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Bureaucratic Capacity, Delegation, and Political Reform

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2004

JOHN D. HUBER  and
NOLAN McCARTY
JOHN D. HUBER
Affiliation:
Columbia University
NOLAN McCARTY
Affiliation:
Princeton University
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Abstract

We analyze a model of delegation and policymaking in polities where bureaucratic capacity is low. Our analysis suggests that low bureaucratic capacity diminishes incentives for bureaucrats to comply with legislation, making it more difficult for politicians to induce bureaucrats to take actions that politicians desire. Consequently, when bureaucratic capacity is low, standard principles in the theoretical literature on delegation no longer hold. We also use the model to examine the issue of political reform in polities with low bureaucratic capacity. The model indicates that politicians in such polities will be trapped in a situation whereby they have little incentive to undertake reforms of either the bureaucracy or other institutions (such as courts) that are crucial for successful policymaking.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 98 , Issue 3 , August 2004 , pp. 481 - 494
Copyright
© 2004 by the American Political Science Association

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