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Prosecutorial Politics: The ICC's Influence in Colombian Peace Processes, 2003–2017

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 June 2017

René Urueña
René Urueña*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor and Director of Research, Universidad de los Andes School of Law, Colombia.
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Extract

In August 2016, in Havana, Cuba, the Colombian Government signed a peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP, after four years of negotiations. The agreement provided a window of hope that Colombia's fifty-year armed struggle, the longest-running conflict in Latin America, would finally come to a close. One actor in these negotiations, whose considerable influence has been underappreciated, is the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Colombia has been under preliminary examination by the OTP since 2004. In addition to discharging its investigatory function, the ICC prosecutor has actively influenced the negotiation of two peace processes: first, the 2005 peace process with the paramilitaries; and more recently, the tumultuous negotiations with the FARC. This Comment explores the specific pathways of the OTP's influence in the Colombian peace process, and the broader lessons this episode holds for the ICC's work and for the continuing negotiations in Colombia.

Type
Notes and Comments
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 111 , Issue 1 , January 2017 , pp. 104 - 125
Copyright
Copyright © 2017 by The American Society of International Law 

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References

2 ICC, Preliminary Examination: Colombia, at https:// www.icc-cpi.int/colombia.

3 See ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan June 2012–2015, paras. 64–67 (Oct. 11, 2013), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Strategic-Plan-2013.pdf; Burke-White, William, Implementing a Policy of Positive Complementarity in the Rome System of Justice , 19 Crim. L. Forum 59–85 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stahn, Carsten, Complementarity: A Tale of Two Notions , 19 Crim. L. Forum 87–113 (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Shenkman, Carey, Catalyzing National Judicial Capacity: The ICC's First Crimes Against Humanity Outside Armed Conflict , 87 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (2012)Google Scholar.

4 On the “catalyst” effect, see Jann K. Kleffner, Complementarity in the Rome Statute and National Criminal Jurisdictions 309–39 (2008).

5 In this sense, the Colombian case resonates with some of Sarah Nouwen's findings in Uganda and Sudan, where, she reports, ICC intervention failed to catalyze genuine domestic prosecutions. See Sarah M. H. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire: The Catalysing Effect of the International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan 337–405 (2013).

6 Bosco, David L., Discretion and State Influence at the International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor's Preliminary Examination , 111 AJIL (2017, forthcoming)Google Scholar.

7 See Informe de Ponencia Primer Debate Proyecto Acto Legislativo 014 de 2001 Senado, 114 Gac. Congr. 1, 4–5 (2001) (Colom.).

8 In fact, one influential interpretation suggests that all of Colombia's constitutional history can be read as a tradition of peace deals-turned constitutions. See Hernando Valencia Villa, Cartas de Batalla: Una Crítica del Constitucionalismo Colombiano, 11–23 (1987).

9 Alfredo Rangel, ¿Adónde van los Paramilitares?, in El Poder Paramilitar 11–23 (Alfredo Rangel ed., 2005).

10 Restrepo, Jorge, Spagat, Michael & Vargas, Juan, The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Dataset , 21 Homo Oeconomicus 396–428 (2004)Google Scholar.

11 Londoño, Ana Maria Ibáñez, El Desplazamiento Forzoso en Colombia: Un Camino Sin Retorno Hacia la Pobreza , 48 Cuad. Geográficos 301–03 (2011)Google Scholar.

12 This rationale was clearly laid out during the debate in the Colombian Congress regarding what was then called a “humanitarian exchange” with the FARC. See Senado de la República, Acta Número 23 de la Sesión Ordinaria del 12 de Noviembre de 2002, 529 Gac. Congr. (Nov. 20, 2002) (Colom.).

13 See generally Burke-White, supra note 3.

14 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 2 (June 16, 2003), at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/MorenoOcampo16June03.pdf.

15 Cable 04THEHAGUE1885_a, ICC: GETTING DOWN TO BUSINESS?, Wikileaks, para. 7, at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/04THEHAGUE1885_a.html.

16 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations 2013 (Nov. 2013), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Policy_Paper_Preliminary_Examinations_2013-ENG.pdf.

17 See ‘Jorge 40,’ Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, Verdad Abierta, at http://www.verdadabierta.com/victimarios/691-perfil-rodrigo-tovar-pupo-alias-jorge-40.

18 Revelaciones Explosivas, Revista Semana (2004, audio available).

19 Explanatory Statement of the Proposed Statutory Law 85 of 2003, Cong. Gazette 436 (2003) (Colom.).

20 See Salvatore Mancuso, Discurso de Salvatore Mancuso ante el Congreso de la República (July 28, 2004), available at http://lasillavacia.com/sites/default/files/media/docs/17789/discurso_salvatore_mancuso.pdf (Salvatore Mancuso's speech before the Colombian Congress on July 2004).

21 This description of the bill is based on: René Urueña, Diego Acosta Arcarazo & Russell Buchan, Beyond Justice, Beyond Peace? Colombia, the Interests of Justice, and the Limits of International Criminal Law , 26 Crim. L. Forum 291–318 (2015)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

22 See Isacson, Adam, Optimism, Pessimism, and Terrorism: The United States and Colombia in 2003 , 10 Brown J. World Aff. 245 (2004)Google Scholar.

23 See Tallman, David A., Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the Dilemma of Treaty Conflict , 92 Geo. L.J. 1033 (2003)Google Scholar. Colombia had such an Article 98 Agreement with the United States.

24 See Jain, Neha, A Separate Law for Peacekeepers: The Clash Between the Security Council and the International Criminal Court , 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 239–54 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 See David L. Bosco, Rough justice: The International Criminal Court in a World of Power Politics 87–101 (2014).

26 Id. at 89–91.

27 See, e.g., Gustavo Gallón & Catalina Díaz Gómez, Justicia Simulada: Una Propuesta Indecente (2003), available at http://escolapau.uab.cat/img/programas/procesos/seminario/semi003.pdf.

28 Antkowiak, Thomas M., Truth as Right and Remedy in International Human Rights Experience , 23 Mich. J. Int’l L. 977 (2002)Google Scholar.

29 See Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 230–89 (2013).

30 Case of Barrios Altos v. Perú, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75, paras. 41–44 (Mar. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Barrios Altos].

31 See Binder, Christina, The Prohibition of Amnesties by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights , 12 Ger. L.J. 1203–30 (2011)Google Scholar.

32 Barrios Altos, supra note 30.

33 Id., paras. 41–44.

34 Germán Darío Valencia Agudelo, Reconstrucción Analítica del Proceso de Desarme, Desmovilización y Reinserción con las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, 2002–2007, Perf. Coyunt. Económica 147, 166 (2007). The calculations are based on the data set of the Colombian High Commissioner for Peace.

35 Rodrigo Uprimny & María Paula Saffon, Usos y Abusos de la Justicia Transicional en Colombia, Anu. Derechos Hum. - Univ. Chile 165, 172 (2008).

36 The description of the LPJ is based on Urueña, Acosta Arcarazo & Buchan, supra note 21, at 295.

37 Victims’ organizations, human rights activists, and some scholars were quick to argue that although the JPL was designed to resemble a legal framework for guaranteeing human rights (particularly as compared to the Alternative Sentencing Bill of 2003), it would not actually live up to these aspirations in practice. This intuition has proven correct. Eleven years after its adoption, out of 4,408 demobilized AUC militants, who confessed 25,757 homicides and 1,046 massacres, only thirty-five sentences have been passed, of which only nine are final. Data of the Colombian prosecutor at http://www.fiscalia.gov.co/jyp/unidad-de-justicia-y-paz.

38 Bosco, supra note 25, at 110–15.

39 Id. at 112.

40 ICC-OTP, Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, para. 2 (2012), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/3d3055bd-16e2-4c83-ba85-35bcfd2a7922/285102/otpcolombiapublicinterimreportnovember2012.pdf [hereinafter OTP Situation in Colombia Report].

41 Human Rights Watch, Breaking the Grip?: Obstacles to Justice for Paramilitary Mafias in Colombia 33 (Oct. 16, 2008), at https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/10/16/breaking-grip/obstacles-justice-paramilitary-mafias-colombia. Lack of resources was not a strategy to starve the Unit and undermine its work. The Colombian Prosecutor's Office did make an effort to enhance the Unit's capacity; for example, in 2008, the Unit went from twenty-three to fifty-seven prosecutors, and, in total, from two hundred to almost five hundred employees. However, the sheer magnitude of the challenge (thousands of demobilized militia) made all this effort insufficient. International Crisis Group, Corregir el Curso: Las Víctimas y la Ley de Justicia y Paz en Colombia. Informe Sobre América Latina, No. 29, 9 (2008).

42 Olga Lucía Gaitán, La Construcción de Sentencias de Justicia y Paz y de la “Parapolítica” 47–51 (2014). In fact, the JPL had to be reformed in order to achieve more complex forms of criminal investigation, under Law 1592 of 2012.

43 This is the problem of “imputaciones parciales,” which led the Colombian Supreme Court to overthrow the first final decision in the context of the JPL, concerning a mid-level paramilitary known as El Loro. See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, Auto del 31 de julio de 2009, Rad. 31539 (Colom.). While a doctrinal criminal law issue in its framing, this is also a problem of investigative capacity: investigating and prosecuting complex criminal organizations is costly and time consuming. The Colombian Prosecutor preferred to be allowed to charge demobilized paramilitaries for some individual charges that were easier to prove, a strategy that would keep the Justice and Peace machinery moving, and would facilitate having some paramilitaries do some prison time for some crimes. The alternative, which the prosecutor rejected, was to bring all charges at the same time, which implied investigating complex criminal activities, but risked either taking so long that the demobilized paramilitaries would walk free, or being forced to present weak evidence to the judge. Originally, the Colombian Supreme Court accepted, with some caveats, the possibility that only some charges were brought against the demobilized (Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, Sentencia del 23 de julio de 2008, Rad. 30120 (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, Sentencia del 9 de febrero de 2009, Rad. 30955 (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, Sentencia del 11 de mayo de 2009, Rad. 31290 (Colom.)). Human Rights NGOs rejected this approach, as these partial charges undermined the rights of victims to know the whole truth regarding the role of the individual paramilitary in the context of the paramilitary criminal organization as a whole (if the paramilitary is tried only for the murder of X, the victims of all his other crimes will have no access to truth and reparation). (See Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, ¿Imputaciones Parciales o Derechos Parciales?, Serie Sobre los Derechos de las Víctimas y la Aplicación de la Ley 975 32 (Bogotá: Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, 2009)). The Court seemed to agree, and decided then to require all charges to be brought (Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, auto de 31 de julio de 2009, Rad. 31539 (Colom.)). The investigative threshold imposed by the Supreme Court to the Prosecutor, then, had an important impact on the latter's resources. Eventually, the Supreme Court moderated its position, and exceptionally accepted some partial charges in particularly complex cases (Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, auto del 14 de diciembre de 2009, Rad. 32575 (Colom.)). The demanding overall standard, though, remained, making prosecutions harder.

44 Carta Enviada por el Fiscal Moreno de la CPI, El Espectador (Aug. 16, 2008), at http://www.elespectador.com/node/32589/impreso/politica.

45 Corte Penal Internacional le Sigue la Pista a la Parapolítica, El Tiempo (Oct. 21, 2007), at http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-2698429.

46 On the private conversations: GOC'S POSSIBLE SHIFT ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT PROVISION. 07BOGOTA7671_a, Wikileaks, at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07BOGOTA7671_a.html. On the public statements: Easterday, Jennifer S., Deciding the Fate of Complementarity: A Colombian Case Study , 26 Ariz. J. Int’l Comp. L. 49 (2009)Google Scholar.

47 Case of the Rochela Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 163 (May 11, 2007) [hereinafter Rochela Massacre]; Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148 (July 1, 2006); Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140 (Jan. 31, 2006); Case of the “Massacre of Mapiripán” v. Colombia, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134 (Sept. 14, 2005).

48 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Informe Sobre la Implementación de la Ley de Justicia y Paz: Etapas Iniciales del Proceso de Desmovilización de las AUC y Primeras Diligencias Judiciales, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.129 Doc. 6 2, paras. 49–52 (Oct. 2007).

49 Id., paras. 78–100.

50 Rochela Massacre, supra note 47.

51 Id., paras. 191–92.

52 Huneeus, Alexandra, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts , 107 AJIL 1, 2 (2013)Google Scholar.

53 Rochela Massacre, supra note 47, para. 192.

54 Case of La Cantuta v. Perú, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162 (Nov. 29, 2006).

55 Extradición Masiva de Paramilitares, BBC Mundo (May 13, 2008), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/latin_america/newsid_7398000/7398251.stm; Extradición Masiva de Paramilitares, Semana (May 13, 2008), at http://www.semana.com/on-line/articulo/extradicion-masiva-paramilitares/92677-3.

56 There is a signed and ratified extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States. Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Colombia, U.S.-Colom., opened for signature Sept. 14, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 97-8 (entered into force March 2, 1982) (Diario Oficial, Year CXVII, No. 35.643, p. 401 (1980)). However, in June 1987, the middle of the drug wars with the Medellín Cartel, the Colombian law approving the treaty was declared unconstitutional in Colombia (Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, Sentencia del 2 de diciembre de 1986, Rad. 1558 (Colom.); Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala de Casación Penal, Sentencia del 25 de junio de 1987, Rad. 1558 (Colom.)). However, the Colombian government never denounced the treaty. The United States usually includes the treaty in the State Department's “Treaties in Force” publication (see http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tif/index.htm). However, since the Treaty is no longer valid under Colombian law, extraditions of Colombian nationals to the United States are framed, in Colombian domestic law, as a unilateral response to the extradition request from the United States, regulated solely by Colombian law.

57 Carta Enviada por el Fiscal Moreno de la CPI, El Espectador (Aug. 16, 2008), at http://www.elespectador.com/impreso/politica/articuloimpreso-carta-enviada-el-fiscal-moreno-de-cpi.

58 U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release, 14 Members of Colombian Paramilitary Group Extradited to the United States to Face U.S. Drug Charges (May 13, 2008), at https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/May/08-opa-414.html; see also, Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to Colombia William Brownfield at a Press Conference in Bogotá (May 3, 2008), available at http://bogota.usembassy.gov/pc_001_13052008.html.

59 See International Human Rights Law Clinic - University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, Truth Behind Bars: Colombian Paramilitary Leaders in U.S. Custody (Feb. 2010), available at https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/7467/Truthbehindbars-Berkeley.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y. For the perspective of victims, see Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz, Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo & Project Counselling Service, La Extradición: Aprendizajes y Recomendaciones Desde las Víctima (2014), at http://www.colectivodeabogados.org/IMG/pdf/extradicion.pdf. For the U.S. Department of State, in contrast, a rigorous cooperation has existed. See U.S. Dep't of State, Memorandum of Justification Concerning Human Rights Conditions with Respect to Assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces (2010).

60 This figure includes the fourteen individuals who were extradited in May of 2008, as well as six who were extradited thereafter.

61 Alejandro Chehtman, The Impact of the ICC in Colombia: Positive Complementarity on Trial 30 (DOMAC/9 Working Paper, 2011).

62 Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, La Metáfora del Desmantelamiento de los Grupos Paramilitares 297–98, and references (March, 2010), at http://www.coljuristas.org/documentos/libros_e_informes/la_metafora.pdf; see also id.

63 Deborah Sontag, The Secret History of Colombia's Paramilitaries and the U.S. War on Drugs, N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 2016, at A1.

64 OTP Situation in Colombia Report, supra note 40.

65 Jim Wyss, El Tortuoso Camino que Llevó a la Paz en Colombia, El Nuevo Herald (Sept. 24, 2016).

66 See generally Enrique Santos Calderón, Así Empezó Todo: El Primer Cara a Cara Secreto Entre el Gobierno y las FARC en La Habana (2014).

67 See James Verini, The Prosecutor and the President, N.Y. Times Mag., June 22, 2016, at MM44.

68 See, e.g., Fatou Bensouda, We Are Not Against Africa, New Afr. Mag. (2012), at http://newafricanmagazine.com/fatou-bensouda-we-are-not-against-africa.

69 The description of the LFP is based on Urueña, Acosta Arcarazo & Buchan, supra note 21, at 298–99.

70 See OTP Situation in Colombia Report, supra note 40.

71 Id., para. 205.

72 Id., para. 204. On the other main point of the LFP—reduced and alternative sentencing—the OTP remained mostly silent. Id., para. 206.

73 See Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Agosto 28, 2013, Sentencia C-579/13 (Colom.) [hereinafter Sentencia C-579/13].

74 See Letter from Fatou Bensouda, ICC Prosecutor, to Jorge Iván Palacio, President of the Colombian Constitutional Court, Ref. 2013/0/FB/JCCD-evdu (July 26, 2013), available at http://www.ips.org/blog/cvieira/documento-fiscalia-cpi-sobre-cero-carcel-por-crimenes-de-su-competencia.

75 James Stewart, Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Role of the International Criminal Court 11 (2015), at https:// www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otp-stat-13-05-2015-ENG.pdf.

76 According to the ICC's Deputy Prosecutor, “This was done confidentially and in advance of formal negotiations on the sentencing issue in the peace talks. The step was prompted by [the OTP's] concern to alert the national authorities to [its] interpretation of the provisions of the Rome Statute in a timely way, and not after the fact, in view of the Government's stated interest in negotiating a peace agreement that was compatible with the Rome Statute.” Id. at 11.

77 See Sentencia C-579/13, supra note 73, para. 9.9.8.

78 Redacción de Paz, Gobierno y FARC Habrían Acordado no Tener en Cuenta Marco Jurídico para la Paz, El Espectador (June 28, 2015).

79 Fiscal Eduardo Montealegre Desmiente Enfermedad: Entrevista, El Tiempo (Oct. 27, 2014).

80 Paul Seils, Squaring Colombia's Circle: The Objectives of Punishment and the Pursuit of Peace, ICTJ Briefing (June 2, 2015), at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-COL-Briefing-Punishments-2015.pdf.

81 Santiago Martinez Hernández, “Jefes de las FARC Deben Estar Dispuestos a ir Presos”: Moreno Ocampo, El Espectador (July 28, 2014).

82 El Mozote & Lugares Aledaños v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252 (Oct. 25, 2012).

83 Id., paras. 283–86; Concurrent Vote, Diego García-Sayán, paras. 9, 10, 18, 20, 37–38.

84 Stewart, supra note 75, at 10.

85 Id.

86 Fatou Bensouda, International Justice and Diplomacy, N.Y. Times (Mar. 19, 2013).

87 Prosecutor v. Kony, ICC-02/04-01/05-116-Corr2, Submission of Information on the Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest in the Situation in Uganda, para. 25 (Oct. 6, 2006), available at http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/501e95.

88 Id., paras. 33–34.

89 See Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, ICC Arrest Warrants for the Lord's Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda , 4 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 179–87 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

90 For example, the Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative, a vocal civil society organization in Northern Uganda, was emphatically against the OTP's intervention. See Apuuli, Kasaija Phillip, Peace over Justice: The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) vs. the International Criminal Court in Northern Uganda , 11 Stud. Ethnicity Nationalism 116–29 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

91 Yusuf Kiranda, Juba Peace Talks Collapse, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (June 12, 2008), at http://www.kas.de/uganda/en/publications/13956.

92 Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Ejército del Pueblo – FARC-EP & Gobierno de Colombia, Acuerdo Final Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera 266 (2016).

93 Id. at 133, 136.

94 Id. at 147.

95 Id.

96 ICC-OTP, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the Conclusion of the Peace Negotiations Between the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (Sept. 1, 2016), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=160901-otp-stat-colombia.

97 Id.

98 See Eric A. Heath, Colombia Rejects Peace Deal with FARC After Plebiscite, ASIL Int'l L. in Brief (Oct. 7, 2016).

99 See Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch Analysis of Colombia-FARC Agreement (Dec. 21, 2015), at https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/21/human-rights-watch-analysis-colombia-farc-agreement.

100 This description of the bill is based on: Urueña, René, Playing with Fire: International Criminal Law, Transitional Justice, and the Implementation of the Colombian Peace Agreement , 110 AJIL Unbound 364–68 (2016)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

101 Original Peace Agreement Between the Colombian Government and the FARC, 137 (Aug. 24, 2016).

102 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Judgment, para. 377 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, para. 307 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2008).

103 Acuerdo Final Para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcció n de una Paz Estable Y Duradera, 152 (peace deal reached on Nov. 12, 2016, final written agreement released Nov. 24, 2016).

104 Human Rights Watch, Carta Sobre “Responsabilidad de Mando” en la Legislación de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz (Jan. 25, 2017), at https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2017/01/25/carta-sobre-responsabilidad-de-mando-en-la-legislacion-de-implementacion-del-acuerdo; see also, Oficina del Alto Comisiona de las Naciones Unidas, El ‘Toque’ de los Militares a la Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, (Jan. 30, 2017), available at http://www.hchr.org.co/migracion/index.php/compilacion-de-noticias/368-jurisdiccion-especial-para-la-paz/8483-el-toque-de-los-militares-a-la-jurisdiccion-especial-para-la-paz.

105 One further problem is that the constitutional amendment only speaks of command responsibility in the case of state agents, possibly excluding this form of criminal liability for FARC commanders. This oversight would be contrary to both Colombia's international obligations and the Peace Agreement itself. My interpretation is that command responsibility exists as a principle of criminal law, even if the constitutional amendment was silent. For the FARC, though, the applicable standard would not be that of the Amendment (which is restricted to agents of the state), but less demanding principles of international law, discussed below.

106 Corte Penal Internacional ya Examina el Nuevo Acuerdo de Paz con FARC. Dice que es Necesario Tener Más Claridad en Responsabilidad por Línea de Mando en Crímenes Graves, El Tiempo (Nov. 18, 2016), at http://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/cortes/corte-penal-internacinal-examina-nuevo-acuerdo-de-paz-con-farc-47136.

107 ICC Chief Prosecutor Bensouda Threatens with Intervention in Colombia, NSNBC Int'l (Jan. 27, 2017), at https://nsnbc.me/2017/01/27/icc-chief-prosecutor-bensouda-threatens-intervention-in-colombia.

108 This strategy has been explored in game theory. In games with infinite iterations, the possibility of cooperation is open, as there is not a “final” iteration where the dominant strategy is defection, as long as the player values sufficiently remaining in the game. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 12–16 (rev. ed. 2006). The OTP's decision to leave the preliminary examination open, though, only opens the possibility of cooperation. It is not necessarily the case that cooperation is going to be the dominant strategy. As Axelrod explains, if the importance of the next move relative to the current move is sufficiently high (if the “discount parameter” is high), there is no best strategy independent of the strategy used by the other player. Interaction between the players becomes crucial.

109 On “weight” as a dimension of global regulatory governance, see Kingsbury, Benedict, The Concept of “Law” in Global Administrative Law , 20 Eur. J. Int’l L. 23–57 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

110 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, para. 50 (Mar. 31, 2010), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_02399.PDF [hereinafter Kenya Decision].

111 Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07 OA 8, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Germain Katanga Against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, para. 78 (Sept. 25, 2009), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2009_06998.PDF.

112 Kenya Decision, supra note 110, para. 53. Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, para. 193 (Oct. 3, 2011).