Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
At the heart of our research was a single basic question: What arms control and disarmament measures might be acceptable to Europeans in 1966, in 1971, and in 1976? And differently put: What would be Europe's attitude in those years either to arms competition or to arms control, and what particular policies would be most popular or least popular in Europe in this respect?
This basic question implied four more detailed questions. The first, What is Europe now, in 1966, and where is it going for the 1971 to 1976 period? Is it going to be a Europe of nation-states with only marginal common functional arrangements on matters not central in importance to the concerns of its citizens? Or will it be to some extent substantially integrated, with some major policy decisions made by common institutions? Or will it be a common body politic, speaking with a single voice and developing common institutions for a wide range of decisions?
Second, do Europeans in general approve or disapprove of arms control? Do they welcome the relaxation of tensions between America and Russia and between the East and West, or do they fear such relaxation?
Third, what specific arms control measures are likely to be most acceptable to Europeans, and which arms control measures are likely to be least acceptable?
And fourth, what are the strength, location, and time aspects of political support for specific policies, such as the policies of France and its President de Gaulle vis-à-vis the NATO Alliance and the United States?
1 This 40 year period is suggested by unpublished provisional results of research by Robert Schaefer, Yale University, 1965–1966.
2 Percentages given in this summary are based on all respondents, including those who said “don't know,” as well as those who did not comment on the particular question, if this category amounted to no more than 5 per cent of the total. If a larger proportion did not touch on a particular question, the percentages given refer only to the “articulate” respondents, that is, to those who did make a comment, even if they only professed themselves to be undecided or uninformed. In this latter case, the actual number of articulate respondents on the question is indicated.
3 For French preferences in regard to German reunification, see p. 358 above.
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