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The Concept of Aggression in International Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 April 2017

Quincy Wright
Quincy Wright*
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Extract

The press reports characterized the resolution of the Chaco Commission of the League of Nations Assembly as amounting “to condemning Paraguay henceforth as the aggressor in the Chaco War.” This resolution of January 16, 1935, recommended a raising of the arms embargo in behalf of Bolivia, because Bolivia had accepted and Paraguay had rejected the Assembly’s report made on November 24, 1934, under Article 15, paragraphs 4 and 9 of the Covenant.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 29 , Issue 3 , July 1935 , pp. 373 - 395
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1935

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References

1 New York Times, Jan. 17, 1935, p. 1.

2 League of Nations Monthly Summary, January, 1935, Vol. 15, p. 9. For earlier developments in the Chaco dispute see, League of Nations, Report of the Chaco Commission, May 11, 1934, Political, 1934, VII, 1; Information Section, Assembly Report on the Dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, Nov. 24, 1934; Cooper, Russell, and Mattison, Mary, “The Chaco Dispute,” Geneva Special Studies, 1934, Vol. 5, No. 2; Mattison, Mary, “The Chaco Arms Embargo,” ibid., 1934, Vol. 5, No. 5; Woolsey, L. H., “The Chaco Dispute,” this journal vol.26 (1932), p. 796, Vol. 28 (1934), p. 724; Wilson, G. G., ibid.', Vol. 27 (1933), p. 724. For political and economic background of the war, see Lindsay, J. W., “The War over the Chaco,” International Affairs, March-April, 1935, Vol. 14, p. 231 ff.

3 The word does not appear in the indexes to Moore, Digest of International Law, 1906; Herahey, Essentials of International Public Law, 1912; Westlake, International Law, 2nd ed., 1913; Oppenheim, International Law, 3rd ed., 1920; Hyde, International Law, 1922; Lawrence, Principles of International Law, 7th ed., 1923; Hall, International Law, 8th ed., 1924; Fenwick, International Law, 1924; Wilson, International Law, 1927. It does, however, appear in Oppenheim, 4th ed., 1926; Hershey, 2nd ed., 1927; Stowell, International Law, 1931; Fenwick, 2nd ed., 1934.

4 Baker, P.J.N., The Geneva Protocol, London, 1925; Buell, R. L., International Relations, 2nd ed., N. Y., 1929, Chap. 26; Clark, Evans, Boycotts and Peace, N. Y., 1932; Eagleton, Clyde, International Government, N. Y., 1932, pp. 125, 440-448; Evans, T. P. Conwell, The League Council in Action, Oxford, 1929, pp. 59, 253-259; Guggenheim, Paul, Les Mesures provisoires de procédure internationale, Paris, 1931, Chap. 9, p. 194; Hudson, Manley O., Progress in International Organization, Stanford, 1932, Chap. 8; Kunz, Josef, L'Article XI du Fade de la Société des Nations, Académie de droit international, 1933, Chap. 5; Miller, Hunter, The Geneva Protocol, N. Y., 1925, Chap. 10; The Peace Pact of Paris, N. Y., 1928, p. 127; Mower, E. C, International Government, N. Y., 1931, pp. 116-123, Chap. 30; Rappard, W. E., Uniting Europe, New Haven, 1930, pp. 159-165,284-288; Ray, J., Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations, Paris, 1930, part 3; Schuman, Frederick L., International Politics, N. Y., 1933, pp. 683-685; Shotwell, James T., War as an Instrument of National Policy, N. Y., 1929, Chap. 19; Webster, C. K. and Herbert, S., The League of Nations in Theory and Practice, London, 1933, p. 155; Williams, Sir John Fischer, Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations, Oxford, 1934, pp. 119-123, 229-242, 292-317.

5 Beneš, Eduard, The Diplomatic Struggle for European Security and Stabilization of Peace, Prague, 1925; Kellogg, Frank B., “The War Prevention Policy of the United States,” Foreign Affairs, Spl. Supp., April, 1928, pp. viii-ix; Politis, Nicolas S., “The Problem of Disarmament,” International Conciliation, March, 1934, No. 298; Stimson, Henry L., “The Pact of Paris, Three Years of Development,” Foreign Affairs, Spl. Supp., October, 1932, pp. viii-ix.

6 Brierly, J. L., “Sanctions,” Proceedings of the Grotius Society, 1931, pp. 12-13; Eagleton, Clyde, “The Attempt to Define Aggression,” International Conciliation, November, 1930, No. 264; “The Attempt to Define War,” ibid., June, 1933, No. 291; Finch, George A., “A Pact of Non-Aggression,” this journal, Vol. 27 (1933), pp. 725-732; Harris Foundation, An American Foreign Policy toward International Stability, 1934, pp. 28-33; Hill, Chesney, “Recent Policies of Non-Recognition,” International Conciliation, October, 1933, No, 293, pp. 372-380; Hill, Norman L., “Post War Treaties of Security and Mutual Guarantee,” International Conciliation, November, 1928, No. 244; Jessup, Philip, “American Neutrality and International Police,” World Peace Foundation, 1928, Vol. 11, pp. 81- 95; Potter, Pitman B., “Sanctions and Security, an Analysis of the French and American Views,” Geneva Special Studies, February, 1932, Vol. 3, No. 2; Whitton, John B., “What Follows the Pact of Paris?” ﹛International Conciliation, January, 1932, No. 276, pp. 35-39; Wright, Q., “Neutrality following the Pact of Paris,” Proceedings American Society of International Law, 1930, pp. 79, 86; “Collective Rights and Duties for the Enforcement of Treaty Obligations,” ibid., 1932, p. 110; “The Future of Neutrality,” International Conciliation, September, 1928, No. 242, p. 360 ff; “Changes in the Concept of War,” this journal, Vol. 18 (1924), p. 767; “The Outlawry of War,” ibid., Vol. 19 (1925), pp. 89-103; “When Does War Exist?” ibid., Vol. 26 (1932), pp. 367-368; “The Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” ibid., Vol. 27 (1933), pp. 51-56; “The United States and Neutrality,” Public Policy Pamphlet No. 17, University of Chicago Press, May, 1935.

7 These include the League of Nations Covenant, 1920 (Arts. 10,12,13, 15); the proposed Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1923 (Arts. 1-3); the Geneva Protocol, 1924 (Arts. 2, 7-10); the Locarno Treaty, 1925 (Arts. 2, 4); The Declarations on Aggressive War of the 8th Assembly of the League, 1927, and of the Sixth Conference of American States, 1928; the Pact of Paris, 1928; the report adopted by the League Council and Assembly on Article XI of the Covenant, 1928; the Model Convention on Mutual Assistance, 1928 (Art. 1); the Convention on Financial Assistance, 1930 (Arts. 1, 2); the General Convention to Improve the Means for Preventing War, 1931 (Arts. 1-6); the Declaration of the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference defining “Aggressor,” 1933; the Litvinoff Convention defining aggression, 1933. The preparatory materials and subsequent interpretations of these documents are also important, especially the reports of the Permanent Advisory Commission, the Temporary Mixed Commission and the Committee of Jurists on the proposed treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1923; the “American Draft” and Commentary (Shotwell), and the Politis and Bene! Commentaries on the Geneva Protocol, 1924; the Brouckere Memorandum on Article 16 (1927), the Politis Memorandum on Security and the Rutgers Memorandum on Articles 10, 11, and 16 of the Covenant submitted to the Committee on Arbitration and Security, 1928; and the statements by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Ambassador Norman Davis, and Foreign Minister Litvinoff concerning aggression, 1933. The pertinent provisions of these documents before 1930 are conveniently collected in Eagleton, “The Attempt to Define Aggression,” International Conciliation, November, 1930, No. 264. See Myers, “World Disarmament,” World Peace Foundation, 1932; United States Department of State Press Releases, May 20, 27, 1933, and Korovine, E. A., “The U. S. S. R. and Disarmament,” International Conciliation, September, 1933, No. 292, for more recent documents. For official publication of the League texts see Reports and Resolutions on the subject of Article 16 of the Covenant, Legal. 1927. V. 14; Arbitration and Security, Systematic Survey of Conventions, 2nd ed., Legal. 1927. V. 29; Documents of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, Series III, Disarmament. 1927. IX. 2; Series VI, Disarmament. 1928. IX. 6.

8 Wright, Q., “Changes in the Concept of War,” this journal, Vol. 18 (1924), p. 755 ff; “The Outlawry of War,” ibid., Vol. 19 (1925), pp. 83-96.

9 Supra, note 7.

10 Sir John Fischer Williams has interpreted the phrase “resort to war” in the Covenant as equivalent to “recourse to armed force” (pp. cit., p. 313), but this is not universally accepted. See observations of committee of jurists on Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, 1923, Records of 4th Assembly, 3rd Committee, pp. 189-191, Eagleton, International Conciliation, No. 264, p. 628; Brouckère Memorandum on Article 16, Documents of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, Series III, Disarmament. 1927. IX. 2, pp. 93-105. The prohibition of non-pacific means in Art. 2 of the Pact of Paris prohibits the use of armed force short of war. See Budapest Articles of Interpretation, International Law Association, 1934; Wright, “The Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” this journal, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 53.

11 See declarations on aggressive war of League of Nations Assembly, 1927, and of the Sixth Conference of American States, 1928, Eagleton, Int. Con. No. 264, pp. 651-652.

12 Secretary General of League of Nations, Memorandum on Article 16,1927, Reports and Resolutions on Article 16, Legal. 1927. V. 14, p. 88; Wright, “The Future of Neutrality,” International Conciliation, No. 242, p. 371; “The Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” this journal, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 51.

13 See Hudson, M. O., “The Verdict of the League, China and Japan,” World Peace Foundation, 1933, pp. 73, 78, 81.

14 League of Nations Monthly Summary, January, 1935, Vol. 15, p. 9.

15 Thus the belligerents of the World War have published extensively their archives from 1870 to 1914 to relieve themselves of the stigma of “war guilt” apparently on the assumption that the diplomatic events of this period were pertinent in this connection but those during and since the war were not.

16 De Jure Belli ac Paris, lib. II, c. 1, sec. 2, par. 2.

17 The historians dealing with responsibility for the World War have often attempted to apply such a test but with the added difiiculty that they have applied it to determine the degrees of conformity to unstated moral obligations rather than to definite legal obligations not to go to war. See Wright, Current History, 1924, Vol. 20, pp. 456-457, reprinted in Barnes, H. E., In Quest of Truth and Justice, Chicago, 1928, pp. 192-194. The article on “War Guilt” in the Encyclopedia Britannica (14th ed) gives space to protagonists on each side and illustrates the improbability of an objective judgment by any one using the historical method for this purpose.

18 The Century Dictionary defines aggression: “The act of proceeding to hostilities or invasion,” and the Standard: “An unprovoked attack or encroachment.” Bouvier's Law Dictionary defines “Aggressor“: “He who begins a quarrel or dispute either by threatening or striking another.” The word is derived from the Latin aggressio from ad gradi, to go to, approach, attack.

19 League of Nations, Appeal of the Chinese Government, Report of the Commission of Enquiry, Political, 1932, VII, 12, pp. 67-71. See also League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents on the Frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, Report, Nov. 28, 1925, p. 3.—“It is impossible to determine which of the two soldiers fired the first shot.“

20 See reports of League of Nations, Permanent Advisory Commission and Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, 1923, Records of the 4th Assembly, 3rd Committee, pp. 115-118, 159-191, Eagleton, Int. Con. No. 264, pp. 621-627.

21 Wright, “Collective Eights and Duties for the Enforcement of Treaty Obligations,” Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1932, pp. 110-111, 115-116. 21 a A recent commentator endorses Secretary of State Bryan's understanding in 1915 that “the responsibility for continuing the war is just as grave as the responsibility for beginning it,” but realizes the difficulty of determining which side wanted to continue without a reasonable proposal from outside. Walter Millis, Road to War, 1935, p. 78.

22 Infra, note 45. See also League of Nations Commission of Enquiry into the Incidents on the Frontier between Bulgaria and Greece, Report, Nov. 28, 1925, p. 7.—“There can be no question of premeditation on either side. The operation orders of the various units show that neither of the armies was prepared for operations amounting to war.“

23 This conforms to the seventh recommendation on American Foreign Policy in the pamphlet issued under the auspices of the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation in November, 1934, which suggested that “The United States urge that agreements be negotiated among the parties to the Pact of Paris that whenever a consultation is begun because of violation or threatened violation of the Pact, it shall be assumed that both parties to the controversy are bound by the Pact to refrain from hostilities and to comply with all resolutions unanimously adopted by the consulting states relating to the stoppage of mobilization, the withdrawal of troops, or an armistice, the votes of the states in controversy not to be counted, and a state shall be entitled to treatment as the innocent victim of aggression only if it scrupulously complies with all such resolutions.” (An American Foreign Policy toward International Stability, University of Chicago Press, Public Policy Pamphlet No. 14, p. 30.)

24 Records of the 5th Assembly, 1924, Plenary Meeting, Sept. 4, 1924; 3rd Committee, p. 169. This test appears in Art. 5 of the Locarno Treaty of Oct. 16,1925, but is at least as old as Thucydides, who wrote “to proceed against one who offers arbitration as against a wrongdoer, law forbids” (Everyman's ed., c. 3, p. 56), quoted by Grotius, II, c. 23, 8. See also Erasmus, Institutio Princpis Christiani, c. 11, p. 60; Wolff, Jus Gentium, sec. 572; Vattel, II, sec. 333; Eagleton, “The attempt to define aggression,” p. 591.

25 League of Nations Monthly Summary, Oct. 1927, Vol. 7, p. 308; Jan. 1928, Vol. 7, pp. 356, 376-378; Conwell-Evans, The League Council in Action, Oxford, 1929, pp. 282-285.

26 Documents of the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference, Series VI, L. of N., Disarmament. 1928. IX. 6, p. 142 ff, par. 117 (e), Eagleton, Int. Con. No. 264, p. 648.

27 Ibid., p. 132 ff, par. 79; Eagleton, Int. Con. No. 264, p. 647.

28 For texts of these conventions see L. of N. Official journal, Vol. 11, p. 1649; Vol. 12, Spl. Supp. No. 92, p. 24, and Myers, “World Disarmament,” World Peace Foundation, pp. 337-355.

29 Wright, Q., “The Neutralization of Corfu,” this journal, Vol. 18 (1924), p. 107.

30 Sir John Fischer Williams (Chapters on Current International Law and the League of Nations, London, 1929, pp. 468-469), believes that Art. 10 protects the state in actual possession or seisin against forcible disseisin even by a state which eventually may prove to have better title. Art. 10 was not applicable in the Mosul Case because Turkey was not a member of the League, but in that case Great Britain took the position that Turkey was bound to respect the actual British line of occupation, whereas Turkey assumed that no objection could be made to any action she might take beyond that line in territory which was hers before the war and which she had never renounced. The Laidoner Commission sent to investigate hostilities in the vicinity of the “Brussels Line” found its activities hampered by this Turkish attitude, but the Wirsen Commission sent to report on the general question gave some support to the Turkish contention (L. of N., Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Iraq, 1925, pp. 84-85). The League Council, however, held that Turkey had by the Treaty of Lausanne renounced title to territory beyond the line to be fixed by the Council. See Conwell-Evans, op. dt., pp. 108-109; Wright, “The Mosul Dispute,” this journal, Vol. 20 (1926), p. 455.

31 Williams, Sir J. F., Some Aspects of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 1934, pp. 102-125; Scott, J. B., “Interpretation of Article X of the Covenant,” this journal, Vol. 18 (1924), pp. 108-113.

32 Supra, note 26.

33 Department of State Press Releases, June 25, 1932, pp. 593-4.

34 Ibid., May 27, 1933. See Harris Foundation, An American Foreign Policy toward International Stability, Chicago, 1934, pp. 13-22.

35 See Wright, “Changes in the Concept of War,” this journal, Vol. 18 (1924), pp. 758-9; Current History, June, 1924, Vol. 20, p. 457 ff.

36 Korovine, E. A., “The U. S. S. R. and Disarmament,” International Conciliation, 1933, No. 292, pp. 349-354; U. S. Treaty Information Bulletin No. 47, August, 1933, p. 39 ff.

37 The Kumboldt Commission on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier incident (supra, note 19), wrote, “In order to obtain a correct view of the decision (of the Greek Government to send its army across the Bulgarian frontier on October 20,1925) it is necessary to get back to the atmosphere which prevailed at the time, determine as accurately as possible the circumstances in which the news from Demir-Kapu was received in Athens and the effect which this news produced on the minds of the members of the Greek Government” (p. 5). The Lytton Commission on the Manchurian incident (supra, note 19) in finding that the operation of the Japanese troops during the night of September 18-19,1931 “cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defense” did not “exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defense.” (p. 71.)

38 Quoted by Secretary Kellogg in address, New York Council on Foreign Relations, March 15, 1928, reprinted in The General Pact for the Prevention of War, text of the Pact as signed, notes and other papers, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1928, p. 64. In his note of June 23, 1928, Secretary Kellogg had written “It is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed definition.” Treaty for the Renunciation of War, Text of the Treaty, Notes Exchanged, Instruments of Ratification and of Adherence and other papers, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1933, p. 57.

39 Wright, “The Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” this journal, Vol. 27 (1933), p. 44; Moore, Digest of International Law, Vol. 2, Sec. 215, Vol. 7, Sees. 1092, 1093; Sir John Simon, British Foreign Minister, Feb. 18, 1932, British Parliamentary Debates, Commons, Vol. 261, p. 1830, quoted this journal, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 586. This is an application of the general principle that “the responsibility of a state is determined by international law or treaty anything in its national law (including executive declarations) to the contrary notwithstanding.” (Harvard Research, Draft Code on Responsibility of States, Art. 2, this journal, Spl. Supp., April, 1929, p. 142; see also Conference for the Codification of International Law, League of Nations, 1929, Vol. 3, pp. 19, 30, 55.)

40 See cases cited in Harvard Research, op. cit., pp. 196-197; Wright, “Responsibility for Losses in Shanghai,” this journal, Vol. 26 (1932), p. 589.

41 M. Politis, speaking in connection with the Corfu incident, expressed the opinion of the Council of the League when he said: “I am aware that in an official communique’ published, I believe yesterday at Rome, the acts of violence which have just been committed against Greece are described as pacific acts of a temporary character. It does not seem to me that it lies with the author of an act to describe it. Acts must be judged objectively, and it is for the Council to judge the acts regarding which Greece has the right to complain.” League of Nations Official journal, Vol. 4, p. 1277. See also Wright, “Opinion of Commission of Jurists on Janina-Corfu Affair,” this journal, Vol. 18 (1924), pp. 541-2, and infra, notes 43, 44, 45.

42 Wright, “Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” toe. cit., pp. 42-47.

43 In the Corfu affair the Committee of Jurists gave a very circumspect answer to the question whether “measures of coercion which are not meant to constitute acts of war are consistent with the terms of Articles 12 to 15 of the Covenant when they are taken by one Member of the League of Nations against another Member of the League without prior recourse to the procedure laid down in these articles.” Without referring to either “defense” or “reprisals”, the commission said such measures “may or may not be consistent with the provisions of Articles 12 to 15 of the Covenant, and it is for the Council, when the dispute has been submitted to it, to decide immediately, having due regard to all the circumstances of the case and to the nature of the measures adopted, whether it should recommend the maintenance or the withdrawal of such measures.” (This journal, Vol. ‘18 (1924), pp. 537, 541.)

44 The Bumboldt Commission on the Bulgarian-Greek frontier dispute made a detailed examination of the incidents, state of opinion, military orders and political intentions leading up to and immediately following the Greek invasion of Bulgarian territory on Oct. 20, 1925, with the conclusion that the “Greek command really feared an invasion in force of its territory” and “had in view merely an operation with limited objectives;” that the Greek Government was “quite naturally alarmed” at the news, and the exaggerated reports of the Demir-Kapu incident in which a Greek officer under flag of truce was killed; that it was impossible to establish who shot first in this incident or the circumstances in which the parliamentaire was killed; that “the Bulgarian Government acted in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations and that the fact that Bulgarian soldiers at Demir- Kapu may have at one moment penetrated a few yards into Greek territory cannot be held to be a violation of the territorial integrity of Greece;” and that, in spite of the extenuating circumstances, “by occupying a part of Bulgarian territory with its military forces, Greece violated the Covenant of the League of Nations.” Consequently the Greek claim for reparation was denied and the Bulgarian claim allowed. (Document cited supra, note 19, pp. 7-8.)

45 The Lytton Commission on the Manchurian incident stated the Japanese and Chinese view of the incident of the night of Sept. 18-19,1931, and the sources of its own information, and concluded that “tense feeling” existed between the Japanese and Chinese military forces, that the Japanese on that night put a “carefully prepared plan” into operation with “swiftness and precision” while the Chinese “had no plan” and “were surprised” by the Japanese attack, that an explosion occurred “on or near the railroad between 10 and 10:30 p.m. on September 18th, but the damage, if any, to the railroad did not in fact prevent the punctual arrival of the south-bound train from Changchun, and was not in itself sufficient to justify military action. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.” (Document cited supra, note 19, pp. 67-70.) The commission, however, made no recommendations for reparations. While the Lytton Commission did not deal with responsibility for the Shanghai affair of January and February, 1932, the report of the Consular Committee of Inquiry set up in Shanghai under authority of the League of Nations, in which the American consul participated, pointed out that the mayor of Greater Shanghai had accepted the Japanese demand and the Japanese consul had informed the consular body of the receipt of this reply, which he said was entirely satisfactory, before the bombardment began. (League of Nations Reports of Committee of Inquiry set up in Shanghai, Political, 1932, 74, p. 2.) On the principles governing responsibility in this affair, see Wright, “Responsibility for Losses in Shanghai,” this journal, Vol. 26 (1932), pp. 586-590.

46 Wright, “Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” loc. cit., pp. 44-47, 54-57; “The Outlawry of War,” this journal, Vol. 19 (1925), pp. 89-91.

47 Conwell-Evans, The League Council in Action, 1929, deals with all of the cases before 1929. On the Shanghai affair, see Lytton Commission Report (L. of N., Political. 1932. VII. 12, pp. 84-88), and on the Leticia affair, Report adopted by the Council, March 18, 1933, Hudson, “The Verdict of the League, Colombia and Peru at Leticia,” World Peace Foundation, 1933, p. 29 ff.

48 Supra, note 13.

49 Supra, note 2.

50 See Davis, Norman’ Statement at Disarmament Conference, Press Releases, May 27, June 3, 1933;Google Scholar Harris Foundation, op. cit, pp. 25-26; Johnstone, , Anne Hartwell, “The United States and the Principle of International Consultation, ” National League of Women Voters, New York, 1934 Google Scholar.

51 The other parties could also justify such discrimination on grounds of reprisal. Q. Wright, “The Meaning of the Pact of Paris,” this journal, Vol. 27 (1933), pp. 59-60. See also Budapest Articles of Interpretation, supra.

52 The third test of aggression discussed above.

53 Assembly report on the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay, Nov. 24, 1934, par. 12 (ii), supra, note 2.

54 ‘Wright, Q., “Collective Rights and Duties for the Enforcement of Treaty Obligations,” Proc. Am. Soc. Int. Law, 1932, p. 110.

55 Supra, note 2.

56 League of Nations Monthly Summary, March, 1933, Vol. 13, p. 84.

57 Ibid., February, 1935, Vol. 15, p. 30. The Czechoslovak representative proposed at the meeting of the advisory commission on March 11, 1935, to submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice the question of who was the “original aggressor” in the Chaco dispute. (Geneva, March, 1935, Vol. 8, p. 30.)

58 Lauterpacht, H., The Function of Law in the International Community, 1933, p. 82. See also note 15, supra.