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The Decay of Consent: International Law in an Age of Global Public Goods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Nico Krisch
Nico Krisch*
Affiliation:
Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, Barcelona. Email nkrisch@ibei.org
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Extract

The consensual structure of the international legal order, with its strong emphasis on the sovereign equality of states, has always been somewhat precarious. In different waves over the centuries, it has been attacked for its incongruence with the realities of inequality in international politics, for its tension with ideals of democracy and human rights, and for standing in the way of more effective problem solving in the international community. While surprisingly resilient in the face of such challenges, the consensual structure has seen renewed attacks in recent years. In the 1990s, those attacks were mainly “moral” in character. They were related to the liberal turn in international law, and some of them, under the banner of human rights, aimed at weakening principles of nonintervention and immunity. Others, starting from the idea of an emerging “international community,” questioned the prevailing contractual models of international law and emphasized the rise of norms and processes reflecting community values rather than individual state interests. Since the beginning of the new millennium, the focus has shifted, and attacks are more often framed in terms of effectiveness or global public goods. Classical international law is regarded as increasingly incapable of providing much-needed solutions for the challenges of a globalized world; as countries become ever more interdependent and vulnerable to global challenges, an order that safeguards states’ freedoms at the cost of common policies is often seen as anachronistic. According to this view, what is needed—and what we are likely to see—is a turn to nonconsensual lawmaking mechanisms, especially through powerful international institutions with majoritarian voting rules.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 108 , Issue 1 , January 2014 , pp. 1 - 40
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2014 

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Footnotes

*

Substantial parts of this article were written while I was on the faculty of the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin and during my semester as a visiting professor at Harvard Law School, and I am grateful for the assistance and support I received in both institutions. For their comments and discussion of earlier versions of the article, I wish to thank Gabriella Blum, Jacob Cogan, Carlos Espósito, Monica Hakimi, Veerle Heyvaert, Markus Jachtenfuchs, Vicki Jackson, Inge Kaul, Georg Nolte, Anne Peters, Anthea Roberts, Joanne Scott, Neus Torbisco Casals, Joel Trachtman, Joseph Weiler, Michael Zürn, and participants in the Research Colloquium of the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, the Institute for International Law and Justice Colloquium at NYU Law School, the International Law/International Relations Workshop at Harvard, the European and Global Governance Colloquium at the Hertie School, and the Faculty Seminar at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. I am also grateful to Sara Nikolic for her research assistance.

References

1 See, e.g., Fernando R Tesón, A Philosophy of International Law (1998); Beitz, Charles R., Political Theory and International Relations (2d ed. 1999)Google Scholar.

2 See, e.g., Charney, Jonathan I., Universal International Law, 87 AJIL 529 (1993)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tomuschat, Christian, Obligations Arising for States Without or Against Their Will, 241 Recueil Des Cours 195 (1993 IV)Google Scholar; Simma, Bruno, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in International Law, 250 Recueil Des Cours 217 (1994)Google Scholar. See also the overview in Andreas Paulus, Die Internationale Gemeinschaft Im VöLkerrecht: Eine Untersuchung Zur Entwicklung Des Völkerrechts Im Zeitalter Der Globalisierung (2001).

3 See the analysis in part I and in the legal literature, especially Helfer, Laurence R., Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev. 71 Google Scholar; Guzman, Andrew T., Against Consent, 52 Va. J. Int’l L. 747 (2012)Google Scholar; Joel P. Trachtman, The Future of International Law: Global Government (2013).

4 I have some sympathies for the normative argument but regard it as one-sided, leaving out countervailing arguments about the right domain of decision making.see Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law 69–108 (2010). See also the analysis and critique of this position in Shaffer, Gregory, International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 23 Eur. J. Int’L L. 669, 683–93 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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7 Traditional customary law is typically viewed as too slow and unpredictable in its processes to serve regulatory purposes well, whereas “modern” custom—more focused on opinio juris than actual state practice—is typically viewed as requiring broader consensus to gain legal force. See generally Roberts, Anthea E., Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AJIL 757 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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10 For overviews, see Kaul, Inge, Global Public Goods: Explaining Their Underprovision, 15 J. Int’l Econ. L. 729 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Gonzalo Escribano Francés, Provisión de Bienes Públicos Globales y Economía Política International, in La Protección De Bienes Juridicos Globales 39 (Carlos Espósito & Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez eds., 2012). But see also the critique by Friedrich Kratochwil, Problems of Policy-Design Based on Insufficient Conceptualization: The Case of “Public Goods, in Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods: Theories, Rules and Institutions for the Central Policy Challenge in the 21St Century 61 (Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann ed., 2012) (Eur. Univ. Inst., Working Paper RSCAS 2012/23)), at http://cadmus. eui.eu/handle/1814/22275/.

11 Olson, supra note 8, at 13–16.

12 Nordhaus, William N., Paul Samuelson and Global Public Goods 8 (2005), at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/PASandGPG.pdf Google Scholar

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14 On the different types of goods, see the overview in Bodansky, supra note 13, at 658 – 65.

15 See Barrett, supra note 13, ch. 4.

16 see Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Art. 4, Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 UNTS 3, available at http://ozone.unep.org/.

17 see Helfer, supra note 3, at 100–02. Consent requirements in international law are, after all, merely formal protections of sovereign equality. see Krisch, Nico, More Equal Than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and U.S. Predominance in International Law, in United States Hegemony and the Foundations of International Law 135 (Byers, Michael & Nolte, Georg eds., 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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19 Barrett, supra note 13, at 72.

20 The interest of international lawyers in global public goods can be seen in a number of recent symposia. see Symposium, Global Public Goods and the Plurality of Legal Orders, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 643 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mini-symposium on Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, 15 J. Int’l Econ. L. 709–91 (2012); Multilevel Governance of Interdependent Public Goods, supra note 10; La Protección De Bienes Juridicos Globales, supra note 10.

21 Guzman, supra note 3, at 749 (the “commitment to consent is a major problem for today’s international legal system”); Trachtman, supra note 3, at 2 (“[T]here will be circumstances in which more highly articulated constitutional or organizational structures—including executive, legislative, and judicial functions—will be useful.”); Helfer, supra note 3, at 124 –25 (“it has become apparent that voluntary treaty making and treaty adherence procedures often produce a problematic result”).

22 Shaffer, supra note 4, at 679 (“For aggregate efforts public goods..., there is a greater need for centralized institutions to produce them, leading to a relinquishment of some national sovereignty.”); Pauwelyn, Joost, Wessel, Ramses A. & Wouters, Jan, Informal International Law making: An Assessment and Template to Keep It Both Effective and Accountable, in Informal International Lawmaking 500, 525 (Pauwelyn, Joost, Wessel, Ramses & Wouters, Jan eds., 2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (state consent is seen as “too strict” as it “makes collective action in an increasingly networked but diversified world extremely difficult”); Kumm, Mattias, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship Between Constitutionalism in and Beyond the State, in Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, And Global Governance 259, 298 (Dunoff, Jeffrey L. & Trachtman, Joel P. eds., 2009)Google Scholar (international intervention beyond traditional constraints becomes legitimate if “there are good reasons for deciding an issue on the international level, because the concerns that need to be addressed are best addressed by a larger community in order to solve collective action problems and secure the provision of global public goods”).

23 Jutta Brunnee & P Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (2010); see also Esty, Daniel C. & Moffa, Anthony L.I., Why Climate Change Collective Action Has Failed and What Needs to Be Done Within and Without the Trade Regime, 15 J. Int’l Econ. L. 777, 779 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar (“a new environmental regime needs to be constructed with institutional capacities designed to respond to global-scale collective action problems”).

24 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

25 Klabbers, Jan, Law-Making and Constitutionalism, in The Constitutionalization of International Law 81, 114 (Klabbers, Jan, Peters, Anne & Ulfstein, Geir eds., 2009)Google Scholar; see also Weil, supra note 5.

26 see Fritz W Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (1999).

27 For Scharpf, arguments from output could ground only pareto-optimal solutions but not measures with greater distributive effects. In later works, he has softened this limitation, especially with respect to judge-made law in the EU. see Scharpf, Fritz W, Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity, 1 Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev. 173, 189–90 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 see Fritz W Scharpf, Legitimationskonzepte jenseits des Nationalstaats (Max Planck Inst. for the Study of Societies, Working Paper No. 04/6, 2004).

29 See, e.g., Moravcsik, Andrew & Sangiovanni, Andrea, On Democracy and “Public Interest” in the European Union, in Die Reformierbarkeit Der Demokratie. Innovationen Und Blockaden 122(Streeck, Wolfgang & Mainz, Renate eds., 2002)Google Scholar.

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38 For example, consent may be lacking entirely; it may be thought of as tacit; or it may come at one remove, as in the creation of majoritarian or independent institutions with rulemaking or adjudicatory powers.

39 see Guzman, supra note 3; Trachtman, supra note 3; see also Tomuschat, supra note 2, at 240.

40 see Kennedy, David, The Move to Institutions, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 841 (1987)Google Scholar.

41 Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J., Delegation Under Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 3, 21 (Hawkins, Darren G., Lake, David A., Nielson, Daniel L. & Tierney, Michael J. eds., 2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Randall Stone, Controlling Institutions:International Organizations and the Global Economy 27 (2011). But see also the contrary finding in Koremenos, Barbara, When, What and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 151, 170–2 (2008)Google Scholar, which may be due to a stronger focus on delegation involving dispute settlement rather than policymaking. See also id. at 179. On delegation and its forms in general, see Bradley, Curtis A. & Kelley, Judith G., The Concept of International Delegation, 71 Law & Contemp. Probs. 1 (2008)Google Scholar.

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46 See supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text.

47 see Naím, Moisés, Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real International Action, 173 Foreign Pol’y 135 (2009)Google Scholar. On the relationship between minilateralism and multilateralism in different regimes, see Kahler, Miles, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, 46 Int’l Org. 681 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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50 see Daniel W. Drezner, All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (2007).

51 See, e.g., Ingo Rohlfing, Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework 84–96 (2012); see also Odell, John S., Case Study Methods in International Political Economy, 2 Int’l Stud. Persp. 161, 166 (2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Flyvbjerg, Bent, Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research, 12 Qualitative Inquiry 219, 231–32 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

52 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 UNTS 162, available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.

53 see Guzman, Andrew T., Is International Antitrust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501, 1510 –24 (1998)Google Scholar; Guzman, Andrew T., Competition Law and Cooperation: Possible Strategies, in Cooperation, Comity, And Competition Policy 345, 354 (Guzman, Andrew T. ed., 2011)Google Scholar. But see also the different emphasis in Bradford, Anu, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 Harv. Int’l L.J. 383 (2007)Google Scholar.

54 David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, And Globalization 24–31 (2010).

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56 Wood, supra note 55, at 284–85.

57 Id. at 285– 87; Sokol, D. Daniel, International Antitrust Institutions, in Cooperation, Comity, And Competition Policy, supra note 53, at 187, 199–200.Google Scholar

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59 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).

60 see Maher M. Dabbah, International and Comparative Competition Law 432–49 (2010).

61 see Damien Geradin, Marc Reysen, & David Henry, Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law, in Cooperation, Comity, And Competition Policy, supra note 53, at 21, 26–30. The effects doctrine has remained somewhat circumscribed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. See, e.g., Case 89/85, In re Wood Pulp Cartel, 1988 E.C.R. 5193.

62 Dabbah, supra note 60, at 469; see also Wood, supra note 55, at 301. On European attempts to promote its approach to competition law abroad, see Aydin, Umut, Promoting Competition: European Union and the Global Competition Order, 34 J. Eur. Integration 663 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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64 See Cédric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction Over Antitrust Violations in International Law 19597 (2008).

65 Dabbah, supra note 60, at 423, 469–76.

66 see Bradford, supra note 42, at 10–20.

67 But see the limitations reflected in F. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004). See also Note, supra note 42, at 1269 –79, which observes an expansion of extraterritorial criminal prosecution in anti trust cases as jurisdiction for civil suits has been restricted in the wake of Empagran.

68 see Dabbah, Maher M., Future Directions in Bilateral Cooperation: A Policy Perspective, in Cooperation, Comity, And Competition Policy, supra note 53, at 287, 290 –93Google Scholar.

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70 see Kindleberger, Charles P., Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides, 25 Int’l Stud. Q. 242 (1981)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Snidal, Duncan, The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory, 39 Int’l ORG. 579 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

71 For concise discussions of limits to the decentralized approach to antitrust regulation and enforcement, see Geradin, Damien, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust and the Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 189 (2009)Google Scholar; Fox, Eleanor M., Antitrust Without Borders: From Roots to Codes to Networks, in Cooperation, Comity, And Competition Policy, supra note 53, at 265, 273–79Google Scholar.

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73 Fox, supra note 71, at 272.

74 see Gerber, supra note 54, at 103–07; see also Elhauge & Geradin, supra note 63, at 1239–47.

75 see Gerber, supra note 54, at 105–06; Fox, supra note 71, at 272; Bradford, supra note 53, at 401–10.

76 see Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 53, at 1537.

77 Gerber, supra note 54, at 106–07; Bhattacharjea, Aditya, The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing Country Perspective, 9 J. Int’l Econ. L. 293, 295–99 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Bradford, supra note 53, at 410–13, emphasizes the problem of transaction costs for developing countries.

78 See the analysis of country incentives in Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 53, at 1526 – 29. See also Bradford, supra note 53, at 401–37, who also argues that negotiations failed largely because of the lack of expected benefits, but does not discuss the impact of extraterritorial regulation on that calculation.

79 Gerber, supra note 54, at 108–09; Elhauge & Geradin, supra note 63, at 1225–39; Dabbah,supra note 60, at 494–540; Gal, Michal S., Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust Enforcement, 60 U. Toronto L. J. 239 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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82 see Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible?, supra note 53, at 1526 –27.

83 See also the accounts in Gal, supra note 81, at 40–45, and Gerber, supra note 54, at 74–78.

84 See, e.g., Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95)130/FINAL (Sept. 21, 1995).

85 For U.S. antitrust agreements, see U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Cooperation Agreements, at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/int-arrangements.html; for EU antitrust agreements, see Commission, European, Bilateral Relations on Competition Issues, at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/index.html Google Scholar. See also the U.S. enforcement guidelines for antitrust authorities, with direct reference to the OECD recommendation, in Elhauge & Geradin, supra note 63, at 1226 (paragraph 2.92).

86 See especially the 1991 and 1998 agreements between the United States and EU, in Elhauge & Geradin, supra note 63, at 1226 –34.

87 International Competition Network, Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures (n.d.), at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf.

88 International Competition Network Steering Group, International Enforcement Cooperation Project 1 (2012), at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc794.pdf.

89 see Barrett, supra note 13, at 74.

90 On the extent of the challenge, see David G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet, chs. 2, 5, 6 (2011).

91 I do not discuss here potential (but highly problematic) strategies of geo-engineering, which could be employed by single states or even private actors. see Barrett, supra note 13, at 37– 40; Victor, supra note 90, at 185–96; Specter, Michael, The Climate Fixers: Is There a Technological Solution to Global Warming?, New Yorker, May 14, 2012, at 96 Google Scholar.

92 see Ostrom, Elinor, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change, 20 Global Envtl. Change 550 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

93 see Barrett, supra note 13, ch. 3; Victor, supra note 90, at 210 –15.

94 May 9, 1992, 1771 UNTS 107, S. Treaty DOC. NO. 102-38 (1992).

95 For overviews, see Brunnée & Toope, supra note 23, at 13141; Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel, Adriana Fabra Aguilar & Ruth Mackenzie, Principles of International Environmental Law 274–98 (3d ed. 2012). Fora critical account, see Victor, supra note 90, ch.7. For the ratification status, see United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php. For a concise account of dominant concerns driving institutional design, see Thompson, Alexander, Rational Design in Motion: Uncertainty and Flexibility in the Global Climate Regime, 16 Eur. J. Int’l Rel. 269 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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97 See also Eckersley, Robyn, Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?, 12 Global Envtl. Pol. 24, 30–31 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, who diagnoses a particularly strong, “affirmative” form of multilateralism in the climate change context.

98 See, for example, the account of the Copenhagen negotiations, with more than forty thousand participants, in Bodansky, Daniel, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AJIL 230 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

99 Consensus is not defined in the UNFCCC, but the formula in Article IX of the WTO Agreement is often taken to capture the practice: “The body concerned shall be deemed to have decided by consensus on a matter submitted for its consideration, if no Member, present at the meeting when the decision is taken, formally objects to the pro posed decision.” Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Art. IX n. 1, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 UNTS 154; see also Alan Boyle & Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law 157–58 (2007).

100 Decision 1/CP.15 (Dec. 18, 2009), in Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010).

101 see French, Duncan & Rajamani, Lavanya, Climate Change and International Environmental Law: Musings on a Journey to Somewhere, 25 J. Envt’l L. 437, 448–51 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

102 Id. at 449 –50. I wish to thank Veerle Heyvaert for drawing my attention to this development.

103 See also the discussion in Brunnée, Jutta, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 15 Leiden J. Int’l L. 1, 23–33 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104 Supra note 52.

105 On the debate, see Streck, supra note 96, at 147.

106 Id.; see also Brunnée & Toope supra note 23, at 185, 201.

107 Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, 7th Sess., Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29–Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties at 64, Decision 24/CP.7, UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.3 (Jan. 21, 2002).

108 Id.

109 see Brunn&e & Toope, supra note 23, at 201–04.

110 see French & Rajamani, supra note 101, at 443–48.

111 see Eckersley, supra note 97.

112 see Bodansky, supra note 98, at 234; Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society 231–32 (2011).

113 Bodansky, supra note 98, at 238; McGregor, Ian M., Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen, 11 Global Envtl. Pol. 1, 5 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On previous, related critiques in climate change negotiations, see Keohane, Robert O. & Victor, David G., The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9 Persp. On Pol. 7, 15 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the broader picture, Fisher, Dana R. & Green, Jessica F., Understanding Disenfanchisement: Civil Society and Developing Countries’ Influence and Participation in Global Governance for Sustainable Development, 4 Global Envtl. Pol. 65 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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115 see Rajamani, Lavanya, The Cancun Climate Agreements: Reading the Text, Subtext, and Tea Leaves, 60 Int’l & Comp. L. Q. 499, 515 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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117 See id. and Abbott, Kenneth W., The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change (2011), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1813198 Google Scholar, for different, though largely complementary, accounts.

118 see Un Scor, 62d Sess., 5663d mtg., UN Doc. S/PV/5663 (Apr. 17, 2007).

119 See, e.g., Scott, Shirley V., Climate Change and Peak Oil as Threats to International Peace and Security: Is It Time for the Security Council to Legislate?, 9 Melb. J. Int’l L. 495 (2008)Google Scholar.

120 On Security Council powers and their extension in general, see Krisch, Nico, Chapter VII Powers: The General Framework and Article 39, in The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary 1237 & 1272 (Simma, Bruno, Khan, Daniel-Erasmus, Nolte, Georg & Paulus, Andreas eds., 3rd ed. 2012)Google Scholar.

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123 see UNSCOR 62 d Sess., 5663d mtg., UNDoc. S/PV/5663 (Apr. 17, 2007); UNSCOR 66th Sess., 6587th mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.6587 (July 20, 2011).

124 On unilateralism in environmental affairs generally, see Shaffer, Gregory & Bodansky, Daniel, Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law, 1 Transnat’l Envtl L. 31 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and also Bodansky, Daniel, What’s So Bad About Unilateral Action to Protect the Environment?, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 339 (2000).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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129 Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Secy of State for Energy and Climate Change, Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, para. 154 (Oct. 6, 2011), at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62010CC0366&lang1=en&type=NOT&ancre=. The European Court of Justice used a more conventional approach to ground jurisdiction. See Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy and Climate Change, Judgment, paras. 121–30 (Dec. 21, 2011).

130 See also the “cosmopolitan pluralist” conception of jurisdiction in Berman, supra note 43, at 481–501.

131 see Barrett, supra note 13, at 59–61,133–48.

132 see Clunan, Anne L., The Fight Against Terrorist Financing, 121 Pol. Sci. Q. 569, 572 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Barrett, supra note 13, at 60.

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135 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999, 2178 UNTS 197; see also Lavalle, Roberto, The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 60 Zeitschrift Für Ausländisches óffentliches Recht Und Vólkerrecht 491 (2000)Google Scholar.

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139 see https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-11&chapter=18&lang=en.

140 see Rosand, Eric & Miller, Alistair, Strengthening International Law and Global Implementation, in Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat 51 (Cortright, David & Lopez, George A. eds., 2007)Google Scholar; Messmer, William B. & Yordán, Carlos L., A Partnership to Counter International Terrorism: The UN Security Council and the UN Member States, 34 Stud. In Conflict & Terrorism 843, 846–51 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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144 see Biersteker et al., supra note 137, at 239–41; Gardner, Kathryn L., Terrorism Defanged: The Financial Action Task Force and International Efforts to Capture Terrorist Finances, in Uniting Against Terror: Cooperative Nonmilitary Responses to the Global Terrorist Threat, supra note 140, at 157 Google Scholar; Heng, Yee-Kuang & McDonagh, Ken, The Other War on Terror Revealed: Global Governmentality and the Financial Action Task Force’s Campaign Against Terrorist Financing, 34 Rev. Int’l Stud. 553 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ian Roberge, Financial Action Task Force, in Handbook of Transnational Governance, supra note 81, at 45.

145 Financial Action Task Force, FATF Recommendations: IX Special Recommendations (2014), at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/ixspecialrecommendations.html.

146 SC Res. 1617 (July 29, 2005).

147 see KOH, supra note 137, at 170–77; Biersteker et al., supra note 137, at 241– 42.

148 see Gathii, James Thuo, The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law, J. Prof. Law. 197, 208 (2010)Google Scholar.

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151 On the impact of the global regime and its limits, see Clunan, supra note 132, at 578–83, Biersteker et al., supra note 137, at 243–49, Heng & McDonagh, supra note 144, at 564–72, Messmer & Yordán, supra note 140, at 851–58, Jeanne K. Giraldo & Trinkunas, Harold A., Terrorist Financing: Explaining Government Responses, in Terrorism Financing and State Responses 282, 291–94 (Giraldo, Jeanne K. & Trinkunas, Harold A. eds., 2007)Google Scholar, and Barrett, Richard, Preventing the Financing of Terrorism, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 719 (2012)Google Scholar.

152 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 135, Arts. 7, 10. On the quasi-universal character of such jurisdiction, see Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law 104–06 (2008). The Convention seeks to avoid jurisdictional conflict by an obligation of countries to “strive to coordinate” their actions. See Article 7(5).

153 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 135, Art. 8; SC Res. 1373, supra note 138, para. 1(c).

153 On the United States see Jimmy Gurulé, Unfunding Terror: The Legal Response to the Financing of Global Terrorism, ch. 8 (2008). For a relatively permissive view on jurisdictional limits to U.S. action, see Colangelo, Anthony J., Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 Harv. J. Int’l L. 121 (2007)Google Scholar.

155 see Anne L.Clunan, U.S. and International Responses to Terrorist Financing, in Terrorism Financingand State Responses, supra note 151, at 260, 265, 277–79; Eckert, Sue E., The US Regulatory Approach to Terrorist Financing, in Countering the Financing of Terrorism, supra note 137, at 209–17Google Scholar; Gurulé, supra note 154, at 156–72.

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158 On the “club” character see Drezner, supra note 50, at 142, and Hu¨lsse, supra note 149, at 461.

159 see Drezner, supra note 50, at 142–44; Hu¨lsse, supra note 149, at 461–62.

160 Quoted in Hu¨lsse, supra note 149, at 464.

161 Id. at 464–65.

162 see Drezner, supra note 50, at 142–45; Hu¨lsse, supra note 149, at 462; Heng & McDonagh, supra note 144, at 565– 68; Sharman, J.C., The Bark Is the Bite: International Organizations and Backlisting, 16 Rev Int’l. Pol. Econ. 573 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see also Giraldo & Trinkunas, supra note 151, at 287– 88.

163 see KOH, supra note 137, at 177–88; Gardner, supra note 144, at 168–70; Hu¨lsse, supra note 149, at 470; Heng & McDonagh, supra note 144, at 571–72.

164 Financial Action Task Force, FATF Recommendations: Review of the FATF Standards (2014), at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/reviewofthefatfstandards.html.

165 See the account in Drezner, supra note 50, at 142, and see Gathii, supra note 148, at 203– 04.

166 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.

167 see Szasz, Paul C., The Security Council Starts Legislating, 96 AJIL 901 (2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Talmon, Stefan, The Security Council as World Legislature, 99 AJIL 175 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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169 see Krisch, supra note 120, at 1253–54. But see SC Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004).

170 see Szasz, supra note 167, at 903, but also the nuances in Denis, supra note 168, at 151–54.

171 see Johnstone, supra note 168, at 284–89.

172 See id. at 290–94; see also Talmon, supra note 167, at 177–78, 186–88.

173 see SC Res. 1977 (Apr. 20, 2011).

174 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

175 See the qualitatively demanding account of multilateralism in Ruggie, John G., Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 Int’l Org. 561 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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177 see Bodansky, supra note 112, at 230.

178 For a discussion of the hurdles for dealing with antitrust in the WTO, see Guzman, Andrew, International Antitrust and the WTO: The Lesson from Intellectual Property, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 933, 953–56 (2003)Google Scholar.

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180 In the UNFCCC context, agreement on voting rules— especially majority voting— has been elusive, and decisions continue to be taken by consensus.see Rajamani, supra note 115, at 515 & n.138. Deviations from consensual decision making are not infrequent in international institutions. see Klabbers, supra note 6, at 206–11; Sands, Philippe & Klein, Pierre, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions 261–75 (5th ed. 2001)Google Scholar. They are less frequent in the context of multilateral treaty conferences. see Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 99, at 157– 60. COPs are hybrids between both institutional types. see Brunnée, supra note 103, at 16; see also Churchill, Robin R. & Ulfstein, Geir, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AJIL 623 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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184 See, for example, UN SCOR, 57th Sess., 4453d mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.4453 (Jan. 18, 2002), on anti-terrorism legislation, and UNSCOR 62 d Sess., 5663d mtg., UNDoc.S/PV/5663 (Apr. 17, 2007) on climate change.

185 See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text.

186 see Fidler, D., Sars: Governance and the Globalization of Disease 132–45 (2004)Google Scholar.

187 See José E.|Alvarez, International Organizations As Law-Makers (2005).

188 Id., ch. 9; Boyle & Chinkin, supra note 99, ch. 6; International Judicial Lawmaking: On Public Authority and Democratic Legitimation in Global Governance (Armin von Bogdandy & Ingo Venzke eds., 2012).

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191 On such a turn in the interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute, see Note, supra note 42, at 1233– 45, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), and Curtis A.Bradley, Supreme Court Holds That Alien Tort Statute Does Not Apply to Conduct in Foreign Countries, ASIL Insights (Apr. 18, 2013), at http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/12/supreme-court-holds-alien-tort-statute-does-not-apply-conduct-foreign. On securities regulation see Fox, Merritt B., Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 Stan. L. Rev. 1173, 1243–63 (2012)Google Scholar.

192 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.

193 see section above entitled “The Challenge of Global Public Goods.”

194 See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44; Slaughter, supra note 44; Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 22; Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 44; Vabulas, Felicity & Snidal, Duncan, Organization Without Delegation: Informal Intergovernmental Organizations (IIGOs) and the Spectrum of Intergovernmental Arrangements, 8 Rev. Int’l Orgs. 193 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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197 see Slaughter, supra note 44, at 227–30; Jonathan G.S. Koppell, World Rule: Accountability, Legitimacy, And the Design of Global Governance 161– 62, 171–73 (2010); Viola et al., supra note 49.

198 But see also Vabulas & Snidal, supra note 194, at 213–14, on the benefits that both powerful and weak countries may derive from informal institutions.

199 See Drezner, Daniel W., The Power and Peril of International Regime Complexity, 7 Persp. On Pol. 65 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, but see also the more ambivalent picture in Helfer, Laurence R., Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2004)Google Scholar, and Alter, Karen J. & Meunier, Sophie, The Politics of International Regime Complexity, 7 Persp. On Pol. 13 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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202 On instantiations of legalized hegemony, see Gerry Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States: Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Order (2004). On hierarchies and club structures in international politics, see Drezner, supra note 50, Clark, supra note 112, and David A. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations (2009).

203 See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 2, at 240, 328–29; Trachtman, supra note 3, at 253–87.

204 For a related discussion see Keohane, Robert O. & Nye, Joseph S., Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy, in Powerand Governance in A Partially Globalized World 219 (Keohane, Robert O. ed., 2002)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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209 See also Financial Action Task Force, Financial Action Task Force Mandate (2012–2020), para. 12 (Apr. 20, 2012), at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/FINAL%20FATF%20MANDATE%202012-2020.pdf (describing the functions of FATF-style regional bodies).

210 See supra note 160 and accompanying text.

211 see Financial Action Task Force, supra note 209.

212 see Hu¨lsse, supra note 149, at 471.

213 see Financial Action Task Force, High-Risk and Non-cooperative Jurisdictions (2014), at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/topics/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/more/moreabouttheinternationalco-operationreview groupicrg.html. On the procedure in its more confrontational variant of the early 2000s, see Wessel, supra note 207, at 176.

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217 see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Recommendations and Best Practices: Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Co-operation Between Member Countrieson Anticompetitive Practices Affecting International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95)130/FINAL, para. I(A)(1) (July 27–28, 1995).

218 Id., para. I(B)(4)(b), (6).

219 See, e.g., id., paras. I(A)(1), (B)(4)(b). For an instance of friction despite such consultation, see Morgan, Eleanor & McGuire, Steven, Transatlantic Divergence: GE-Honeywell and the EU’s Merger Policy, 11 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 39 (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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223 See, e.g., Kingsbury et al., supra note 214, at 37–42; Krisch, supra note 120, at 1258–59.

224 See also Eckersley, supra note 97, for a normative argument in favor of an “inclusive” minilateralism with greater elements of representation.

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237 See, e.g., Slaughter, supra note 44; Pauwelyn et al., supra note 22; Handbook of Transnational Governance, supra note 81. But see also Stefan Voigt, The Economics of Informal International Law: An Empirical Assessment, in Informal International Lawmaking, supra note 22, at 82, who finds a sharp increase in in for mal agreements concluded by the United States in the 1990s and 2000s, but a decrease since 2007.

238 See also Kingsbury et al., supra note 214, at 37–41.

239 See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 187, at 588–601; Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law, 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 23 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pauwelyn et al., supra note 22, at 526 –33.

240 see Raustiala, supra note 44, at 586–91.

241 See, for example, the conceptualization of hard and soft law on a continuum in Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44, and also Cotterrell, Roger, What Is Transnational Law?, 37 Law & Soc. Inquiry 500 (2012)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

242 See also Bru¨tsch & Lehmkuhl, supra note 227.

243 Most case studies in the initial legalization project were then also concerned with international trade and trading blocs as instances of legalization. Another relatively strong case concerned human rights, whereas the remaining ones (monetary affairs and Asia) displayed limited degrees of legalization. see Legalization and World Politics (Judith L. Goldstein et al. eds., 2001).

244 see Denemark & Hoffmann,supra note 232, at 202–6.The issue areas are categorized only broadly, however, so they will often mix different problem types.

245 See the range of issues and institutions in Informal International Lawmaking: Case Studies (Ayelet Berman, Sanderijn Duquet, Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., 2012), at http://www.fichl.org/fileadmin/fichl/documents/LOTFS/LOTFS_3_Web.pdf.

246 see Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44, at 429; see also Krasner, Stephen D., Global Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 World Pol. 336 (1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tim Bu¨the & Walter Mattli, The New Global Rulers: The Privatization of Regulation in the World Economy (2011).

247 Drezner, supra note 50.

248 For an overview of institutional structures, see Koppell, supra note 197.

249 The present inquiry does not allow for firm conclusions on this matter, however, since the design provides no comparison between cases involving public goods and ones involving other types of goods.

250 see Abbott & Snidal, supra note 44.

251 See also Drezner, supra note 50.

252 The delegation of powers by multilateral treaties to international institutions rarely involves formal voting privileges for powerful countries. see Koremenos, supra note 41, at 165– 68. Privileges are typically of an informal nature. see Cogan, supra note 229; Stone, supra note 41.

253 see Krisch, Nico, International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power in the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

254 See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text.

255 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.