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The United States and the Brazilian Naval Revolt, 1893–1894
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 December 2015
Extract
The fall of the monarchy in 1889 left Brazil in a state of confusion and disorder. The republicans seemed to lack a coherent political program; the new régime as a consequence, was forced to contend with dissension within its own ranks. Extreme ideas of “states’ rights” and the vagaries of impractical political dreamers diverted attention from a monarchist opposition which, however small, was at least united on a specific aim. The army was mainly responsible for the existence of the new republic; the army proceeded, therefore, to take charge and attempt to introduce unity after its own fashion.
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- Copyright © Academy of American Franciscan History 1945
References
1 See Castilho, Augusto de, Portugal e Brasil (Lisboa, 1891), I Google Scholar; Nabuco, Joaquim, A Intervenção Estrangeira durante a Revolta (Rio de Janeiro, 1896), chapters I and II. The agreement of October 1, 1893 is also printed in Foreign Relations: 1893, pp. 56–58.Google Scholar
2 “Essa attitude hostil dos Estados-Unidos despertou na esquadra o receio de que fosse ella o começo de execução de um plano politico baseado nas informações dadas oficialmente á legação Americana de que a revolta tinha por fim a restauração da Monarchia.” Nabuco, op. cit., p. 84.
3 Telegram of Thomas S. Thompson to Gresham, December 13, 1893: in Despatches: Brazil. LV (State Department Archives). Hereafter cited as Despatches, LV.
4 Perkins, Dexter, The Monroe Doctrine: 1867–1907 (Baltimore, 1937), pp. 121–122.Google Scholar
5 Cf.Gresham, M., Life of Walter Q. Gresham (Cleveland, 1919); S. F. Bemis (ed.), American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy (New York, 1926), VIII; Perkins, op. cit., passim; Latané, United States and Latin America (New York, 1926), passim; C. C. Tansill, Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard (Fordham, 1940), passim.Google Scholar
6 Despatches, LV. The remainder of the cable refers to the existing military situation. German naval representatives took no part in the agreements of the foreign naval commanders; German diplomatic representatives remained aloof from action of their colleagues. Both pursued their course independently of the other powers; but it is clear from the sources that their line of action was the same as that of others.
7 Gresham to Bayard, No. 240, December 18, 1893, Department of State, Instructions, Greet Britain, XXX [italics mine].
8 In American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy, VIII, p. 252.
9 Thompson to Gresham, telegram of September 6 in Despatches, LV; Peixoto did not receive Thompson until some weeks after the outbreak of hostilities.
10 Thompson to Gresham, no. 3, September 7, 1893, loc. cit.
11 The Rio News, September 14, 1893. This paper, published by a citizen of the United States, was the best source of information on the situation until the Peixoto government suppressed it in December.
12 Castilho, op. cit., II, p. 372.
13 For Saldanha da Gama, see Freire, Felisbello, Historia da Revolta 6 de Septembro, 1893 (Rio de Janeiro, 1896), passim. Dunshee de Abranches, A Revolta da Armada e a Revolução Rio-Grandense (Correspondencia entre Saldanha da Gama e Silveira Martins), 2 vols. (Rio de Janeiro, 1914). Thompson’s despatches in Despatches, LV, LVI. Castilho, op. cit., passim.Google Scholar
14 See despatches of September 9 and 11, loc. cit.
15 Gresham to Thompson, no. 10; Instructions, Brazil, XVIII; hereafter cited as Instr., XVIII.
16 A complete list of the American vessels which were stationed in Rio harbor may be found in the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy: 1894, p. 23.
17 Thompson to Gresham: telegrams of September 15 and 16, 1893, Desp. cit. On Carvana, see Thompson to Gresham, no. 30, October 1; for Simpson case, no. 63, October 24.
18 Gresham to Thompson, telegram September 16, 1893; Instr., XVIII.
19 Thompson to Gresham, telegram, September 19; Desp. cit.
20 Gresham to Thompson, September 22; Instr.
21 Thompson to Gresham, no. 30; October 1; id.
22 Cf. note 18.
23 Thompson to Gresham, no. 30 id., and Thompson to Gresham, no. 150, February 1, 1894 (Desp., LVI).
24 See Gresham instruction and inquiry of January 29, 1894, cited below. It is true that Gresham to Thompson, no. 125, April 26, 1894, Instr., seems to deny this; but one is inclined to suspect that Gresham’s message expressing absolute approval of Thompson’s work was composed without any great aim beyond soothing ruffled feelings. Though Thompson was the target of unjust newspaper criticism, the impartial observer cannot avoid the conclusion that he was often lost in a situation far too big for him.
25 Thompson to Gresham, no. 94, December 5, 1893. McCann commanded the American naval vessels stationed at Iquique during the successful Congressionalist revolt against Balmaceda. Thompson’s original attitude was similar to that taken by Patrick Egan at the beginning of the revolt against Balmaceda: and this attitude was unexceptionable. As the conflict developed in Chile, foreign aid to the Congressionalist faction was more open: and Egan’s support of Balmaceda correspondingly more stubborn. For a balanced account of this affair, see Evans, H. C., Chile and its Relations with the United States (Durham, 1927), pp. 135–155.Google Scholar
26 Gresham to Thompson, Instr., cit.
27 See inclosures 1 and 2, Thompson to Gresham, no. 65; inclosures in ditto, no. 66: both November 10. Desp., cit.
28 Instr. cit. Cf. Gresham’s letter to Messrs. Lanman & Kemp, Nov. 2, 1893… “While our Government recognizes the existence of war between Brazil and the insurgents it does nor. accord the latter belligerent rights. It is not claimed that the harbor of Rio is blockaded, and your right to transfer merchandise from an American or other netural ship anchored there, to the shore, is clear provided that in so doing you do not cross the line of fire or otherwise interfere with the military operations of the insurgents. Barges and lighters thus employed will doubtless be protected by our naval forces there should Mello attempt to seize them.” Cited in Moore, John Bassett, Digest of International Law, Washington, 1906, I, 283.Google Scholar
29 Thompson to Gresham, no. 39, October 13, 1893 with inclosure in loc. cit.
30 The Argentine government censured their minister for his effrontery before Gresham could reply. Thompson to Gresham, telegram November 1J: Gresham to Thompson, of even date: Thompson to Gresham, no. 65, December 21.
31 Thompson to Gresham, no. 43, October 13, 1893, Desp. cit.
32 See Thompson to Gresham, telegram November 17, and no. 79. Gresham to Thompson, November 18. On these floating (explosive) buoys and torpedoes, and the controversy over their origin: Castilho, op. cit., I, note 122. Cf. especially Documents C and D on pp. 336–337. Melo accused the Peixoto government of deliberately setting these adrift; and Admiral Magnaghi, then acting naval chairman, directed an investigation by the foreign naval forces. Their verdict was that Melo’s charge was correct.
33 Documents inclosed in Thompson to Gresham, no. 44, October 13, 1893. Castilho, II, 122 ff. is a much better account.
34 Thompson to Gresham, no. 43, October 13, 1893. Nabuco and Castilho state that Boynton was the leader, a fact which is not at all apparent from Thompson’s sketchy account. Boynton was turned over to the custody of Captain Picking of the U. S. S. Charleston; nothing more is heard of him.
35 Documents inclosed in Thompson to Gresham, especially nos. 169 (February 14, 1894) and 173 (February 17, 1894): Desp., LVI; Castilho, passim.
36 Cf. note 32.
37 Thompson to Gresham, telegram of October 2, 1893; no. 34, October 3: Desp., LV. Thompson was first approached privately. When he properly rejected this clandestine method, he was invited to call on the Brazilian minister of finance. The Brazilian Foreign Minister dropped in “accidentally” at the psychological moment. The finance minister had already prepared the ground by “explaining” to Thompson that the revolt was monarchical in character, and that it was to the interest of the United States to cooperate with Peixoto.
38 Consul William N. Burke to Thompson, Dec. 26: “… The steamship Nictheroy… is still in port. Why it should remain here so long seems shrouded in mystery. Five days after her arrival there were rumors of a mutiny on board, and 60 or 70 men in irons. That there was an attempt at mutiny I have reason to believe, but the vigilance and firmness of the officers crushed it out before it developed…. From information I receive from Capt. Baker, in charge of the Nictheroy from New York here, the said steamship was taken possession of by the Brazilian authorities on the 15th, one day after her arrival…. From the day of her anchoring… no one from the ship communicated with the shore.
“On the 18th, Mr. Bryson, of the New York Herald, Mr. Fontaine, of the World, and Mr. Mariotte, of the Associated Press, came on shore against the wishes of Capt. Baker, as they stated. The following day from 55 to 60 of the crew, including Mr. Judge, a gunner on board, and Mr. Conway, one of the lieutenants, were allowed to land. These officers and men are still in the city, waiting steamer to take them to New York.”
“According to the agreement signed between Salvador Mendonça, minister to the United States from Brazil, and the officers and crew of the Nictheroy, the Brazilian authorities here were to arrange passage of those not willing to enlist, to return them to New York. I am informed… that they will be sent at the first opportunity. With the exception of the two officers and the 65 to 50 [sic] that were landed, the rest are still on board, viz, 160 or 170 men all told. It is stated by some, the reason the cruiser, as it is called, does not proceed to Rio is that the government is not willing to accede to the terms proposed by officers and crew willing to enlist. Others say that the ship has not been paid for, and that Flint & Co. have given orders not proceed until payment is made. There is still another rumor that the captain and officers refuse to be under the supervision of any Brazilian officers, of which there are some on board, together with a hundred or more cadets from the military school at Ceara…. I do not know whether there is any foundation for [the rumors]…. The America has not arrived. It is said a mutiny arose on the America after leaving New York, and that she put into St. Thomas or Martinique. It seems, from the information requested by this consulate from Capt. Baker, that neither officers nor crew were shipped before the U. S. shipping commissioner, nor was there any clearance from the custom-house in New York, and that she sailed under the Brazilian flag; therefore the consulate has no jurisdiction in the matter, and in case of any ill treatment by the Brazilian authorities toward the crew the consul can not interfere in his official capacity, as it would devolve on him to do were they regularly shipped seamen. He can only act as he would in case of complaint by any American citizen…” Inclosure in Thompson to Gresham, no. 134, January 12, 1894; Desp. LV. Evidently the enlistment was to take place on Brazilian soil. But the suspicion that there may be some connection or relation of this affair with the offer to buy the Charleston or Newark is strengthened, rather than diminished by reading Burke to Thompson, January 16, 1894:… “There has been no disturbance more than under ordinary circumstances excepting the disorders and scandalous proceedings on the streets caused by the large number of drunken seamen dumped on these shores from the steamship America on the 3d instant.
“The America arrived on the 31st ultimo. I have written a strong article to the Department setting forth the facts relating to the drunken and disorderly conduct of a large part of the crew landed from the America, and expressing the hope that the Government will not allow any other expedition of a like nature [italics mine] under such an irresponsible management, especially on the part of the crew of the America, to come to this country, a shame, a scandal, and a disgrace to our flag, our country, and to American citizens residing here. I have had no end of trouble with these men since they landed, now nearly four weeks since the first ones came on shore from the Nictheroy.”
“I have no official rights in the matter, as they are not American seamen… the Brazilian officials have been very courteous in their dealings and treatment of the men, their great fault being a lack of doing the right thing at the right time. The Nictheroy is still here with the America. About 170 of the men and officers that brought out the Nictheroy have been engaged in the Brazilian service for three months.
“The crew receive… a bounty of $500, and $100 for three months. The officers receive $5,000 for three months’ service. They are drawing their pay, rolling in the trough of the sea outside the reef. It is said the Nictheroy, America, and Aurora, a torpedo boat, will proceed to Rio in five or six days. If these ships are in any wise effective, it is a little strange that they should continue at anchor in this port when there is so much need of fighting material at Rio.” Inclosure in Thompson to Gresham, no. 156: February 6, 1894: Desp., LVI. These vessels apparently took little or no part in the war. A later dispatch of Thompson alludes to an anonymous ‘American steamer’ which assisted government forces in landing troops. In the late spring of 1894 (after the end of the revolt), Thompson called an American consul to sharp account for stating that an insurgent plot to capture a shore town was frustrated by the arrival of the U. S. S. Detroit. Investigation proved that the consul’s statement was founded on vague gossip: perhaps the kernel of truth was that one of these vessels was used.
38a Some 3,000 persons of all social classes were imprisoned by the Peixoto government. The recruiting of the army was by means of impressment; but instead of concentrating on vagabonds, the government sent the press-gangs to the factories to seize the workers. These last began to hide themselves from the press-gangs, resulting in th paralysis of industry. The Rio News, September 27, 1893.
39 Printed in Foreign Relations: 1893, iii-iv.
40 Hill, Lawrence, The Diplomatic Relations between the united States and Brazil (Durham, 1932), p. 276.Google Scholar See also Thompson to Gresham, Nov. 10, 1893: Desp., LV; Gresham to Thompson, December 20, 1893: Instr., XVIII, for Stanton’s “faithlessness” (!) Moore, op. cit., I, pp. 240–242 gives a complete history of this incident. Stanton defended himself by stating that he believed that he was following a precedent of which he was informed by Admiral McCann: but a letter press copy of the official correspondence of the Secretary of the Navy (Hilary L. Herbert) states that the verdict was justified because of a special instruction issued early in 1893 (which Stanton probably had not seen before the incident). Stanton was transferred to command of the North Atlantic squadron, succeeding Rear Admiral Benham, while the latter took over the South Atlantic squadron. Confidential files, Dec. 21, 1893: U. S. Navy Archives.
41 Note of Picking to Thompson (Dec. 24, 1893) inclosed in Thompson to Gresham, no. 122: Dec. 31, 1893: Desp. cit. Thompson’s complaints against Picking take up Thompson’s no. 194 (March 7, 1894). There is little substance in them. The men differed in interpretation of orders: Thompson was so anxious to avoid doing anything that might be construed as recognition of Melo, that Picking was able to say that he even failed to show Melo the common courtesies due a gentleman: and Picking resented this. Thompson had reason to suspect that Gresham was securing information from Picking’s reports (which was probably true, in spite of Gresham’s disclaimer: see the latter’s no. 125, cited above) and was correspondingly jealous.
42 Thompson to Gresham, no. 96, loc. cit.
43 Cf. inclosure in Thompson to Gresham, no. 107, Dec. 18, 1893, cit., LV; no. 122, ibid.
44 Probably (through Thompson does not say so) because Thompson lived at Petrópolis, and only went into Rio when business demanded.
45 Cf. Thompson to Gresham: telegrams of December 21, 23, 25; inclosures in no. 117,. December 31; telegrams and despatches through 122. Desp. cit.
46 Gresham to Thompson, October 25, 1893; Instr. cit.
47 See note 39.
48 Hill, op. cit., p. 258 ff.
49 Gresham to Thompson, telegram Jan. 6, 1894; Instr., XIX.
50 See copies of documents inclosed in Thompson to Gresham, Dec. 17 and 31.
51 Instr., XIX.
52 See despatches of October and November for inclosed copies of documents on these controversies.
53 Practically every legal point on which this case touched was set by precedent of action here.
54 Desp., LV.
55 Schuyler, in Bemis, op. cit., p. 242.
56 Inclosure in Thompson to Gresham, no. 304, October 22, 1854; Desp., LVT. Thompson simply sent the translation of the speech. He makes no reference to this in any of his despatches: apparently he knew nothing of the affair.
57 Report of the Secretary of the Navy: 1894, p. 23. It was probably this mediation attempt, rather than the intervention, that led Benham to state that he believed that his actions in Brazil would inevitably bring Brazil and the United States into closer ties of friendship. See Nabuco, op. cit., pp. 56–57, n. 3.
58 Instr., XIX.
59 Ibid.
60 Thompson to Gresham, telegram January 29, 1894. Desp., LVI. See also nos. 150 and 151, February 1, for ff.
61 Gresham to Thompson, February 1. Instr., XIX.
62 Thompson to Gresham, no. 153, February 3.
63 Castilho, op. cit., III, p. 110. “Tres navios mercantes de vella, Americanos, carregados, pretendiam atracar aos trapiches da cidade para operaram a sua descarga. O Almirante Saldanha comtudo, que parece tinha denuncia de que um dos referidos navios pelo menos trazia munições de guerra para o governo, tomou as suas precauções para evitar tal manobra, mandando fazer fogo sobre um dos referidos navios mercantes, que teve por isso de fundear perto…”
64 Desp., LVI.
65 Logbook U.S.S. San Francisco: January 29, 1894. Entry 4:00–8:00 AM Watch.
66 tel. Jan. 31 cit. supra.
67 Logbook cit. supra, entry 8:00–12:00 M. Watch.
68 Thompson to Gresham, no. 153, cit. supra.
69 After Benham’s action, Gama was reported ready to surrender at once, but was dissuaded by his junior officers. The London Times March 15, 1894, quoted Melo as stating that he knew the surrender of his fleet was inevitable after Benham enforced his rule.
70 Inclosure in Thompson to Gresham, no. 161, February 9, 1894, Desp., LVI. This is the English translation of Gama’s party. Thompson says it was being circulated to win sympathy for the insurgents.
71 Inclosure in Thompson to Gresham, no. 155, Feb. 9, 1894: Desp., LVI.
72 For original text of Gama protest and Benham letter of February 3, cf. Dunshee de Abranches, op. cit., II, pp. 135–140. See Castilho, III, 126.
73 Nabuco, op. cit., p. 84.
74 Ibid., pp. 56–57.
75 Castilho, op. cit., III, p. 110.
76 Hill, op. cit., p. 280.
77 Report of the Secretary of the Navy: 1894, p. 23. [Italics mine.]