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Proposals for UN Security Council Reform

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 February 2017

Yehuda Z. Blum
Yehuda Z. Blum*
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
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American Journal of International Law , Volume 99 , Issue 3 , July 2005 , pp. 632 - 649
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Copyright © American Society of International Law 2005

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References

1 A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Doc. A/59/565, at 8 (2004), available at <http://www.un.org/secureworld/report.pdf> [hereinafter Panel Report]. The panel was headed by former prime minister Anand Panyarachun of Thailand. The other members came from Australia, Brazil, China, Egypt, France, Ghana, India, Japan, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Uruguay. According to the secretary-general, the panel was composed of “eminent persons from around the world, who represent a wide range of experience and expertise,” thus implying that they had been appointed in their personal capacity and by virtue of their personal qualities and professional expertise. Note by the Secretary-General Transmitting Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, UN Docs. A/59/565 & Corr.1, at 1, para. 2 (2004) [hereinafter Note by the Secretary- General]. The panel’s overall composition, however, closely reflected that of the Security Council by including eminent persons on the basis of the geographical distribution of its seats among the various regional groups, as well as nationals of the five permanent members. The only departure from this pattern was the absence from the panel of an eminent person from the group of eastern European states (formerly states of the Soviet bloc). This lack can perhaps be explained by the fact that “Europe” as a whole was treated as one of the four “regional areas” referred to in the panel’s report. Panel Report, supra, at 67, para. 251.

2 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 1, para. 3.

3 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 78–92.

4 Id. at 66–69; Recommendations 73–79, id. at 87–88.

5 Transmittal Letter Dated 1 December 2004 from the Chair of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/565, at 6, 6. Secretary-General Annan, in his report of March 21, 2005, sounded the same warning. In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/59/2005 & annex, at 60, para. 8(c), available at <http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm> [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General].

6 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 53–58.

7 Id. at 58–60.

8 Id. at 45–51.

9 Id. at 38–45.

10 Id. at 26–31.

11 For instance, after leveling exceptionally sharp criticism at the Commission on Human Rights, the panel recommends that it be expanded to universal membership. Id. at 74, para. 285. In the words of the report, “The Commission on Human Rights suffers from a legitimacy deficit that casts doubts on the overall reputation of the United Nations.” Id. at 64. In an editorial of March 26, 2005, the New York Times called the Commission “one of the United Nations’ great embarrassments, . . . letting egregious violators of human rights like Cuba, Libya and Sudan sit in judgment of other countries’ performance.” The U.N. Fights for Its Future, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 2005, at A12. The Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, at 45, para. 182, echoes the panel’s criticism of the Commission, stating that

the Commission’s capacity to perform its tasks has been increasingly undermined by its declining credibility and professionalism. . . . States have sought membership of the Commission not to strengthen human rights but to protect themselves against criticism or criticize others. As a result, a credibility deficit has developed, which casts a shadow on the reputation of the United Nations system as a whole.

See also Human Rights and the U. N., N.Y. Times, May 3, 2005, at A24 Google Scholar (editorial).

12 Panel Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 97, at 92.

13 Id. at 77, para. 299. In the words of the panel, “The Trusteeship Council. . . performed an important task in helping the world emerge from the era of colonialism and steering many cases of successful decolonization. The United Nations should turn its back on any attempt to return to the mentalities and forms of colonialism.” Id. Oddly enough, while the panel recommends the deletion of the chapter dealing with the Trusteeship Council, it does not even mention Chapters 11 and 12 of the Charter, which set forth the admittedly outdated concepts of non-self-governing territories and the trusteeship system, respectively. It is not clear how the panel envisages the survival of the trusteeship system once the Trusteeship Council is dismantled. It would have been more logical to delete Chapters 11 and 12 while retaining Chapter 13 and adjusting it to the new international realities. Since under Article 81 of the Charter not only individual states but also the United Nations may serve as an “administering authority” of a territory placed under trusteeship, the Trusteeship Council may still serve a useful purpose— at least on a transitional basis—in some future crisis situations around the globe. A UN “administering authority” could better dispel the well-justified suspicion that arises whenever an individual state acts in that capacity; such a state is often suspected of using the trusteeship system (and its predecessor, the mandate system of the League of Nations era) as a cloak for the promotion of its selfish colonial interests. However, Secretary-General Annan fully endorsed the panel’s position. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, at 52, para. 218.

14 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 77, para. 300. Article 47 of the Charter established a Military Staff Committee consisting of the chiefs of staff of the five permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives, based on the (unfulfilled) assumption that those five powers—acting in unison—would assist the Council and coordinate their activities aimed at maintaining international peace and security. While the committee continued its paper existence, its activities over the years have been reduced to ritual monthly luncheons at UN headquarters. In correctly recommending the deletion of Article 47, as well as the references to it in Articles 26, 45, and 46, the panel diplomatically states that “[i]t is no longer appropriate for the joint chiefs of staff. . . to play the role imagined for them in 1945.” Id.; see also Recommendation 100, id. at 92. Here, too, the secretary-general endorsed the panel’s position. Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, at 52, para. 219.

15 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 77, para. 298. Article 107 of the Charter (located in Chapter 17, Transitional Security Arrangements) was intended to enable and validate action in relation to any state that during World War II had been an enemy of any Charter signatory. Clearly intended as a transitional measure, it can no longer be invoked now against those states, all of which have been UN members for decades and are naturally entitled to “sovereign equality” enshrined in Article 2(1). However, the provision (and the reference to it in Article 53)— even if now obsolete on the legal level—may still retain a certain symbolic significance, by reminding the United Nations and the world at large that the UN Organization grew out of the great wartime UN coalition that defeated the Axis powers and their allies in World War II. The vague reference to the UN origins in the preambular paragraph pledging “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind” can hardly serve as such a reminder. Significantly, the panel did not recommend the deletion of Article 107 and the reference to it in Article 53 but only their revision, to be “appropriately drafted to avoid retroactively undermining the legal provisions of these articles.” Id. In this author’s view, any revision of these articles should also take into account the need to avoid undermining their ideological—as distinct from their legal—implications. However, the secretary-general has gone beyond the panel’s recommendation, stating that “it is high time to eliminate the anachronistic ‘enemy’ clauses in Articles 53 and 107 of the Charter.” Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, at 52, para. 217 (emphasis added).

16 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 64.

17 Walther, Schücking & Wehberg, Hans, Die Satzung Des Völkerbundes: Kommentiert 204 (1921)Google Scholar. The terms “Executive Committee” and “Executive Council” were also used in the various drafts of the UN Charter in 1943–1944. See infra note 29.

18 League of Nations Covenant Art. 4(1); see Goodrich, Leland M., Hambro, Edvard, & Anne, Patricia Simons, Charter of the United Nations 654 (3d rev. ed. 1969)Google Scholar.

19 The question of the veto did not arise in this connection because, as a rule, the decisions of both the Assembly and the Council required unanimity. League of Nations Covenant Art. 5(1); Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 655.

20 Schucking & Wehberg, supra note 17, at 206.

21 League of Nations Covenant Art. 5(2); Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 654.

22 League of Nations Covenant Art. 5(2) bis.

23 2 Georg Dahm, Völkerrecht 214 (1961).

24 Id.

25 At the San Francisco Conference, amendments to allow for immediate reelection were overwhelmingly defeated, “the chief argument against the principle being that it might ‘do away with the distinction between permanent and nonpermanent members,’ a reminder of the development of semipermanent seats on the Council of the League of Nations.” Russell, Ruth B. & Muther, Jeannette E., A History of the United Nations Charter: The Role of the United States, 1940–1945, at 649 (1958)Google Scholar.

26 League of Nations, in 3 Encyclopedia of Public International Law 177, 182 (Bernhardt, Rudolf ed., 1997)Google Scholar [hereinafter EPIL].

27 Id.

28 3 Strupp, Karl & Hans-Jürgen, Schlochauer, Worterbuch des Völkerrechts 602 (1962)Google Scholar.

29 Russell & Muther, supra note 25, at 231. The term “Executive Committee” had already been used by Roosevelt in his conversations with Stalin at the Teheran Conference of November 1943. Id. at 154–55. In the attachment to the memorandum submitted to Roosevelt by the U.S. State Department in December 1943 (entitled “Plan for the Establishment of an International Organization for the Maintenance of International Peace and Security”), the term used was “Executive Council.” Id. at 991. Since Roosevelt had expressed enthusiasm for entrusting security enforcement exclusively to the four major Allied powers (“the four policemen”), the State Department’s technical committee (which did not favor such complete predominance of the great powers) came up with a compromise formula under which a four-power “Executive Committee” would form the nucleus within an eleven-member “Executive Council” (that would be “the general executive organ of the new institution”). The predominant position of the “Big Four” (later joined by France) would be guaranteed through both their permanent membership within the “Executive Council” and their right of veto on nonprocedural matters. Id. at 228–29. In the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals of September 1944, both of these terms were replaced by “Security Council,” but the said privileged position of the great powers was still guaranteed. Id. at 1020, 1022.

30 Id. at 1022 (Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, ch. VI, sec. A).

31 Id. at 443.

32 Id. In retrospect it is not devoid of irony that in 1944–1945 the founders of the United Nations deemed even a thirteen-member council as excessively large. Yet another curious argument against a thirteen-member council was raised at Dumbarton Oaks, namely, that in such a council there would be an uneven number (seven) of elected members, which might complicate the election process since only an even number would make it possible to elect equal numbers each year. Id. Needless to say, it would have been perfectly possible to elect three and four members alternately in the annual elections. A more valid argument against a permanent Brazilian seat was raised by Great Britain: that “any further increase in the number of permanent members . . . would only open the door to pressure for other additions.” Id.

33 For the problems inherent in the distinction between procedural and nonprocedural matters, see Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 216–25 (quoting Statement by the Delegations of the Four Sponsoring Governments on Voting Procedure in the Security Council, submitted to the San Francisco Conference in 1945, id. at 217–20); see also Kelsen, Hans, The Law of the United Nations 245–55 (1950)Google Scholar.

34 For a critical appraisal of this practice (including an analysis of the various possible interpretations of the relevant words of Article 27(3)), see Kelsen, supra note 33, at 240–44.

35 Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 197, 199.

36 As a result of the accession to independence of a large number of Caribbean states, this regional group is now known as the Latin American and Caribbean Group of States.

37 Now known as the Western and Other Group of States [hereinafter WEOG].

38 The eastern European seat was also split on several occasions between a state situated in that region and a state of Africa or Asia, as a result of me admission of numerous new members from those regions. See Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 198, tbl. 4.

39 The cold-shouldering of France in the early stages of the United Nations may well have accounted for the pique felt by de Gaulle, throughout his political career, toward the Organization.

40 On the eve of France’s surrender in June 1940, Churchill—then in office for barely one month as British prime minister—even proposed to the French government that the two countries be merged into a union, to spare the French the trauma and humiliation of capitulation. At Yalta, “Churchill’s insistence upon including France among this small elite group [of permanent members of the Security Council] was accepted with . . . skepticism by Roosevelt and Stalin as to the postwar position of France. “Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 193.

41 It is well-known that President Roosevelt did not take kindly to de Gaulle’s petulance, and even Churchill was quoted as saying that the heaviest cross he had to carry during the war was the Cross of Lorraine (the emblem of de Gaulle’s “Free French”).

42 For the adoption of any amendment to the Charter, Article 108 requires a two-thirds majority of UN membership in the General Assembly, followed by ratification by two-thirds of the UN membership, “including all the permanent members of the Security Council” (emphasis added).

43 That opposition was prompted mainly by the continued occupation of the Chinese seat at the United Nations by Taiwan.

44 GA Res. 1991A (XVIII) (Dec. 17, 1963).

45 Rosenne has pointed out that one of the features that the International Court of Justice has shared (since 1965) with the Security Council is that “[b]oth are today composed of fifteen members.” 1 Rosenne, Shabtai, The Law and Practice of the International Court, 1920–1996, at 66 (3d ed. 1997)Google Scholar. The Court is, of course, composed ofjudges elected in their personal capacity, irrespective of their nationality, see ICJ Statute Art. 1, while membership on the Security Council is based on state representation, see UN Charter Art. 23(1). Still, die same author also states that “[i]n so far as concerns the [overall] composition of the Court, noticeable is . . . the distribution of seats among the regional groups recognized by the General Assembly.” Rosenne, supra, at 396. While the question of the Court’s enlargement has not been raised by the panel (or subsequently), in the long term the Security Council’s enlargement may conceivably trigger demands for the Court’s expansion as well.

46 This happened in 1973, when in its Resolution 344 of December 15 the Council decided by ten (nonpermanent) votes, with four of its permanent members abstaining (and China not participating in the voting), to convene a conference on the Middle East in Geneva.

47 See Blum, Yehuda Z., Sauterpour Mieux Reculer: The Security Council’s New Look, 15 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 863 (1966)Google Scholar.

48 UN Doc. A/35/L.34/Rev.2 (1980).

49 On December 24, 1991, the Russian Federation, with the consent of the other republics of the former Soviet Union, took over the Soviet seat at the United Nations, including the permanent seat on die Security Council. UN Doc. 1991/RUSSIA, app.; UN Doc. 1991/RUSSIA.l. The three Baltic republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) had already been admitted to the United Nations in September 1991 upon their secession from the Soviet Union. The other former Soviet republics, with the exception of the Ukraine and Byelorussia (now Belarus)—two founding members of the Organization—were all later admitted to the United Nations. For the legal questions surrounding these developments, see Blum, Yehuda Z., Russia Takes over the Soviet Union’s Seat at the United Nations, 3 Eur. J. Int’l L. 354 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

50 See Blum, Yehuda Z., UN Membership of the “New” Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break? 86 AJIL 830 (1992)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia were admitted to the United Nations in 1992, and Macedonia (admitted as “the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”—FYROM) in 1993. The shrunken Yugoslavia was readmitted in 2000, following the downfall of Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević, and changed its name in 2003 to “Serbia and Montenegro.” When the former Czechoslovakia split in January 1993 into the Czech and Slovak Republics and the Czechoslovak seat became extinct, the two new states were admitted to the Organization, as was Eritrea upon its secession from Ethiopia in the same year.

51 Liechtenstein was admitted in 1990, San Marino in 1992, and Monaco and Andorra in 1993. There was little justification for excluding them once the Organization had admitted over the preceding two decades a large number of newly independent microstates (mostly island states) of the Caribbean, as well as of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, some of which displayed lesser qualifications of statehood than the above-mentioned European microstates. On the problem of microstates’ quality as states and their membership in international organizations, see Microstates, in EPIL, supra note 26, at 362–64, and the references cited there. See also Crawford, James, The Creation of States in International Law 139–41 (1979)Google Scholar. The League of Nations took a negative attitude to the admission of such states to its ranks. Schücking & Wehberg, supra note 17, at 148–49 (on Liechtenstein), 158 (on Monaco). As of 2005, about 30 of the 191 UN members have a population of less than half a million, and about half of them a population of less than one hundred thousand. The panel’s report does not address this question.

52 A U.N. for the 21st Century, N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 2004, at A26 Google Scholar (editorial). In an editorial of March 26, 2005, the paper reiterated this argument, stating that “[t]he current line-up [of the Security Council], particularly the five veto-wielding permanent members... emerged from the geopolitics of 1945.” The U.N. Fights for Its Future, supra note 11.

53 GA Res. 55/5B (Dec. 23, 2000), since reaffirmed by GA Res. 58/1B (Dec. 23, 2003). The same resolution fixed “the floor” at 0.001% of the regular budget. For the years 2004–2006, this minimum contribution has been set for forty-five members, with ten members contributing 0.002% each and eight members 0.003% each. Thus, the combined contribution of sixty-three members (33% of the membership) is currently 0.089% of the budget.

54 By way of comparison, France’s contribution to the regular UN budget now amounts to 6.030%, the United Kingdom’s to 6.127%, China’s to 2.053%, and the Russian Federation’s to 1.100%.

55 In fact, India (which had been a member of the League of Nations) sought a permanent seat for itself at the San Francisco Conference in 1945 (two years before becoming independent) and based its demand on the size of its population. Russell & Muther, supra note 25, at 648.

56 India has the second largest population in the world, estimated at 1.1 billion. Brazil’s population is estimated at around 200 million.

57 As pointed out by Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 199, “There has been a tendency on the part of many members to interpret the term ‘geographical distribution’ as meaning ‘regional representation.’” These authors quote the prescient warning, issued by the Chinese representative as early as the first session of the General Assembly, that “there were states which belong to a given region but not necessarily to a particular group in that region,” and that if “any vacancy … should always be filled by another Member of the same group or region, [then some states] would always be excluded from obtaining a place on the Council.... [This would] obviously be … detrimental to the best interests of the Organization.” Id. (and the reference there).

Israel is a case in point. Because of Arab opposition, it was excluded from the regional group of Asia to which it geographically belongs. Secretary-General Annan, in a speech in Jerusalem on March 25, 1998, termed this practice’ an anomaly . . . which means [Israel] has no chance of being elected to serve on main organs.” UN Press Release SG/SM/6504/Rev. 1 * (Mar. 25, 1998). Israel was co-opted to the WEOG in 2000 “on a temporary basis,” on the understanding that it would not seek a seat on such organs, which only perpetuated this major aspect of the anomaly. Moreover, as even this arrangement was not applied outside New York (e.g., in Geneva), Israel is still not a member of any regional group elsewhere.

58 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 66, para. 244.

59 Id.

60 Id., para. 245.

61 Id.

62 Id., para. 246.

63 Id. at 66–67, para. 249(a).

64 Id. at 67, para. 249(b).

65 Id., para. 249(c).

66 Id., para. 249(d).

67 Id., para. 250.

68 The seven affirmative votes required before 1965 amounted to 63.6% of the membership of eleven; the nine affirmative votes required since 1965 constitute 60% of the current membership of fifteen.

69 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 67, para. 251 (emphasis omitted).

70 Id. (emphasis omitted).

71 Id., para. 252.

72 Id. at 68, para. 256. The panel views the veto with open skepticism:

We recognize that the veto had an important function in reassuring the United Nations’ most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members’ veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age . …

Id. (emphasis added).

73 At least two of the serious contenders for permanent seats—Germany and Japan—originally indicated their objection to this proposal by the panel and insisted on a veto right for themselves. On a visit to Tokyo in December 2004, German chancellor Schröder and japanese prime minister Koizumi demanded that their countries be allocated permanent Council seats with veto rights. Schroeder Demands German Veto Power, Spiegel Online, Dec. 9, 2004, at <http://service.spiegel.de/cache/international/0,1518,331971,00.html>. However, Schröder added that this demand for nondiscrimination vis-à-vis the original permanent members was merely a starting position. He noted that eventually a consensus would be required and that Germany would not stand in its way. Vetorecht für alle in neuem Uno-Sicherheitsrat? Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Dec. 10, 2004, at 7 Google Scholar. In view of these statements, it is difficult to see how Schröder expected this demand to be taken at face value. Japan and Germany also established a loose alliance with India and Brazil (“the G—4”) in order to campaign jointly for their election as permanent Council members. Germany has now apparently reconciled itself to the fact that in the event that the Security Council is enlarged at this time, the veto will remain confined to the five original permanent members, even if, under modeM (not surprisingly preferred by Germany over model B), six new permanent seats will be added. See text at notes 112–13 infra.

74 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 67, para. 252.

75 Id.

76 Id.

77 Id. at 67–68, para. 253.

78 Italy’s population (about 60 million) roughly equals those of France and the United Kingdom, respectively. Its financial contribution to the regular UN budget (4.885%) does not substantially lag behind those of the United Kingdom (6.127%) and France (6.030%).

79 The population of Spain and Poland is about 40 million each. Turkey’s population is over 70 million.

80 Canada’s contribution to the regular UN budget is now 2.813%, compared to Argentina’s 0.956% and Mexico’s 1.883%. However, Mexico’s population is now about 100 million and that of Argentina about 40 million, as against Canada’s roughly 30 million.

81 The Russian Federation is counted by the panel (under both models) as belonging to the European regional area, although most of its territory is located in Asia, beyond the Ural Mountains, which are generally accepted as the border separating European Russia from its Asian counterpart. Turkey, whose territory is located mostly in Asia, participates in both WEOG and the Asian regional group, but for electoral purposes is considered to belong only to WEOG.

82 Indonesia has served only two terms on the Security Council—in the years 1973–1974 and 1995–1996.

83 Reischauer, Edwin O., Preface to The Japanese (1981)Google Scholar.

84 Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, annex, at 60, para. 8(c) (emphasis added). The supporters of both models A and B, in their proposals submitted in May–June 2005, have spoken of a Council of twenty-five members. Ching, Frank, UN Security Council Reforms Hit a Brick Wall , New Straits Times (Malaysia), June 9, 2005, at 23, available in Lexis, News Library, Major Newspapers File Google Scholar.

85 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 68, para. 257.

86 Id. (emphasis omitted).

87 Id.

88 Id., para. 255.

89 In the Dumbarton Oaks deliberations it was already pointed out that “[i]f one [Latin American] state were selected for permanent membership, this would no doubt produce as many complaints from the other Latin American republics as would the failure to single out any of them.” Russell & Muther, supra note 25, at 443–44.

90 At Dumbarton Oaks a thirteen-member Council was “thought undesirably large.” Id. at 443. However, at San Francisco it was argued that “even fifteen members would not impair operating efficiency and would make it more representative . . . . Any change in size, however, would have upset the voting formula arrived at with such difficulty by the three major powers. On this point, therefore, the permanent members agreed to stand fast Id. at 649–50.

91 In this regard the semipermanent seats constitute a hybrid phenomenon: some of those seats are likely to be permanently occupied by the same member, while others may be rotating among members belonging to the same regional group. Hence the difficulty of placing them en bloc in either of the two columns.

92 This Charter concept of “democracy” and “equality” is understandably not devoid of problems and has often been subjected to (mosdy doctrinal) criticism. See, for example, the materials reproduced in Sohn, Louis B., Cases on United Nations Law 248–90 (2d rev. ed. 1967)Google Scholar, also containing various proposals for reforming the existing system. Since the majority of the UN membership at this time consists of small states that are die main beneficiaries of the current system (and for which the General Assembly is often the main, if not the only, major international forum where they can articulate their views), there is little chance for any change in the foreseeable future that would curtail their status and rights. To be sure, the sponsoring powers at San Francisco, over the initial opposition of many smaller states, made sure that General Assembly decisions addressed to member states (and to the Security Council) would be merely in the nature of nonbinding “recommendations.” UN Charter Art. 10.

93 Panel Report, supra note 1, at 66, paras. 244, 248 (emphasis added).

94 Id. at 67, para. 249(b), (d) (emphasis omitted).

95 See Report of the Secretary-General, supra note 5, annex, at 60, para. 8(c)), where Secretary-General Annan urged the membership to agree “to take a decision on this important issue [the enlargement of the Security Council] before the summit in September 2005. . . . If . . . they are unable to reach consensus, this must not become an excuse for postponing action.”

96 The U.N. Fights for Its Future, supra note 11. For some reason, the editorial overlooked the existence of similar problems within Europe, as will be pointed out below.

97 Kahn, Joseph, If 22 Million Chinese Prevail at U.N. Japan Won’t, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2005, at A4 Google Scholar.

98 Id.; see also Erling, Johnny, China sieht keinen Anlaβ zur Beruhigung, Die Welt, Apr. 19, 2005 Google Scholar.

99 Kahn, supra note 97.

100 Id.

101 Südkoreas Präsident beurteilt UN-Reformpläne skeptisch, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 14, 2005 Google Scholar.

102 Pilling, David & Sullivan, Paul, Six Countries Oppose Bids by Japan and India for Permanent UN Security Council Seats, Fin. Times (London), Apr. 12, 2005, at 12 Google Scholar; Shirakawa, Yoshikazu, Meeting Urges UNSC Reform by Consensus , Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), Apr. 13, 2005, at 1, available in Lexis, News Library, Major Newspapers File Google Scholar.

103 Pilling & Sullivan, supra note 102.

104 A Breakthrough for Security Council Reform? Economist, June 11, 2005 Google Scholar (U.S. ed.).

105 UN Press Release GA/10371, ‘United for Consensus’ Group of States Introduces Text on Security Council Reform to General Assembly (July 26, 2005). On the G–4, see note 73 supra.

106 Manfred, Schäfers, Mit mehr Geld in den Sicherheitsrat; Die Erhöhung der Entwicklungshilfe soil deutschen Interessen dienen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Apr. 19, 2005 Google Scholar.

107 Bone, James, China Backs Germany for the UN Top Table, Times (London), Apr. 15, 2005, at 41 Google Scholar.

108 Kessler, Glenn, Rice Puts Japan at Center of New U.S. Vision of Asia; China Challenged in Major Speech, Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 2005, at A16 Google Scholar.

109 Kessler, Glenn, Rice Apparently Rejects German Bid, Wash. Post, May 18, 2005, at A11 Google Scholar (quoting a confidential memorandum of the U.S. Department of State).

110 Borger, Julian, US Backs Japan to Join SC, Guardian, June 17, 2005, at 3 Google Scholar (and correction, June 24, 2005).

111 Hishinuma, Takao, Proposal to Expand UNSC Facing Delay , Daily Yomiuri (Tokyo), June 8, 2005, at 1, available in Lexis, News Library, Major Newspapers File Google Scholar.

112 Shirakawa, Yoshikazu & Kawakami, Osamu, 3 Hurdles Remain for G–4, Daily Yomiuri, June 11, 2005, at 3 Google Scholar.

113 Id.

114 U.S. Dep’t of State, On-the-Record Briefing on UN Reform (June 16, 2005), at <http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2005/48186.htm> (R. Nicholas Burns, under secretary for political affairs).

115 Id.

116 USUN Press Release 119 (05), Statement by Anne W. Patterson, Acting U.S. Representative to the United Nations, on U.S. Proposals for UN Reform, in the General Assembly (June 22, 2005), available at <http://www.un.int/usa/05_l 19.htm>.

117 Pisik, Betsy, U.N. Report Skirts Big Issues, Wash. Times, June 6, 2005, at A1 Google Scholar.

118 See Robinson, Jacob, Metamorphosis of the United Nations Charter, in 94 Recueildes Cours 493, 547 (1958 II)Google Scholar; Sohn, Louis B., United Nations Decision-Making: Confrontation or Consensus1? 15 Harv. Int’l L.J. 438 (1974)Google Scholar.

119 GA Res. 1991A (XVIII) (Dec. 17, 1963) (Security Council enlargement); GA Res. 1991B (XVIII) (Dec. 17, 1963) (first enlargement of Economic and Social Council).

120 GA Res. 2847 (XXVI) (Dec. 20, 1971).

121 Should the Charter amendments proposed by the panel be adopted by the General Assembly and receive the requisite ratifications, member states opposing those amendments would also be bound by them. However, the question may still arise whether such opposition could entitle them to withdraw from the United Nations, since the UN Charter—unlike the League Covenant—is silent on the question of withdrawal. Instead, the San Francisco Conference adopted an interpretive declaration under which “[i]f... a Member because of exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, … it is not the purpose of the Organization to compel that member to continue its cooperation in the Organization.” Doc. 1210, P/20, 1 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 612, 616 (1945). A discussion of the juridical effect and value of this declaration would go beyond the scope of this Note. For the different views on this question, see Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra note 18, at 640–41; Kelsen, supra note 33, at 127–29; Singh, Nagendra, Termination of Membership of International Organisations 93–94 (1958)Google Scholar. Suffice it to say here that among the “exceptional circumstances” justifying withdrawal by a member, the declaration specified, by way of illustration, a situation in which a member’s “rights and obligations” were changed by a Charter amendment with which it did not concur and was thus unable to accept. Goodrich, Hambro, & Simons, supra, at 75.

On the right of withdrawal from the United Nations in general, see Feinberg, N., Unilateral Withdrawal from an International Organization, 1963 Brit.Y.B. Int’l L. 189, 197–202, 211–19 Google Scholar; Dehousse, Fernand, Le Droit de retrait aux Nations Unies, 1 Revue Belge de Droit International 30 (1965)Google Scholar & 2 id. at 8 (1966).

In practical terms, should the proposed Charter amendments clear the constitutional hurdles laid down in Article 108, it is highly unlikely that any possible opponent of these amendments would wish to withdraw from the United Nations on this score. Indonesia’s avowed withdrawal from the United Nations in 1965 was subsequently characterized by both the United Nations and Indonesia as a mere “cessation of co-operation” with the Organization, which enabled Indonesia to “resume full co-operation with the United Nations” in 1966, without having to be formally readmitted. Thus, the United Nations has been able to maintain that no member state has ever withdrawn from it since its establishment in 1945. See Blum, Yehuda Z., Indonesia’s Return to the United Nations, 16 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 522 (1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.