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Series:   Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy

Commitment and Resoluteness in Rational Choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2022

Chrisoula Andreou
Chrisoula Andreou
Affiliation:
University of Utah

Summary

Drawing and building on the existing literature, this Element explores the interesting and challenging philosophical terrain where issues regarding cooperation, commitment, and control intersect. Section 1 discusses interpersonal and intrapersonal Prisoner's Dilemma situations, and the possibility of a set of unrestrained choices adding up in a way that is problematic relative to the concerns of the choosers involved. Section 2 focuses on the role of precommitment devices in rational choice. Section 3 considers the role of resoluteness in rational choice and action. And Section 4 delves into some related complications concerning the nature of actions and the nature of intentions.
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Keywords

commitmentcooperationrational choiceresolutenessself-control
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in Decision Theory and Philosophy
Online ISBN: 9781009211536
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 03 March 2022

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