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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2014
The passage of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Revenue Bond Act in 1959 ended a quarter of a century during which the Authority was dependent upon Congressional appropriations to supply the capital investment for its growing electric power facilities. This development marked the first appearance of consensus in the long conflict over the role of TVA in the national economy. The consensus emerged from an impasse between TVA's lack of support in Congress—the result of its narrow geographical limits, its identification with a single political party, and the growing industrialization of states on its borders—and the inability or unwillingness of its opponents to have TVA sold to private investors—the result of intensive support for the Authority among an active few in Congress, the unified nature of the TVA power system, and the huge amounts of power which TVA supplied to defense installations. The resolution of this impasse by authorizing TVA to sell revenue bonds on the public market suggests that in an open political arena like the Congress a stable consensus on policy may arise despite the most ardent efforts of the main contenders to achieve other solutions. Indeed, conflict among independent political forces may well achieve solutions meeting a far wider range of preferences than would be the case if the decision were made by any single official. Since maintenance of adequate Congressional support is a perennial problem for federal agencies, it will be instructive to review the shifting basis of support for TVA in Congress and draw from this experience the appropriate lessons.
1 In the years since it was founded in 1933, TVA became primarily a producer and distributor of electric power. Although one heard a great deal about TVA's flood control, navigation, resource development, and regional planning functions, by far the greatest part of the Authority's expenditures was devoted to its power operations. In 1959, for example, the total operating expense of the power program was approximately $186.7 million compared to $28.7 million for all non-power functions combined. From the inception of TVA until June 30, 1957, net power income was $413.4 million and net expense of non-power operations was $175.8 million; Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1957, pp. A12–A15 Google Scholar; 1959, pp. A2–A3.
2 Despite the overwhelming importance of TVA's power program, the vast outpouring of literature on the Authority does not contain a single piece which attempts to identify and analyze the sources of support and opposition which it encountered in Congress. Selznick's, Phillip excellent book, TVA and the Grass Roots, A Study in the Sociology of Formal Organizations (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1949)Google Scholar, deals with the Authority's accommodations with the interests in its area of operations.
3 Berelson, Bernard, Lazarsfeld, Paul, McPhee, William, Voting (Chicago, 1954), p. 207 Google Scholar. Even if this pattern is less typical than these authors contend, it is certainly a prominent one and serves the useful analytic function of providing a basis of comparison to the TVA experience. For an excellent study of the movement toward consensus on the issue of government regulation see Lane, Robert E., The Regulation of Businessmen (New Haven, 1954)Google Scholar.
4 The method to be followed here is a simple one. Since the votes in Congress divide closely along party lines, it will not be essential to show the detailed vote from every state. It should be sufficient to present the total vote by party and to pay special attention to the Republicans who voted for TVA's appropriation desires and the Democrats who voted against them. Analysis of the geographic areas in which these party deviants predominate will enable us to pinpoint the sections in which changes in voting patterns occurred. Since the Congressional votes cannot be interpreted apart from some understanding of the issues involved, brief reference will be made to the arguments for and against TVA power appropriations, technological changes in the TVA power system which carry with them important political implications, the consequences of war on power production, and internal developments within the Authority. The voting records are, therefore, supplemented by interviews, newspaper accounts, Congressional hearings and a variety of other documentary sources.
This paper is an extension of material originally developed as part of a book, Dixon-Yates: A Study in Power Politics, to be published by Yale Press as part of the Yale Political Science Series. In the course of this research, I interviewed over one hundred participants, friends and foes of TVA, many of whom contributed information on TVA's Congressional fortunes. I wish to thank Allan Sindler, Nelson Polsby, Theodore Lowi, and James Barber for their comments at various stages of this analysis.
5 In the Senate, the Democrats enjoyed a 60 to 35 majority over the Republicans and there was one Farmer-Laborite. The Act was approved by a vote of 63 to 20 with 12 not voting. Congressional Record, Vol. 77, pp. 2808–2809, 05 3 1933 Google Scholar. There were 310 Democrats in the House to 117 Republicans and 5 Farmer-Laborites. TVA was supported by 258 Representatives, 112 were opposed and 60 did not vote. Ibid., p. 3600, May 17, 1933.
6 Ibid., passim.
7 The seven TVA states include Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia.
8 For an account of TVA appropriations in the early years see Pritchett, C. Herman, The Tennessee Valley Authority (Chapel Hill, 1943), pp. 230–241 Google Scholar. As is usual with defeated parties in legislative battles in the United States, the opposition to TVA tried to defeat it in the courts before it could get started. The Ashwander case left the opposition without any effective means of redress through the courts. Ibid., pp. 56–64. The next forum for attack was an extended congressional investigation.
9 Congressional Record, Vol. 84, p. 1250 Google Scholar.
10 Ibid., p. 1673. The number of Senators not voting was 16.
11 Pritchett, op. cit., p. 234.
12 See Sure, Ellen St., “The TVA Ammonia Plant,” in Stein, Harold, ed., Public Administration and Policy Development (New York, 1952), pp. 391–444 Google Scholar.
13 Pritchett, op. cit., p. 78.
14 Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1956.
15 Ibid., 1945–1951.
16 The Republicans enjoyed a 254 to 185 lead in the House and a small 51 to 45 margin in the Senate.
17 Congressional Record, Vol. 94, pp. 5623–5624 Google Scholar. The vote took place on May 11, 1948. There was a second vote on June 19 in which another bid to provide funds for New Johnsonville was defeated 201 to 186 with 42 not voting, two seats vacant, and one person answering present. The only notable difference between the two votes was that there were fewer non-voters the second time. The latter vote is recorded in a valuable compilation by the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Voting Records on Rural Electrification and Related Wholesale Power and Rural Telephone Issues (09, 1954)Google Scholar. Hereafter cited as NRECA Voting Records.
Beginning with 1948, all votes have been doublechecked with the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, which contains a category of voting showing those who were paired for or against or who made known their position. This category is symbolized in the tables by a check (✓). It has been used in order to tabulate all available indications of support or opposition to TVA.
18 Congressional Record, Vol. 94, pp. 8280–8282 Google Scholar.
19 Ibid., pp. 8282–8283. This vote took place on June 15, 1948. A motion to reverse the previous Senate action was defeated on June 19 by 47 to 37 with 12 not voting. NRECA Voting Records.
20 Congressional Record, Vol. 94, p. 9018 Google Scholar.
21 New York Times, April 4, 1948, part III, p. 1.
22 Newsweek, March 28 1949, p. 66.
23 New York Times, April 4, 1948, part III, p. 1.
24 In the House the Democrats led by 263 to 171; and in the Senate by 54 to 42.
25 Congressional Record, Vol. 95, p. 1260 Google Scholar.
26 New York Times, February 17, 1949, p. 13.
27 Congressional Record, Vol. 95, p. 4482, 04 13 1949 Google Scholar; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 5, 1949, p. 258 Google Scholar.
28 Annual Report of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 1954, p. 12 Google Scholar.
29 Congressional Record, Vol. 98, pp. 2699–2700, 03 21 1952 Google Scholar; NRECA Voting Records; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 8 (1952), p. 128 Google Scholar. Democrats in 1952 outnumbered Republicans 234 to 199 in the House and 49 to 47 in the Senate.
30 Congressional Record, Vol. 98, p. 6473 Google Scholar. The Senate earlier rejected an amendment to cut TVA's appropriation by some $46 million, by a vote of 36 to 31. Ibid., p. 6471.
31 Ibid., p. 9247, June 3, 1952; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 8 (1952), p. 134 Google Scholar.
32 New York Times, January 16, 1951, p. 21.
33 The Middle South system includes the Arkansas Power & Light Company, the Mississippi Power & Light Company, the Louisiana Power and Light Company, and New Orleans Public Service, Inc.
34 See James, Daniel and Forrow, Brian, Memorandum of Middle South Utilities, Inc., Regarding Legal Aspects of the Federal Government in the Electric Power Business, 10 27 1954, pp. 50–51 Google Scholar.
35 New York Times, December 5, 1952, p. 18.
36 Ibid., January 10, 1953.
37 Ibid., July 1, 1954, p. 10. Press Conference.
38 Eisenhower, The Inside Story (New York, 1956), pp. 335–36Google Scholar.
39 New York Times, October 22, 1953, p. 20.
40 Congressional Record, Vol. 99, p. 6714 Google Scholar. An amendment to decrease TVA appropriations further was defeated 153 to 69.
41 Quoted from Charles Bartlett's Files, story dated June 20, 1953. The files contain original copies of stories.
42 See the Congressional Record, Vol. 99, pp. 6651–6652 ff.Google Scholar
43 Ibid., p. 8472, July 10, 1953.
44 Bartlett's Files, July 10, 1953.
45 New York Times, August 20, 1953, p. 36.
46 Interviews with TVA officials.
47 Official Report of Proceedings Before the United States Court of Claims, Docket No. 479–55, Mississippi Valley Generating Company et al., Plaintiff, the United Stales of America, Defendant, 1957, p. 116 Google Scholar. Testimony by Carl H. Schwartz, Jr. of the Budget Bureau. Hereafter cited as Dixon-Yates Trial, 1957.
48 This and the following two paragraphs are summaries of events covered in detail in Wildavsky, op. cit., chs. 2 to 6.
49 Congressional Record, Vol. 100, p. 10432 Google Scholar.
50 Senator John McClellan, a Democrat from Arkansas where the Dixon-Yates power plant was scheduled to be built, posed the basic policy issue as he saw it: “Are we to continue to pour out millions and millions of dollars in this [TVA] area to build it up beyond its natural potentials while the rest of the country suffers and waits?” The American way, McClellan concluded, was to let some other state get the benefits flowing from the construction and operation of a large powerplant. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Hearings … to Amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, part II, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 06, 1954, pp. 1009–1010 Google Scholar. Henceforth cited as JCAE Hearings, June, 1954.
51 NRECA Voting Records; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 10, 1954, p. 186 Google Scholar.
52 Congressional Record, Vol. 100, p. 11221 Google Scholar; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 10, 1954, p. 563 Google Scholar. The two Democratic Senators from Rhode Island and Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts, constituting the total number of New England Democrats, voted against Dixon-Yates. Immediately thereafter, by a virtually identical vote of 56 to 35, the Senate approved another amendment specifically authorizing contractual arrangements of the Dixon-Yates kind.
53 See, e. g., Congressional Record, Vol. 100, pp. 10142–11307 Google Scholar, inter-alia.
54 Ibid., p. 11745; New York Times, July 24, 1954, p. 1.
55 NRECA Voting Records; New York Times, 07 23 1954, p. 1 Google Scholar; Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 10, 1954, p. 563 Google Scholar.
56 On the Democratic side, the following pro-Dixon-Yates senators supported the public power amendment: Fulbright of Arkansas, Lennon of North Carolina, Long of Louisiana, Byrd and Robertson of Virginia, and McCarran of Nevada. The following Republican senators favorable to Dixon-Yates voted for the public power amendment: Dworshak of Idaho, and Mundt and Case of South Dakota. Senator Kennedy of Massachusetts was the only opponent of Dixon-Yates who also voted against the public power amendment.
57 Congressional Record, Vol. 101, p. 8470 Google Scholar ff.
58 Ibid., p. 8491.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., pp. 8494–8495.
61 Excerpt from Minutes of Meeting of Board of Light, Gas & Water Commissioners of City of Memphis.
62 Ibid., Resolution of Board of Commissioners of City of Memphis.
63 See Lindblom, Charles E., “The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’” Public Administration Review, Vol. 19 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79–88 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
64 See House Appropriations Committee Hearings, Public Works Appropriations for 1956, … Tennessee Valley Authority, 84th Congress, 1st sess., pp. 176–179, 331 Google Scholar.
65 For an outline of these events see “TVA Revenue Bonds,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac, Vol. 15 (1959), pp. 261–265 Google Scholar. As TVA's congressional fortunes worsened in the early 1950s, the idea of resorting to revenue bonds was “in the air” among supporters of the Authority who saw no hope for it in continued reliance on appropriations. The Port of New York Authority and many state toll road authorities provided conspicuous and apparently successful models. Meanwhile, the rise in interest rates paid by the Treasury, together with the Authority's ample and growing operating revenues, made the prospect of raising TVA funds in the open market a less unattractive alternative. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, a Republican supporter of both TVA and President Eisenhower, suggested self-financing 1954 and was in the forefront of the battle for its adoption. In 1955, President Eisenhower requested the TVA Board to recommend ways of financing power operations other than through appropriations. The Board recommended financing through bonds secured by revenues from power. There followed a complex series of interagency negotiations in 1956 and 1957. Congress wrestled with the problem from 1957 to 1959 when the Revenue Bond Act was passed. It contained a series of provisions limiting the geographical area served by TVA, granting the Secretary of the Treasury limited control over the timing and interest of the bonds, putting a $750 million ceiling on TVA's borrowing capacity, and arranging the terms for the repayment by the Authority of the Government's previous investment in its power facilities.
66 There appeared to be little support for turning TVA down altogether. When a motion was made to recommit the revenue bond bill to committee, the Senate voted 73 to 17 against it. The Democrats gave an overwhelming 56 to 2 vote and the Republicans split 17 to 15 against the motion. No comparable situation arose in the House where all the votes involved the conditions rather than the fact of issuing revenue bonds. Ibid.
67 Turner, Julius, Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 38–39 Google Scholar. The Index of Likeness for the tariff was 21.4, for patronage 26.9, and for Government Action 36.1. More recent confirmation is found in McCloskey, Herbert, Hoffman, Paul, and O'Hara, Rosemary “Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers,” this Review, Vol 54 (06, 1960), p. 411 Google Scholar. Taking a sample of party leaders at national conventions, the authors find that Republicans and Democrats are furthest apart on domestic issue preferences in regard to public ownership of natural resources.
68 Nothing that is said here is meant to belittle the considerable defensive advantages possessed by a small group of intensely committed Congressmen; but this is not the same as the ability to secure a majority for TVA appropriations against opponents who are also intensely committed.
69 A Gallup Poll on the Dixon-Yatrs affair showed that only a third of the nation's voters had any idea of what was going on, and a majority of them had not decided whether it was good or bad. Public Opinion News Service, December 4, 1954.
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