Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Message from the Director
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Trade, Terrorists, Shipping, and Cargo Containers
- Chapter 2 Al-Qaeda's “Navy”
- Chapter 3 A Maritime Terror Strike — Where and How?
- Chapter 4 Mega-Terror — Radiological and Nuclear
- Chapter 5 Catastrophic Terrorism and its Potential Impact on Global Trade
- Chapter 6 Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Security
- Chapter 7 How Secure?
- Chapter 8 Proliferation Security Initiative
- Chapter 9 Sea Change and Recommendations
- Notes
- References
- About the Author
Chapter 9 - Sea Change and Recommendations
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 21 October 2015
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Foreword
- Message from the Director
- Preface
- Chapter 1 Trade, Terrorists, Shipping, and Cargo Containers
- Chapter 2 Al-Qaeda's “Navy”
- Chapter 3 A Maritime Terror Strike — Where and How?
- Chapter 4 Mega-Terror — Radiological and Nuclear
- Chapter 5 Catastrophic Terrorism and its Potential Impact on Global Trade
- Chapter 6 Costs and Benefits of Enhanced Security
- Chapter 7 How Secure?
- Chapter 8 Proliferation Security Initiative
- Chapter 9 Sea Change and Recommendations
- Notes
- References
- About the Author
Summary
Under international law, every ship must sail under the flag of a sovereign state to gain the protection of a government while on the high seas. A key lesson from the So San affair and other terrorism or WMD-related trafficking in international waters is that those trying to shut the trade down by pursuing suspect ships wherever they are need to get cooperation from the government whose flag the ships are flying. At present, only if the flag state expressly consents, can foreign warships legally halt and inspect a ship flying its flag on the high seas — except in a few specific cases, among them “universal crimes” such as piracy, slavery and unauthorized broadcasting. Because nearly half the world's fleet by tonnage is now on foreign registers, this means that, in many cases, permission to halt and inspect in international waters must be sought from a “flag-of-convenience” state.
As noted at the end of Chapter 8, the US and Britain have asked countries that operate or sanction foreign flag registers to cooperate in allowing boarding and search to take place when it is reasonably suspected that the ship involved is carrying WMD-related cargo to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern.
IMO and Reform
The International Maritime Organization's motto is: “safer shipping, cleaner seas”. But the IMO shies away from using the term “flag of convenience”, talking instead of sub-standard shipping. It has for some time been developing a voluntary model flag state audit that could be used to improve the regulation of global shipping and the fight against terrorism.
Progress was frustratingly slow until late 2002. It now appears that a voluntary scheme could be in place by mid-2005, followed by a mandatory one later. The new IMO Secretary-General Efthimios Mitropoulos has said he is determined to ensure that the audit scheme is a success and has placed it under his direct supervision.
The IMO has been slow in the past to improve its regulation of sub-standard shipping in part because leading operators of open registers — including Panama, Liberia, the Bahamas, Malta and Cyprus — are among the largest contributors to the IMO's regular budget. These countries are among the 29 that the ITF has listed as flag of convenience providers.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- A Time Bomb for Global TradeMaritime-Related Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction, pp. 108 - 121Publisher: ISEAS–Yusof Ishak InstitutePrint publication year: 2004