Changing the Rules enters into the debate between theoretical analyses of constitutional amendments (considered the most important part of a constitution) and empirical research (which argues that amendment provisions have little or no significance). George Tsebelis demonstrates how strict provisions are a necessary condition for amendments to have low frequency and significance and provides empirical evidence from case studies and over 100 democracies to corroborate this claim. Examining various cultural theories that dispute these findings, Tsebelis explains why their conclusions have weak foundations. He argues that constitutional rigidity is also a necessary condition for judicial independence and provides theoretical argument and empirical evidence. Tsebelis also establishes a negative correlation between the length of a constitution and problematic indicators such as time inconsistency, low GDP/capita, high corruption, inequality, and lack of innovation. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

‘Constitutional amendment processes matter — for the legitimacy and stability of constitutional systems. But they also vary widely in design and difficulty. Changing the Rules offers a magisterial account of this variation — and of how amendment rules, and ‘veto players,’ influence the rigidity of written constitutions across the globe. Drawing together quantitative and qualitative insights, it makes a compelling case for the importance of institutions and institutional design, but also for how constitutional rigidity can promote values such as judicial independence. This book should be considered compulsory reading for all lawyers and political scientists interested in the importance and dynamics of constitutional change.’

Rosalind Dixon - University of New South Wales, Sydney

‘Challenging a growing institution-skepticism among constitution scholars, Tsebelis makes a powerful case that institutions matter, rules matter, and procedures matter to political outcomes. This book is a very important contribution to the debate on the relevance of constitutional design, and should be on the reading list of everyone thinking about whether constitutions work, and how they work. Highly recommended.’

Tarunabh Khaitan - London School of Economics and Political Science

‘Building on veto player theory, in Changing the Rules: Constitutional Amendments in Democracies, George Tsebelis develops a parsimonious approach to understanding the occurrence of constitutional amendments. Empirically, the book shows the range of constitutional amendment procedures in modern democracies and applies the new approach in case studies of both successful and failed amendment processes in countries as different as Chile, Italy, and Mexico. Other chapters build on worldwide comparative data on rules and amendments and relate the new approach to some of the prominent issues in the study of constitutions, such as the rigidity and length of constitutional documents. Changing the Rules: Constitutional Amendments in Democracies is a path-breaking contribution to the study of the politics of constitutional change and provides a framework for empirical studies that take into account the preferences of the actors in the constitutional game.’

Wolfgang C. Müller - University of Vienna

‘George Tsebelis deploys his influential theory of institutional veto players to explain constitutional amendments in democratic countries. Tsebelis goes against recent scholarship in constitutional law that emphasizes inertia, culture, or idiosyncratic factors to explain why and when constitutions are reformed. This book will without doubt spark interesting debates on a fundamental topic for democratic governance. Changing the Rules should find an audience not only with social scientists and legal scholars, but also with policy- and constitution-makers.’

Julio Ríos-Figueroa - ITAM (Mexico City)