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Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Norman Dorsen
Norman Dorsen*
Affiliation:
New York University School of Law; American Civil Liberties Union
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Extract

Foreign affairs, and its close relation national security, has been a graveyard for civil liberties for much of our recent history. The questions to be answered are not whether this is true—it demonstrably is—but why we have come to this pass and how we might begin to relieve the Bill of Rights of at least some of the burden thus imposed on it.

Type
Rights—Here and There
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 83 , Issue 4 , October 1989 , pp. 840 - 850
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1989

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References

1 Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919).

2 Henkin, Foreign Affairs, in 2 Encyclopedia of the American Constitution 747, 754 (L. Levy, K. Karst & D. Mahoney eds. 1987).

3 Id.

4 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The espionage cases following World War I reflect an even earlier preoccupation with national security at the expense of civil liberty. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 247 U.S. 47 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). The authors of the Constitution were aware of the dangers. In a telling passage quoted in A. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency, at ix (1973), James Madison said, “[P]erhaps it is a universal truth that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pretended, from abroad.” For similar expressions of concern by Madison, see LaFeber, The Constitution and U.S. Foreign Policy: An Interpretation, in A Less Than Perfect Union 221, 224 (J. Lobel ed. 1988).

5 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319.

6 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).

7 American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).

8 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

9 E.g., compare Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966), with American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); compare Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), with Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); compare Rowaldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957), with Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); see Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), overruling Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958).

10 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958).

11 E.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).

12 M. Halperin & D. Hoffman, Freedom vs. National Security: Secrecy and Surveillance (1977), as characterized in Halperin, The National Security State: Never Question the President, in The Burger Years: Rights and Wrongs in the Supreme Court 1969–1986, at 51 (H. Schwartz ed. 1987) [hereinafter Halperin].

13 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

14 Halperin, supra note 12, at 50–51.

15 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981); Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii/Peace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). See also United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 259 (1988).

16 See, e.g., Atlee v. Laird, 347 F.Supp. 689 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff’d sub nom. Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973); United States v. Sisson, 294 F.Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968). More recent cases challenging presidential wars, brought by members of Congress, have met the same fate. E.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F.Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert, denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F.Supp. 333 (1987), aff’d, No. 87-5426 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 17, 1988).

17 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981); Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319).

18 E.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S.Ct. 562 (1988); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).

19 See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1082–83 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 109 S.Ct. 259 (1988) (Wilkinson, J., concurring).

20 E.g., Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).

21 Lowenfeld, Book Review, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 494, 506 (1973). See also cases cited in note 16 supra; T. Franck & M. Glennon, Foreign Relations and National Security Law 723–855 (1987).

22 Henkin, supra note 2, at 754.

23 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

24 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I); Brown v. Board of Educ, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

25 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).

26 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (concurring opinion).

27 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 763 (1971). In fact, as the defendant newspapers and amici civil liberties groups maintained at the time, the danger presented by the documents was greatly exaggerated. Erwin N. Griswold, Solicitor General in the Nixon administration, presented the Government’s case to the Supreme Court in the Pentagon Papers case. He has recently stated that he had “never seen any trace of threat to the national security from the publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such an actual threat.” Griswold, Secrets Not Worth Keeping, Wash. Post, Feb. 15, 1989, at A25, col. 4 (op-ed).

28 Remarks of Alexander Bickel, Arthur Garfield Hays Conference: The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties Cases, 10 Wayne L. Rev. 457, 477 (N. Dorsen ed. 1964).

Professor Neuborne has suggested another possible reason for judicial deference that is applicable to separation of powers cases. That doctrine is premised both on the desirability of dividing governmental authority among the branches to avoid arbitrary use of power and on the advantages of enabling each branch to perform functions that are best suited to its structure. But because of a widespread belief in “the necessity of the country’s speaking with one voice” in cases concerning war or foreign affairs, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 281 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), courts are reluctant to thwart the actions of the political branches (particularly the Executive) or to act forcefully as an “umpire” between the branches. See text at notes 42–44 infra. See generally Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 363 (1982).

29 Boos v. Barry, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (1988); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

30 E.g., Bullfrog Films, Inc. v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) (regulations issued by United States Information Agency to implement treaty facilitating international circulation of audio-visual materials abridge freedom of speech and are unconstitutionally vague); American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F.Supp. 1060 (CD. Cal. Jan. 26, 1989) (provision of McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 that permits deportation of aliens for exercising free speech violates First Amendment under test of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).

31 Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 217, 225–26 (1983); G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 972–1146 (11th ed. 1985).

32 G. Stone, L. Seidman, C. Sunstein & M. Tushnet, Constitutional Law 1035 (1986).

33 Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).

34 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 730 (1971).

35 United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F.Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507(1980).

36 E.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). See Dorsen & Gora, The Burger Court and the Freedom of Speech, in The Burger Court and the Counter-Revolution That Wasn’t 28, 41–44 (V. Blasi ed. 1983); Neuborne & Shapiro, The Nylon Curtain: America’s National Border and the Free Flow of Ideas, 26 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 719(1985).

37 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).

38 See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).

39 Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §1989).

40 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Among other things, Justice Murphy pointed out that during World War II Great Britain afforded hearings to German and Italian aliens to determine whether each one was a “real enemy” before deciding on internment. Id. at 242 n.16.

41 Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

42 See Freund, Umpiring the Federal System, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 561 (1954).

43 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).

44 The decision requiring “some mutual participation” between Congress and the President is Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970) (emphasis in original), and the case that concluded there was such participation, Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), were parts of the same litigation. The War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (50 U.S.C. §§1541–1548) (1982)), was adopted partially in response to the Orlando decision.

45 This practice was endemic during the McCarthy period. See the cases cited in note 7 supra for examples of such statutes. In recent years, Congress has been more solicitous of civil liberties. An example is the effort in Congress to roll back the McCarran-Walter Act, which blocked the entry of foreigners whose ideas were considered a threat to national security. The law passed in the 82d Congress during the height of the McCarthy era. N.Y. Times, June 1, 1989, at A21, col. 1. On the other hand, Congress has sometimes acted inconsistently with civil liberties in recent years. See Intelligence Identities Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-200, 96 Stat. 122 (1982) (50 U.S.C. §§421–426 (1982)); and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C.A. §§5201-5203 (West Supp. 1988) (ordering the closing of the PLO office at the United Nations).

46 Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 Yale L.J. 1255 (1988). Congressional acquiescence is all the more surprising because Congress has the tools, particularly the power of the purse, to prevail in a conflict with the President, “provided that it has the will to [use] them.” Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 Foreign Aff. 284, 297 (1987).

47 Koh, supra note 46, at 1287 (emphasis in original).

48 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).

49 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

50 Remarks by Sen. Biden, 134 Cong. Rec. S17.285–90 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988), quoted in 14 Center for National Security Studies, First Principles 4–8 (1989). Senator Biden offered proposals for a constitutional “framework” that would embody “the sound constitutional principle that sustained hostilities should be based on affirmative and specific congressional approval.” 134 Cong. Rec. at S17.285.

51 Koh, supra note 46, at 1297 (emphasis in original); see also Glennon, The War Powers Resolution: Sad Record, Dismal Promise, 17 Lov. L.A.L. Rev. 656, 659–60, 664 (1984); The War Power After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional Impasse: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on War Powers of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1258, 1261 (1989) (Statement of Thomas M. Franck). For useful suggestions to improve the system, see Halperin & Stern, Lawful Wars, Foreign Pol’y, No. 72, Fall 1988, at 173.

52 Roberts, Reagan Faults Congress on Foreign Policy Role, N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1988, at 7, col. 1 (late city final ed.).

53 N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at 1, col. 6. The agreement prompted the White House Counsel, C. Boyden Gray, to say that the administration had surrendered too much power to Congress by allowing lawmakers to review and possibly veto aid to the Nicaraguan contras. N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1989, §1, at 1, col. 1. Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d immediately responded by asserting that “the accord enhanced the President’s power to shape foreign policy.” N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1989, at A10, col. 1.

54 E.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).

55 The Government’s position was sustained in Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).

56 For accounts of these and other incursions, see R. Curry, Freedom at Risk: Secrecy, Censorship, and Repression in the 1980s (1988).

57 W. Wilson, speech given in Philadelphia, July 4, 1914, The Morrow Book of Quotations in American History 320 (J. R. Conlin ed. 1984).