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Series:   Elements in Ethics

Contemporary Virtue Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 October 2020

Nancy E. Snow
Nancy E. Snow
Affiliation:
University of Oklahoma

Summary

This Element provides an overview of the central components of recent work in virtue ethics. The first section explores central themes in neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, while the second turns the discussion to major alternative theoretical perspectives. The third section focuses on two challenges to virtue ethics. The first challenge is the self-centeredness or egoism objection, which is the notion that certain kinds of virtue ethics are inadequate because they advocate a focus on the person's own virtue and flourishing at the expense of, or at least without due regard for, the concerns of others. The second is situationist challenges to the ideas that there are indeed virtues and that personality is integrated enough to support virtues.
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Keywords

virtue ethicsneo-Aristotelianismsituationismself-centeredness objection
Type
Element
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Series: Elements in Ethics
Online ISBN: 9781108580496
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 22 October 2020

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Contemporary Virtue Ethics
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Contemporary Virtue Ethics
  • Nancy E. Snow, University of Oklahoma
  • Online ISBN: 9781108580496
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