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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Moore's Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2020

William H. Shaw

Summary

This Element critically surveys the full range of G. E. Moore's ethical thought, including: (1) his rejection of naturalism in favor of the view that 'good' designates a simple, indefinable property, which cannot be identified with or reduced to any other property; (2) his understanding of intrinsic value, his doctrine of organic wholes, his repudiation of hedonism, and his substantive account of the most important goods and evils; and (3) his critique of egoism and subjectivism and his elaboration of a non-hedonistic variant of utilitarianism that, among other things, creatively blends aspects of act- and rule-oriented versions of that theory.
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Keywords

Moorenonnaturalismintrinsic valueorganic wholesutilitarianism
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108581295
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 24 September 2020

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References

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