“Triepel dedicates to the proving of this thesis more detailed explanations. He tries to show that, in the first place, there is not the least prospect that the institution of contraband will ever disappear from the law of warfare. If the right of capture should be abolished but that of contraband be retained, then the conception of contraband, which up to the present has referred only to neutral property, would be applied also to that of the enemy. This enemy property would then fall a prey to the opponent, not as booty but as contraband. There would then arise the danger that by the great extension of the idea of contraband sea-booty might again be introduced, by means of which the maritime commerce of the enemy could be crippled just as much as by the right of capture. The abolition of the right of capturing prizes, without the abolition of the right of declaring contraband, would be advantageous to the sea-power which could manipulate the weapon of the capture of contraband goods the more readily. As long as the geographical situation and the proportions of power have not changed, Germany will derive more harm than benefit from such a freedom of the seas. The prospects for an abolition of blockade are just as slight. If, moreover, the right to capture prizes should be abolished but not that of blockade, the result would be ineffectual. For blockade would then signify to the adversary nothing else than capture. Ships would fall a prey to the enemy either as prizes or as blockade-runners. The blockade would destroy the enemy’s commerce by its very existence. Therefore a blockading sea-power could, if necessary, dispense with the right of capture, for one military measure could be substituted for another. The abolition of the right of capturing prizes would have to be followed, as a logical conclusion, by the abolition of the right of blockade. In England the correct deduction was made that, because they could not dispense with blockade, neither could they with the capturing of prizes. At any rate, the retention of the right of blockade would make the abolition of the right of capture an illusion. On the other hand, the abolition of the right of blockade with the retention of the right of capture would not have the least advantage for Germany. Yes, even if both institutions should be abolished, there would be no gain; for at once sharper emphasis would be laid upon other means of warfare, upon substitutes for blockade. The suppression of the introduction of contraband goods might very successfully replace blockade; even the mere prohibition of the right to import contraband goods might operate as a blockade. The same effect might be attained by the extension of the conception of contraband; likewise by the obliteration of the distinction between absolute and relative contraband. At any rate, the abolition of blockade could without the least difficulty be rendered ineffectual by the energetic application of the right to declare contraband. The problem would work out just as in the case of trying to abolish the capture of prizes. Capture, contraband, and blockade are like the three keyboards of an instrument, on any one of which one can at pleasure play the same melody. If necessary, contraband could be renounced if it were permitted to retain blockade; both blockade and capture could be given up if contraband remained. A renunciation of the capture of prizes is, therefore, according to Triepel, only possible if both blockade and contraband are abolished without leaving either a trace or a substitute. And that, he says, is impossible of realization. Substitutes for the one or the other would always be present. Moreover, Triepel does not lose sight of the possibility that England in a future naval war might be more vulnerable than it has so far been. In that case the Germans would be fools if they should rob themselves of the right of capture and of blockade. Consequently, Triepel comes to the conclusion that the abolition of the right of capture would bring Germany no advantage, but perhaps also no detriment. Citation from
Nippold, ,
Die Gestaltung des Völkerrechts nach dem Weltkriege
, 1917, pp. 279–281
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