing arbitrary will as supreme command).

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Chapter
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Ruling by Cheating
Governance in Illiberal Democracy
, pp. 153 - 197
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2021

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  • Constitutional Structure
  • András Sajó, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: Ruling by Cheating
  • Online publication: 07 August 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996.006
Available formats
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  • Constitutional Structure
  • András Sajó, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: Ruling by Cheating
  • Online publication: 07 August 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996.006
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Constitutional Structure
  • András Sajó, Central European University, Budapest
  • Book: Ruling by Cheating
  • Online publication: 07 August 2021
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108952996.006
Available formats
×