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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Contractarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 January 2020

Michael Moehler

Summary

This Element provides a systematic defense of moral contractarianism as a distinct approach to the social contract. It elucidates, in comparison to moral conventionalism and moral contractualism, the distinct features of moral contractarianism, its scope, and conceptual and practical challenges that concern the relationship between morality and self-interest, the problems of assurance and compliance, rule-following, counterfactualism, and the nexus between morals and politics. It argues that, if appropriately conceived, moral contractarianism is conceptually coherent, empirically sound, and practically relevant, and has much to offer to contemporary moral philosophy.
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Keywords

assurancecompliancemultilevel social contract theorymultistage social contract theoryself-interest
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108634090
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 13 February 2020

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