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Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Augustine’s Picture of Language and the Referential Conception of Linguistic Meaning
- 3 Names and Their Meaning, Sentences and Descriptions
- 4 Meaning and Use, Understanding and Interpreting
- 5 Ostensive Definition and Family Resemblance: Undermining the Foundations and Destroying the Essences
- 6 Metaphysics, Necessity and Grammar
- 7 Thought and Language
- 8 The Private Language Arguments
- 9 Private Ownership of Experience
- 10 Epistemic Privacy of Experience
- 11 Private Ostensive Definition
- 12 My Mind and Other Minds
- 13 The Inner and the Outer – Behaviour and Behaviourism
- 14 ‘Only of a Human Being and What Behaves like a Human Being …’: The Mereological Fallacy and Cognitive Neuroscience
- 15 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - I
- 16 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - II
- 17 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - III
- Abbreviations
- Further Reading
- Index
17 - Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - III
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 December 2024
- Frontmatter
- Dedication
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Introduction
- 2 Augustine’s Picture of Language and the Referential Conception of Linguistic Meaning
- 3 Names and Their Meaning, Sentences and Descriptions
- 4 Meaning and Use, Understanding and Interpreting
- 5 Ostensive Definition and Family Resemblance: Undermining the Foundations and Destroying the Essences
- 6 Metaphysics, Necessity and Grammar
- 7 Thought and Language
- 8 The Private Language Arguments
- 9 Private Ownership of Experience
- 10 Epistemic Privacy of Experience
- 11 Private Ostensive Definition
- 12 My Mind and Other Minds
- 13 The Inner and the Outer – Behaviour and Behaviourism
- 14 ‘Only of a Human Being and What Behaves like a Human Being …’: The Mereological Fallacy and Cognitive Neuroscience
- 15 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - I
- 16 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - II
- 17 Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy - III
- Abbreviations
- Further Reading
- Index
Summary
The Goals of Philosophy: Conceptual Geography and Intellectual Therapy
In the last two lectures, we saw that according to Wittgenstein, philosophy has both positive and negative aims.
● Positively, philosophy aims to give an overview – a surveyable representation of a conceptual field. Wittgenstein compares this task of philosophy to conceptual cartography.
● Negatively, philosophy aims to disentangle conceptual confusions, to destroy metaphysical illusions, to undermine mythologies of symbolism and of psychology (both within philosophy and within the sciences).
So, let's start with the positive objective. To give a synopsis of the use of an expression, describing its salient logico-grammatical features and rendering a surveyable account of its conceptual affinities and disaffinities, is a positive achievement. One who has an overview knows his way around in the grammar of the problematic expression and is in a position to clear up associated philosophical confusions. The point of striving for an overview is to clear up philosophical difficulties – to make the troubles disappear. Where there are no conceptual difficulties, as in, say, culinary discourse, there is no point in striving for an overview of concepts. For where there are no such troubles, there is nothing to make disappear. The field of philosophy is limited by the range of our philosophical troubles.
Int. Yes, I think I understood that in our last meeting. But now I am a bit confused. I thought that it was Gilbert Ryle who talked about logical geography in his famous book The Concept of Mind.
PMSH. You’re quite right. Ryle did use this phrase in Concept of Mind. That book was published in 1949. But Wittgenstein invoked the metaphor of logical, or conceptual, geography much earlier. The philosopher, he wrote, wanted to master the geography of concepts: to see every locality in its proximate and its distant surroundings. In the early 1930s, he said to his pupils
One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view. We encounter the kind of difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we had no map, or else a map of isolated bits. The country we are talking about is language and the geography its grammar.
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- A Beginner's Guide to the Later Philosophy of WittgensteinSeventeen Lectures and Dialogues on the Philosophical Investigations, pp. 291 - 308Publisher: Anthem PressPrint publication year: 2024