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Series:   Elements in Metaphysics

Metaphysical Realism and Anti-Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2022

J. T. M. Miller
J. T. M. Miller
Affiliation:
Durham University

Summary

Minimally, metaphysical realists hold that there exist some mind-independent entities. Metaphysical realists also (tend to) hold that we can speak meaningfully or truthfully about mind-independent entities. Those who reject metaphysical realism deny one or more of these commitments. This Element aims to introduce the reader to the core commitments of metaphysical realism and to illustrate how these commitments have changed over time by surveying some of the main families of views that realism has been contrasted with: such as (radical) scepticism, idealism, and anti-realism.
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Keywords

metaphysical realismmetaphysical anti-realismexistencemind-independenceaccessibility
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Series: Elements in Metaphysics
Online ISBN: 9781009006927
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 07 July 2022

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Metaphysical Realism and Anti-Realism
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