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Series:   Elements in American Politics

Roll Call Rebels

Strategic Dissent in the United States and United Kingdom

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 December 2018

Justin H. Kirkland  and
Jonathan B. Slapin
Justin H. Kirkland
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
Jonathan B. Slapin
Affiliation:
University of Essex

Summary

Scholars of legislative politics often note the many differences between the British House of Commons and the United States House of Representatives. These include differences in party strength, members' partisan loyalty on votes, and general institutional structure. Because of these differences, scholars have rarely compared these chambers directly. This Element aims to do precisely that. The authors point out the many similar motivations of members in both chambers, and leverage these similar motivations to theorize that member ideology, as well as how party agenda interact to produce party disloyalty. Using data on legislative voting following changes in agenda control, the authors demonstrate that ideological extremists in both the US and UK use party disloyalty to connect with ideologically extreme constituents. The similarities in patterns across these chambers suggest that legislative scholars have much to gain by considering the commonalities across American and British politics, and in general, by thinking more frequently about US legislative politics in a comparative context.
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Keywords

legislative politicsHouse of RepresentativesHouse of Commonsparty loyaltyideology
Type
Element
Information
Series: Elements in American Politics
Online ISBN: 9781108568883
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication: 20 December 2018

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