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The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 March 2017

Howard S. Levie
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Extract

For many centuries the armistice agreement has been the method most frequently employed to bring about a cessation of hostilities in international conflict, particularly where the opposing belligerents have reached what might be termed a stalemate. This practice has not only continued but has probably increased, during the present century.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 50 , Issue 4 , October 1956 , pp. 880 - 906
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 1956

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Footnotes

*

The views contained herein are those of the writer and are not to be construed as official or as reflecting those of the Department of the Army.

References

1 All of these agreements may be found in Maurice, The Armistices of 1918, Appendices (London, 1943). They are referred to in the text as “so-called armistice agreements” because each one was actually what one author has called a “capitulatory armistice, in which the victor imposes upon the vanquished conditions which are normally reserved for the treaty of peace.” Burgos, Nociones de Dereeho de Guerra 144 (Madrid, 1955).

2 U. S. Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931–1941 (Washington, 1943), Vol. I, p. 217.

3 U. S. Foreign Relations, The American Republics: 1935 (Washington, 1953), Vol. IV, p. 73. This was termed a “Peace Protocol” and, in many respects, went beyond the normal scope of even a modern armistice. Neither of these two armistice agreements had any particular significance in the development of the general armistice as an important war convention.

4 See comment in note 1 above. These agreements may be found in 39 A.J.I.L. Supp. (1945) 88 (Rumania); 93 (Bulgaria); and 97 (Hungary); 40 ibid. 1 (1946) (two with Italy). A number of other such agreements were entered into during the course of the war (Finland-U.S.S.R., 34 ibid 127 (1940); France-Germany, 34 ibid 173 (1940); France-Italy, 34 ibid. 178 (1940), etc.). The surrenders of Germany on May 7, 1945 (Exec. Agr. Ser., No. 502), and of Japan on Sept. 2, 1945 (Exec. Agr. Ser., No. 493) do not fall within this category. See Zemanek, , “Unconditional Surrender and International Law,” in 26 The Annual, Journal of the A.A.A. 29 (1956).Google Scholar

5 The Renville Truce Agreement (Netherlands-Indonesia), U.N. Doe. S/649, Jan. 17, 1948; Resolution for a Cease-fire Order and Truce Agreement (India-Pakistan), U.N. Doc. S/995, Sept. 13, 1948; the four Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements:

U.N. Doe. S/1264/Rev. 1, Feb. 23, 1949 (Egypt); U. N. Doc. S/1296/Rev. 1, March 23, 1949 (Lebanon) ; U.N. Doc. S/1302/Rev. 1, April 3, 1949 (Jordan) ; and U.N. Doc. S/1353/Rev. 1, July 20, 1949 (Syria); the Korean Armistice Agreement, U.N. Doc. S/3079, Aug. 7, 1953; and the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina: IC/42/Rev. 2, July 20, 1954 (Viet-Nam); IC/51/Rev. 1, July 20, 1954 (Laos); and IC/52, July 21, 1954 (Cambodia). The Korean Armistice Agreement may also be found in 47 A.J.I.L. Supp. 186 (1953), and the three Indochinese agreements in Report on Indochina, U. S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 1954, Committee Print, pp. 16–41.

6 Rosenne, Israel’s Armistice Agreements with the Arab States 27 (Tel Aviv, 1951) ; Zemanek, loc. cit. 30.

7 Phleger, Proceedings of Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, 1955, p. 98; Sibert, “L'armistice dans le droit des gens,” in 40 Revue générale de droit international public 714 (1933).

8 While any review of the historical development of the general armistice will necessitate some discussion, however limited, of the general armistice agreement over the centuries, emphasis will be placed on those of the last decade.

9 Monaco, , “Les conventions entre belligérants,” in 75 Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de La Haye 323 (1949, II).Google Scholar

10 We are not here concerned with the local, or partial, armistice, the agreement between belligerents which has only a military character and which results only in a temporary armistice of limited scope. All references in the text to an “armistice” refer to a general armistice agreement.

11 Art. 50, Declaration of Brussels of 1874, Recueil général des lois et coutumes de la guerre (Brussels, 1943), p. 595; Art. 36, Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague Convention No. II, July 29, 1899 (32 Stat. 1811, 2 Malloy, Treaties 2042); Art. 36, Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to Hague Convention No. IV, Oct. 18, 1907 (36 Stat. 2277; Malloy, op. cit. 2269).

12 Par. 253, Rules of Land Warfare, U. S. Army, Basic Field Manual 27-10 (Washington, 1940); par. 479, The Law of Land Warfare, U. S. Army, Basic Field Manual 27-10 (The Law of Land Warfare superseded the Rules of Land Warfare in July, 1956); pars. 256, 258, and 270, British Army Manual of Military Law, 1929, Amendments No. 12 (1936), Ch. XIV, The Laws and Usages of War on Land; pars. 256, 258, and 270, British Army Manual of Military Law, 1951, Draft Section XIV, The Laws of War on Land (when published, The Laws of War on Land will supersede The Laws and Usages of War on Land).

13 Basdevant, , Cours de droit international public 176 (Paris, 1946)Google Scholar; Calvo, , Le droit international, Vol. IV, #2436 (5th ed., Paris, 1896)Google Scholar; Clunet, , “Suspension d'armes, armistice, préliminaires de paix,” in 46 Journal du droit international privé 173 (1919)Google Scholar; Fauchille, , Traité de droit international public, Vol. II, p. 326 (8th ed. by Bonfils, Paris, 1921)Google Scholar; Phillipson, , Termination of War and Treaties of Peace 74 (New York, 1916)Google Scholar; Robert, , Des effets de l'armistice général 28 (Paris, 1906)Google Scholar; Sibert, loc. cit. 662.

14 Calvo, op. cit. But see Art. 75 of the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (47 Stat. 2021; Treaty Series, No. 846; 4 Malloy, Treaties 5224).

15 Clunet, loc. cit. 174.

16 Fauchille, op. cit. 326; Robert, op. cit. 28; Sibert, loc. cit. 685.

17 The more important provisions of the “usual” armistice agreement, if such there be, are discussed in detail in Part III hereof, beginning at page 888 below.

18 Art. 136, Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field (General Orders No. 100, April 24, 1863); Politis, , “La guerre gréco-turque,” in 5 Revue de droit international public 116, 135 (1898)Google Scholar ; Spaight, , War Rights on Land 238 (London, 1911).Google Scholar

19 Bernand, , L'armistice dans les guerres Internationales 53 (Geneva, 1947)Google Scholar; Calvo, , op. cit. #2437; Castrén, The Present Law of War and Neutrality 129 (Helsinki 1954)Google Scholar; Halleck, International Law Vol. II, p. 312 (3d ed. by Baker, London, 1893); Kluber, , Droit des gens moderne de 1'Europe # 277 (2d Ott ed. in French, Paris, 1874)Google Scholar ; Sibert, loc. cit. 669; Vattel, The Law of Nations, iii, XVI, 237 (Text of 1758, Classics of International Law, Washington, 1916). Vattel states that “the conclusion of a general armistice is a matter of such importance that the sovereign is always presumed to have reserved it to himself.” This undoubtedly refers to ratification, rather than negotiation. One of the few armistice agreements actually signed by sovereigns personally in modern times was that of Villafranca, which was signed by the Emperors Napoleon III of France and Francis Joseph of Austria on July 11, 1859.

20 Lawrence, , The Principles of International Law 565 (6th ed., New York, 1915)Google Scholar, but see the 7th ed., 1927, p. 556; 2 Oppenheim, International Law 550 (7th ed. by Lauterpaeht, London, 1952). While par. 259 of the Rules of Land Warfare stated categorically that a general armistice is always subject to ratification, par. 483 of The Law of Land Warfare states that “if an armistice contains political terms, it must be made under authorization from the governments concerned or subject to approval by them.”

21 Clunet, loc. cit. 173; Fauchille, op. cit. 326; Wheaton, International Law 222 (7th ed. by Keith, London, 1944). Each of the four Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements (note 5 above) states in the preamble that the Parties have “appointed representatives empowered to negotiate and conclude an Armistice Agreement.”

22 Notes 1 and 4 above. However, the Protocol of Buenos Aires (note 3 above) suspending the Gran Chaco hostilities did require ratification. This was one of its numerous variations from the usual armistice of modern times.

23 The four Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements specifically provided that they were not subject to ratification. The others were completely silent on the subject.

24 De Jure Belli, ii, X, 292 (Text of 1612, Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1933). This was apparently the feeling of at least a part of the British press during the Korean negotiations. See Frankenstein, , L'Organisation des Nations Unies devant de Conflit Coréen 323 (Paris, 1952).Google Scholar

25 Monaco, loc. cit. 326. In discussing the preparations for the Armistice of Rethonde which brought World War I hostilities to an end on November 11, 1918, Maurice (op. cit. 34) makes the following amusing comment: “This latest American note did much to clear the air, but it did not entirely satisfy Marshal Foch, and there followed some interesting correspondence between him and his Government on the respective responsibility of statesmen and soldiers in making terms of armistice.”

26 Note 5 above. It is probable that the Arab states did not use diplomatic representatives because of their refusal to take any action which might, even remotely, imply recognition of the existence de jure of the state of Israel.

27 Of course, this was not the case prior to the invention of wireless telegraphy. In August, 1808, Lt. General Sir Arthur Wellesley (later Lord Wellington) was successful in several engagements with the French in Portugal. The French Commander then approached Sir Arthur and his superiors with a request for an armistice. Agreement on an armistice extremely favorable to the French was reached at Cintra on Aug. 22, 1808. Later, a “Definitive Convention for the Evacuation of Portugal by the French Army” was agreed upon. “Violent public clamour” ensued when the news reached England, where on the facts known, no justification could be perceived for having entered into a truly consensual agreement with what appeared to have been a defeated foe. As a result, Sir Arthur and his two superiors were subsequently compelled to face a Board of Enquiry. Stockdale, , The Proceedings on the Enquiry into the Armistice and Convention of Cintra (London, 1809).Google Scholar

28 0ppenheim (op. cit. 546) states that during a general armistice “the condition of war remains between the belligerents themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals, on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities.” And in his International Law Codified (Trans, of 5th Ital. ed. by Borchard, New York, 1918), note, #1775, Fiore goes even further, cautioning that “both in the relations of public interna] law and in those of international law, during an armistice, however long protracted, the law of war, not the law of peace, must be applied.”

29 2 Phillipson, , The International Law and Customs of Ancient Greece and Rome 287, 289–290 (London, 1911).Google Scholar

30 Gentili, op. cit. ii, XII, 302–303; Grotius, , De Jure Belli ac Pacis iii, XXI, I–II (Text of 1646, Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1925)Google Scholar; Pufendorf, , Of the Law of Nature and Nations viii, VII, 3 (Text of 1688, Classics of International Law, Oxford, 1934).Google Scholar

31 Benton, , International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War 226 (Baltimore, 1908)Google Scholar; Calvo, op. cit. #2339; Clunet, loc. cit. 72; Fenwick, , International Law 580 (3d ed., New York, 1952)Google Scholar ; McNair, , Legal Effects of War 5 (Cambridge, 1948)Google Scholar; Sibert, loc. cit. 658; Spaight, op. cit. 245; Zemanek, loc. cit. 31.

32 Lieber, op. cit. Art. 142; par. 253, Rules of Land Warfare; par. 479, The Law of Land Warfare; par. 266, Laws and Usages of War on Land; par. 266, Laws of War on Land (note 12 above).

33 Kahn v. Anderson, Warden, 255 U.S. 1, 9 (1921).

34 In Suarez, re, Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1943–1945 (ed. by Lauterpacht, London, 1949), p. 412.Google Scholar Suarez, a French newspaperman, was charged with “communicating with the enemy” during the German occupation of France. He contended that after the Armistice of Compiègne (June 22, 1940) relations with German nationals no longer fell within the meaning of that term. The Court of Cassation disagreed with this contention and Suarez died before a French firing squad. In the editorial comments on this case Lauterpacht says: “This judgment is in full conformity with the classical theory of international law regarding the juridical nature of an armistice. … An armistice is only a provisional suspension by treaty of hostilities, a temporary pause in military operations between belligerents, leaving, moreover, the state of war, with all its juridical consequences, still in existence.”

35 Security Council, Sixth Year, Official Records, 558th Meeting, pars. 1–7. The resolution made no mention of the Treaty of Constantinople of 1888.

36 Stone, Legal Controls of International Conflict 641, 644 (New York, 1954).Google Scholar

37 On April 13, 1956, while Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld, Secretary General of the United Nations, was in the Middle East pursuant to a Security Council Resolution of April 4, 1956, attempting to secure compliance with the General Armistice Agreements, Mr. David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister of Israel, requested him to “ascertain whether their [Egypt’s] readiness to undertake the full implementation of the General Armistice Agreement signifies that they no longer consider Egypt to be at war with Israel.” New York Times, April 17, 1956. For a further discussion of the problem of the naval blockade during an armistice, see p. 903 below.

38 Bluntschli, , Le droit international codiflé #691 (Trans, from German into French, Paris, 1870)Google Scholar; Calvo, op. cit. #2339; Fiore, op. cit. #1774; Hall, , A Treatise on International Law 585 (7th ed. by Higgins, Oxford, 1917)Google Scholar; Vattel, op. cit. iii, XVI, 246; 2 Westlake, International Law 92 (2d ed., Cambridge, 1913); Wheaton, op. cit. 224; Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 787 (2d ed. rev., Washington, 1920).

39 Castrén, op. cit. 130; Fauchille, op. cit. 330; Fenwick, op. cit. 580; Grotius, op. cit. iii, XXI, VII; 2 Hyde, International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 283 (Boston, 1922); Lawrence, op. cit. 558; Phillipson, op. cit. 63 (note 13 above); Spaight, op. cit. 235; par. 256, Rules of Land Warfare; par. 487e, The Law of Land Warfare; par. 282, Laws and Usages of War on Land; par. 282, Laws of War on Land (note 12 above). It is interesting to note that Spaight (op. cit.) criticized a statement in Lawrence (apparently in the latter’s 5th edition) to the effect that “it is universally agreed that during an armistice a belligerent may do in the actual theatre of war only such things as the enemy could not have prevented him from doing at the moment when actual hostilities ceased”; and that, perhaps as a salutary effect of Spaight’s criticism, the next edition of Lawrence’s work (the 6th), published in 1915, four years after Spaight’s book appeared, stated (at p. 566): “There is a controversy whether during an armistice a belligerent may do, in the actual theatre of war, only such things as the enemy could not have prevented him from doing at the moment when active hostilities ceased, or whether he may do whatever is not forbidden expressly, except, of course, attack the enemy or advance further into his territory. The. weight of authority is in favor of the former alternative; but the weight of reasoning seems on the side of the latter, which has the decisive support of recent practices.” The latest (1927) edition of Lawrence is consistent with its immediate predecessor (p. 558).

40 Several hundred years before the birth of Christ the famous Philip of Macedon took advantage of a “truce” (we would call it a suspension of arms), which he had requested for the purpose of burying his dead, and withdrew to a more advantageous position. Gentili (op. cit. ii, XIII, 313) says “Philip did wrong”; Grotius (op. cit. iii, XXI, VII) maintains that “it is not inconsistent with a truce to withdraw with the army inland as we read in Livy that Philip did”; Vattel (op. cit. iii, XVI, 250) also sees no bad faith in such an act, though warning that it gives the enemy the right to renew the attack despite the suspension of hostilities; Winthrop (op. cit. 787) concurs in Gentili’s position; while Maurice (op. cit. 32) points out that in October, 1918, the British and French felt it necessary to call President Wilson’s attention to the fact that the mere evacuation of occupied territory by the Germans (which had been suggested as a provision of the armistice which was then under discussion) would not suffice, inasmuch as the enemy would then have the opportunity, among other things, of “retiring without loss on to new positions which he would have time to choose and fortify”—clear acceptance of the validity of Philip’s act.

41 The last reported incidents involving this problem occurred during the latter half of the 19th century. They clearly indicate that, as a matter of practice, belligerents have frequently taken actions during an armistice which were not specifically forbidden and which the enemy could have prevented at the moment when actual hostilities ceased. One of these incidents occurred during the Seven Weeks’ War between Prussia and Austria. After the Armistice of Nikolsburg had been signed (July 26, 1866), Prince Frederick Charles, the Prussian commander, massed his troops in such a manner as to facilitate an attack on Pressburg, should the negotiations for peace fail, an action which the Austrians could, at least, have rendered difficult. This action brought no protest from the Austrians—and the Treaty of Prague (August 23, 1866) brought the war to an end. Similarly, after the Armistice of Adrianople had been signed (Jan. 31, 1878), bringing to a halt hostilities between the Russians and the Turks, the Russian commander, General Totleben, ordered his troops to erect a number of high observation posts from which a full view of the Turkish entrenchments could be obtained, an act which the Russians certainly could not have accomplished prior to the cessation of hostilities. The Turkish commander demanded that they be removed and threatened to open fire on them if this was not done. General Totleben refused to comply with this demand and complained to the Turkish Government which overruled its military commander and never questioned the right of the Russians to do as they had done. And again, during the Boer War, after the signing of the Armistice of Tugela Heights (Feb. 25, 1900), British artillery was moved to new positions and the British took other actions which the Boers had been in a position to prevent at the time the armistice was signed. All this was apparently done with no protest on the part of the Boers.

42 Bordwell, , The Law of War between Belligerents 295 (Chicago, 1908)Google Scholar; Phillipson, op. cit. 63–64 (note 13 above); Spaight, op. cit. 235.

43 For an example of this practice, see sub-pars. 13c and 13d of the Korean Armistice Agreement. The three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina have many restrictive provisions identical with, or closely parallel to, those contained in the Korean Armistice Agreement. They also have additional provisions in this regard, such as those relating to “foreign troops,” “military bases,” and “military alliances.”

44 See p. 881 above.

45 A number of the armistice agreements to which reference will be made were studied in somewhat esoteric documents which were approximately contemporaneous with the particular armistice itself. These documents, many of which are probably unique, are located in the Library of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Where this is so it will be indicated by a footnote stating “I.C.J. Library.”

46 Pars. 487–488, The Law of Land Warfare (note 12 above).

47 See p. 882 above.

48 Traité de Trève entre Le Serenissime et Très-Puissant Prince Leopold, Empereur des Romains et L ‘Empire, d'une Part ET Le Serenissime et Très-Puissant Prince Louis XIV Roy Très-Chrestien de France et de Navarre d'autre Part, I.C.J. Library.

49 Traité de Suspension d'Armes en Italie Conclu à Vigevano le Septième Octobre 1696 (Paris, 1697), I.C.J. Library.

50 I.C.J. Library.

51 T.I.A.S., No. 1604; 40 A.J.I.L. Supp. 1 (1946); Dept. of State Bulletin, Nov. 11, 1945, p. 748.

52 Takahashi, , International Law Applied to the Russo-Japanese War 219 (New York, 1908).Google Scholar

53 Ibid. 220.

54 Ibid. 224.

55 Ibid. 225.

56 Par. 1, Renville Truce Agreement (note 5 above).

57 Part IA, Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement (note 5 above).

58 See, for example, Art. III(1), Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement. In view of the basic similarity between the four Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements all subsequent references to this group of agreements will be restricted to the Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement, which was drafted by eliminating unnecessary provisions from the prior Israeli-Egyptian agreement and which served as the model for the agreements later negotiated between Israel and its other Arab neighbors, Jordan and Syria.

59 Par. 12, Korean Armistice Agreement (note 5 above). So, likewise, do the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina, which, in many instances, adopted verbatim the phraseology of the Korean Armistice Agreement. In view of the basic similarity between the three Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Indochina, all subsequent references to this group of agreements will be restricted to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

60 Spaight, op. cit. 234.

61 Oppenheim, op. cit. 554.

62 The Armistice of Nikolsburg (Austria-Prussia) was signed on July 26, 1866, to be effective one week later, on Aug. 2 (Phillipson, op. cit. 65). The Truee of Brussels (Spain-United Provinces) was signed on March 13, 1607, and did not take effect until May 4, 1607 (Discours, Paris, 1609, I.C.J. Library).

63 The Armistice of Versailles, Bigned by France and Germany on Jan. 28, 1871, provided for a cessation of hostilities on the date of the signing in the Paris area and three days later in the more remote areas of France (Clercq, Recueil des traités de la France (Paris, 1864–1872), Vol. X, pp. 410–414). Art. 11 of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (note 5 above), provides for a cessation of hostilities simultaneously throughout all of Viet-Nam and then, paradoxically, specifies different effective dates in different areas of the country because of the difficulty of transmitting orders down to the lowest combat echelons. Because of the comparatively primitive conditions existing in Indochina, a number of the provisions of these three agreements are throwbacks in history.

64 Benton, op. cit. 228. Another instance of difficulties arising because of insufficient attention being paid to armistice provisions regarding time occurred during the Second Balkan War (1913). An armistice agreement was entered into while peace negotiations were being conducted. It became necessary to extend the duration of the armistice and, by error, an armistice which expired at noon was renewed only as of 1:00 P.M. The threat of a resumption of hostilities for one hour was only overcome by direct appeal to the peace conference!

65 Par. 1, Renville Truce Agreement; Art. VIII(1), Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement (notes 5 and 58 above); pars. 12 and 63, Korean Armistice Agreement; Arts. 11 and 47, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (notes 5 and 59 above). Because the India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement was actually only a resolution of the United Nations Commission, it was necessary for the parties to reach a supplementary agreement as to the effective date and time of the cessation of hostilities. This they did (par. 14, U.N. Doc. S/1196, Jan. 10, 1949).

66 Note 62 above, and Ariga, La Guerre sino-japonaise 251 (Paris, 1896).

67 Actenstiicke zur Schleswig-Holstein ‘schen Frage. Waffenstillstand von Malmoe vorn 26 August 1848 (Frankfurt am Main, 1848), I.C.J. Library,

68 I.C.J. Library.

69 Politis, loc. cit. 130.

70 Par. 10, Renville Truce Agreement.

71 Art. VIII (2), Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement.

72 Par. 62, Korean Armistice Agreement.

73 Politis, loc. cit.

74 Note 11 above.

75 Ibid.

76 They appear to do no more than to reiterate the principle of Pacta sunt servanda.

77 Spaight, op. cit. 234; Wheaton, op. cit. 225. Both par. 265b of the Rules of Land Warfare and par. 487b of The Law of Land Warfare (note 12 above) state that if the duration of an armistice is indefinite, “a belligerent may resume operations at any time after notice.”

78 See, for example, Spaight, op. cit.

79 War of the Rebellion, Vol. XLVII, pp. 302, 334, 345.

80 Ibid. 243 (Sherman to Grant and to Halleck).

81 laid. 293 (Sherman to Johnston).

82 Politis, loc. cit. 136, 130; Spaight, op. cit. 244. See also par. 265c, Rules of Land Warfare; par. 487c, The Law of Land Warfare; par. 289, Laws and Usages of War on Land; and par. 289, Laws of War on Land (note 12 above).

83 Robert, op. cit. 36.

84 Note 27 above.

85 Note 68 above.

86 Note 62 above.

87 Politis, loc. cit. 130. Phillipson, op. cit. 69, says that these two armistice agreements omitted demarcation lines. However, that of Epirus provided for the Turks to occupy the right bank of the Arachtos River and for the Greeks to retire to the left bank; and that of Thessaly specified that a line of demarcation was thereafter to be plotted. This was done and a neutral zone 5 km. wide was established (Politis, loc. cit. 136).

88 Pars. 1 and 2, Renville Truce Agreement (note 5 above).

89 Arts. 4 and 5, Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement (notes 5 and 58 above).

90 Pars. 1–4, Korean Armistice Agreement.

91 Art. 1, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

92 Part IIA 1, India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement.

93 Note 11 above.

94 Ibid. For a dispute as to the correctness of the above official translation of this article, see Spaight, op. cit. 232, note.

95 Lieber, op. cit. Art. 141.

96 Par. 265d, Rules of Land Warfare; par. 487d, The Law of Land Warfare, loc. cit.

97 T.I.A.S., No. 3365; 50 A.J.I.L. 724 (1956).

98 Robert, op. cit. 28; Sibert, loc. cit. 700; Spaight, op. cit. 245. Sibert states that “civilians remain under the protection—extremely imperfect—of the laws of war.” It is to be hoped that the Civilian Convention (note 97 above) will prove to have mitigated this criticism.

99 Bluntschli, op. cit. #693.

100 Hyde, op. cit. 285.

101 ARTICLES de la TREFUE proposée par les Ambaffadeurs des Roys de France, & de la grande Britagne, en l'affemblée des Eftats Generaulx (Paris, 1608), I.C.J. Library.

102 DISCOURS de ce qui s'est passé au Royaume D'Hongrie, sur le traitté de la pais, auee le Roy d'Espagne, & les serenissimes Princes Archiducs, & les Estats généraux des prouinces vries dudict pays (Paris, 1609), I.C.J. Library.

103 Traité entre Le Roy Louis XIV, La Reyne de Suede, etc., d'une Part ET L'Electeur Maximilian, etc., d'autre Part (Paris, 1689), I.C.J. Library.

104 Note 48 above.

105 Note 5 above. Strangely enough, this subject of commercial intercourse probably received more attention in former days than it does now.

106 Par. 59, Korean Armistice Agreement.

107 Art. 14(d), Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, loc. cit. For some statistics on the huge number of persons who took advantage of this provision, see Report on Indochina 8–9 (note 5 above).

108 Ibid. Art. 21.

109 Note 97 above.

110 Note 103 above.

111 Note 50 above.

112 Note 67 above.

113 Note 11 above.

114 Note 14 above.

115 Art. 118, 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, T.I.A.S., No. 3364; 47 A.J.I.L. Supp. 119(1953).

116 Par. 487f, The Law of Land Warfare. The details of the dispute with regard to the release and repatriation of prisoners of war which bogged down the Korea narmistice negotiations for well over a year after agreement had been reached on all other matters is beyond the scope of this paper. It is suggested that, while the definitive discussion of that problem remains to be written, basic materials with regard thereto may be found in Charmatz & Wit, “Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention,” in 62 Yale Law Journal 391 (1953)Google Scholar; Qutteridge, , “The Repatriation of Prisoners of War,” in 2 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 207 (1953)Google Scholar; Mayda, , “The Korean Repatriation Problem and International Law,” in 47 A.J.I.L. 414 (1953)Google Scholar; Lundin, , “Repatriation of Prisoners of War: The Legal and Political Aspects,” in 39 American Bar Association Journal 559 (1953)Google Scholar; British White Paper, The Legal Aspects of the Repatriation of Prisoners of War, Cmd. 8793 (March, 1953); Department of State, Memorandum of Legal Considerations Underlying the Position of the United Nations Command Regarding the Issue of Forced Repatriation of Prisoners of War (1953); Baxter, , “Asylum to Prisoners of War,” in 30 British Tear Book of International Law 489 (1953)Google Scholar; and Stone, op. cit. 661–665, 680–683. See also Garcia-Mora, , International Law and Asylum as a Human Right, Ch. VII (Washington, 1956).Google Scholar

117 Bernand, op. cit. 92; Politis, loc. cit. 142; Robert, op. cit. 97.

118 Robert, ibid. 99.

119 Pars. 157–159, Rules of Land Warfare.

120 The Final Act of the 1949 Geneva Conference had 59 signatories. Up to July 1, 1956, there had been notification of 42 ratifications and 10 adherences. The U. S. ratification became effective on February 2, 1956. See 50 A.J.I.L. 724 (1956).

121 Par. 52, Korean Armistice Agreement (note 5 above).

122 Par. 7f, Renville Truce Agreement.

123 Art. VI, Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement (notes 5 and 58 above).

124 Pars. 51–58 and Annex, Korean Armistice Agreement.

125 Notes 5 and 59 above.

126 Note 107 above.

127 Par. 487g, the Law of Land Warfare (note 12 above).

128 Note 101 above.

129 Note 48 above.

130 Note 68 above.

131 34 A.J.I.L. Supp. 127, 131 (1940) ; Dept. of State Bulletin, April 27, 1940, p. 453.

132 Arts. 4, 8, and 9, and par. 3 of the Annex, Renville Truce Agreement.

133 Part ID, Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement.

134 Art. VII, Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement (notes 5 and 58 above).

135 Pars. 19–35, 36–50, 56, 57, 59, and Annex, Korean Armistice Agreement (note 5 above).

136 Pars. 30–33 and 34–36, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (notes 5 and 59 above).

137 See p. 881 above.

138 Par. 488, The Law of Land Warfare (note 12 above).

139 Prohibition of sabotage, restrictions on propaganda radio broadcasts: par. 7, Renville Truce Agreement; local administration, guarantee of human and political rights, consultation on means of self-determination: Parts IIA3, IIB3, and III, India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement; civil administration and relief in demilitarized zone, displaced persons, recommendation for the convening of a political conference: pars. 10, 59, and 60, Korean Armistice Agreement (note 5 above); civil administration and relief in demilitarized zone, political and administrative measures in regrouping zones, prohibition of foreign military bases, prohibition of military alliances: pars. 8, 14, and 19, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam (notes 5 and 59 above). The Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreements contain no such provisions, probably for the reason mentioned in note 26 above.

140 See p. 892 above.

141 Lieber, op. cit. Art. 136. For some reason, Art. 145 provides further that a “clear” breach of an armistice by one party releases the other.

142 Note 11 above.

143 Ibid.

144 Wheaton, op. cit. 229.

145 Oppenheim, op. cit. 556.

146 An exception to this statement is par. 10 of the Renville Truce Agreement, which provides: “This agreement shall be considered binding unless one party notifies the Committee of Good Offices and the other party that it considers the truce regulations are not being observed by the other party and that this agreement should therefore be terminated.”

147 Grotius, op. cit. iii, XXI, XIII.

148 Note 11 above.

149 Par. 269, Rules of Land Warfare (note 12 above).

150 Par. 494b, The Law of Land Warfare (note 12 above).

151 Ibid. par. 494c. In general accord on this problem, see pars. 299 and 300, Laws and Usages of War on Land; and pars. 299 and 300, Laws of War on Land.

152 Note 103 above.

153 Note 5 above.

154 The India-Pakistan Resolution for a Cease-Fire Order and Truce Agreement is stated to be applicable to “all forces, organized and unorganized.” The Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement refers to “military or para-military forces of either Party, including non-regular forces.” The Korean Armistice Agreement uses the more general term “all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval, and air forces.” So does the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam.

155 Rosenne, op. cit. 45.

156 The exception is Rolin, Le droit moderne de la guerre (Brussels, 1920), in which an entire chapter (Vol. II, Ch. XVII, ##801–810) is devoted to “The application of the rules of armistice in maritime warfare.”

157 Castréa, op. cit. 130.

158 Oppenheim, op. cit. 547; Politis, loc. cit. 134; Robert, op. cit. 52; Wheaton, op. cit. 229. Rolin (op. cit. #805) quotes Art. 72 of the Manuel des lois de la guerre maritime, drafted by the Institut de Droit International, as stating that “in the absence of a specific provision in the agreement, blockades in being at the time of an armistice need not be lifted.” Rolin asserts, however, that no new blockades may be established, as the establishment of a blockade is an act of war.

159 Oppenheim, op. cit. 144; Politis, loc. cit.

160 Pillet, , Les lois actuelles de la guerre 368 (Paris, 1901).Google Scholar

161 For a discussion of the problem arising from the indefiniteness of the provision of the Israeli-Egyptian General Armistice Agreement in this regard, see p. 885 above.

162 Note 102 above.

163 Note 50 above.

164 Note 67 above.

165 Clercq, op. cit.

166 Note 66 above.

167 Politis, loc. cit. 116.

168 See p. 889 and notes 52 and 54 above.

169 Note 5 above.

170 Notes 5 and 58 above.

171 See p. 885 above.

172 Note 5 above.

173 Notes 5 and 59 above.