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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
“Pocket veto” is the term applied to the killing of a bill by the President by the process of retaining it without signing it when Congress adjourns before the bill has been in his hands ten days. The Constitution provides for the pocket veto by stating: “If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.” In the “Pocket Veto” case the Court decided that the word “adjournment” in this clause refers not merely to the final adjournment at the expiration of a Congress, but to any temporary or ad interim adjournment. In short, the President may effectively pocket veto a bill whenever Congress, by going home, prevents him from returning it within ten days. The Court thus gave judicial sanction to a practice which has been followed sporadically ever since the days of Madison.
On June 24, 1926, a bill was presented to President Coolidge authorizing certain Indian tribes to sue in the Court of Claims. On July 3 the first session of the 69th Congress adjourned, and it did not meet again until December. It was not in session on July 6—the tenth day after the bill was presented to the President (Sundays excepted).
1 Const., art. 1, sec. 7, cl. 2.
2 279 U. S. 655. The case is cited as the “Pocket Veto” case in the official reporter. As originally presented, it was Okanogan Indians v. United States, and is so cited in the Lawyers' Edition of the Supreme Court Reports.
3 The only case in the Supreme Court which has any bearing upon the problem at all is that of La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 423, which held that the President might lawfully sign a bill presented to him after Congress has taken a recess for a fixed period.
4 Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U. S. 276.
5 S. 366, 40 Cong., 2d. Sess.
6 The results of a careful investigation of previous practice made by the Department of Justice are presented in House Document No. 493, 70 Cong., 2d. Sess.
7 273 U. S. 135. See comment in this Review, vol. 22, p. 78 Google Scholar.
8 279 U. S. 620.
9 25 Fed. Rep. (2d.) 733.
10 29 Fed. Rep. (2d.) 817.
11 Art. 1, sec. 5, cl. 1.
12 279 U. S. 263.
13 U. S. Code, title 2, sec. 192.
14 Mammoth Oil Co. v. United States, 275 U. S. 13.
15 278 U. S. 327.
16 278 U. S. 339.
17 Const., art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 17.
18 278 U. S. 439.
19 278 U. S. 367.
20 266 U. S. 405. See comment in this Review, vol. 20, p. 82 Google Scholar.
21 On December 17, 1929, Mr. Hughes filed his report with the Supreme Court. His recommendation is that Chicago must be ready to dispose of its own sewage by artificial means in nine years, and that thereafter a diversion of not over 1,500 cubic feet per second be allowed. U. S. Daily, December 18, 1929.
22 279 U. S. 438.
23 1 Peters 511.
24 268 U. S. 501. See comment in this Review, vol. 20, p. 83 Google Scholar.
25 253 U. S. 245. See comment in this Review, vol. 14, p. 641 Google Scholar.
26 279 U. S. 749.
27 278 U. 8. 194.
28 The strictness with which the Court enforces the general principle of the immunity of the government from all liability for tort not voluntarily assumed by specific statute is emphasized in Boston Sand and Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U. S. 41. A special statute allowed the plaintiff to sue the federal government in admiralty to recover damage for the injury to the plaintiff's boat which had been run into by a United States destroyer. It instructed the Court to determine the whole case “upon the same principle and measure of liability with costs as in like cases in admiralty between private parties.” While admittedly the plaintiff could have collected interest on the damages against a private defendant, and while the government itself could similarly collect interest had it incurred the loss, the Court holds that the plaintiff is not entitled to the interest. This result is based upon the long continued statutory policy of the government in such cases, which the Court believes must compel a strict construction of the present statute against the plaintiff's claim. Four justices dissented in a strong opinion urging that the present statute should be enforced “according to its plain terms.”
29 St. Louis and O'Fallon R. Co. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461.
30 279 U. S. 644.
31 Naturalization Act of June 16, 1906, 34 Stat. at L. 597; U. S. Code, title 8, sec. 381.
32 279 U. S. 231.
33 278 U. S. 607.
34 278 U. S. 594.
35 A treaty between the United States and Japan authorizes Japanese citizens to carry on trade in this country and “to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects. ….” This provision is construed by the Court in Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U. S. 123, to include the operation of a hospital upon a business basis and the leasing of land for that purpose by a corporation composed of Japanese subjects. The secretary of state of California, who had refused to grant the corporate charter asked for on the ground that the alien land law of the state did not permit incorporation of respondents for the purpose named, is accordingly compelled by mandamus to do so. The Court holds that the treaty must be liberally construed to effect the purposes of the contracting parties, and that, so construed, a hospital operated as a business undertaking must be deemed to be included within the meaning of the terms “trade” and “commerce.”
36 278 U. S. 105.
37 279 U. S. 337.
38 272 U. S. 365. See comment in this Review, vol. 22, p. 94 Google Scholar.
39 277 U. S. 183. See comment in this Review, vol. 23, p. 90 Google Scholar.
40 278 U. S. 116.
41 242 U. S. 526.
42 279 U. S. 582.
43 278 U. S. 456.
44 279 U. S. 392.
45 278 U. S. 235.
46 273 U. S. 418. See comment in this Review, vol. 22, p. 92 Google Scholar.
47 259 U. S. 44.
48 278 U. S. 24.
49 279 U. S. 159.
50 278 U. S. 300.
51 279 U. S. 1.
52 279 U. S. 639.
53 278 U. S. 63.
54 278 U. S. 515.
55 11 Peters 420.
56 278 U. S. 429.
57 278 U. S. 51.
58 161 U. S. 519.
59 279 U. S. 245.
60 279 U. S. 95.
61 278 U. S. 460.
62 278 U. S. 503.
63 279 U. S. 421.
64 279 U. S. 429.
65 278 U. S. 499.
66 279 U. S. 620.
67 278 U. S. 96. Those interested in the work of the Supreme Court for the 1928 term should read the excellent article by ProfessorsFrankfurter, and Landis, , “The Business of the Supreme Court at the October Term, 1928,” in 43 Harvard Law Review 33 (November, 1929)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Attention may be called also to the forthcoming volume by Gregory, and Hankin, Charlotte A., The United States Supreme Court—A Review of the Work of the Supreme Court of the United States for the Year 1928–1929, to be published by Legal Research Service, Washington, D.C. Google Scholar
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