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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 10 February 2009
By their nature, ruling groups tend to be conservative, preserving the status quo rather than working to alter it. But few leaders have responded to demands for change with the kind of stolid passivity that seems to have characterized the bureaucratic statesmen of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the last years of its existence. Eduard Taaffe's day-to-day Fortwursteln is one of the more famous characterizations of their “desperate but not serious” attitude toward policy-making. The leaders may have agreed in private to the necessity of far-reaching reforms in the Monarchy's institutional structure, but, faced with the practical difficulties of carrying out those reforms, they were inclined to make few experiments and to take few risks. If one looks at the last statesmen of the Monarchy who both occupied central positions of authority and possessed the willpower to attempt to carry through radical change, besides the hapless Emperor Karl, only a handful of figures emerges: Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal, who effected the Bosnian annexation; the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne; and Ottokar Czernin, Karl's foreign minister from 1916 to 1918.
1 Czernin to Hoyos, Nov. 20, 1913, Fellner, Fritz, ed. Schicksalsjahre Österreichs, 1908–1918, Das politische Tagebuch Josef Redlichs, 2 vols. (Graz: H. Böhlaus Nachf., 1953–1954), I, 215, note 1.Google Scholar
2 Cf. Hoffmann's judgment of him at Brest-Litovsk, von Hoffmann, Max, War Diaries and Other Papers, Sutton, Eric, trans. 2 vols. (London: M. Seeker, 1929), II, 198.Google Scholar
3 Aehrenthal saw the annexation as part of a larger political design which he was never able to carry out, but it is significant that he viewed his forceful resolution of the Bosnian problem as the necessary precondition for what was to follow. Even liberals like Josef Redlich applauded his willingness to conduct an energetic (if not downright risky) foreign policy.
4 Meckling's, IngeborgDie Aussenpolitik des Grafen Czernin (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1969)Google Scholar, is authoritative. The biography by Singer, Ladislaus, Ottokar Graf Czernin, Staatsmann einer Zeitenwende (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1969)Google Scholar, does little more than repeat the views of memoirs, Czemin's, In the World War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1920).Google ScholarKann, Robert A. covers the Sixtus Affair in Die Sixtusaffäre und die geheimen Friedensverhandlungen Österreich-Ungarns im Ersten Weltkrieg (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1966).Google Scholar A brief, but excellent, summary of Czernin's career is Hans Friedl's sketch in the Neue Österreichische Biographie ab 1815 (Vienna: Amalthea-Verlag, 1968), XVII, 106–118. Two further studies should be mentioned: Hopwood, Robert F., “Interalliance Diplomacy: Count Czernin and Germany, 1916–1918” (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University 1965)Google Scholar; and Shanafelt, Gary W., The Secret Enemy: Austria-Hungary and the German Alliance, 1914–1918 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs, 1985).Google Scholar
5 Kann, Robert A., Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, Studien (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1976), pp. 157–205.Google Scholar The section on Czernin is a revised version of his earlier article, “Count Ottokar Czernin and Archduke Francis Ferdinand,” Journal of Central European Affairs, XVI (1956), 117–145.Google Scholar
6 There are several general studies of the Central Powers' relations with Romania, but nothing on Czemin's mission as such. The relevant chapters of Silberstein, Gerard, The Troubled Alliance, German-Austrian Relations, 1914 to 1917 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970)Google Scholar, provide a general coverage. Torrey, Glenn E., “Rumania and the Belligerents, 1914–1916,” Journal of Contemporary History, I, (1966), 171–191CrossRefGoogle Scholar, is brief but has the perspective of a study of Romanian, as well as Austro-German, sources. See also his “Irredentism and Diplomacy: The Central Powers and Rumania, August-November 1914,” Südostforschungen, XXV (1966), 285–332Google Scholar; and “Rumania's Decision to Intervene: Bratianu and the Entente, June-July 1916,” Rumanian Studies, II (1971–1972), 3–29.Google Scholar Of course, there is Czernin's own account in his memoirs and the sections of Singer; also those pages in Albertini, Luigi, The Origins of the War of 1914, Massey, Isabella, trans., 3 vols. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967)Google Scholar, which cover Austro-Romanian relations through the July crisis.
7 The main source for this article is Czernin's reports in the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, Politisches Archiv (hereafter abbreviated PA). The Staatsarchiv also contains the Nachlaβ of Franz Ferdinand, where Czernin's and Berchtold's correspondence with the Archduke is to be found. There are also a few Czernin letters to Ludwig Flotow, an important secondary official in the Austrian Foreign Ministry, in the Nachlaβ Flotow. Czernin's main reports to August 1914 are printed in Bittner, Ludwig et al. , Österreich-Ungarns Auβenpolitik 1908–1914, 8 vols. (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930)Google Scholar (hereafter abbreviated ÖUA). The Austrian Kriegsarchiv, also in Vienna, holds the papers of the Militärkanzlei of Franz Ferdinand (hereafter abbreviated MKFF), which include a file of Czernin correspondence on the Romanian question. The Berchtold Family Archive of the Státní Archiv in Brno, Czechoslovakia, contains private letters from Czernin and Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold. Tisza's papers are deposited in the Magyaroszági Református Egyház Zsinati Levéltára in Budapest, and include much from Czernin (Burián's papers, also there, contain practically nothing from him). The Tisza papers were edited for publication by Jenõ Balogh in Tisza's Összes Munkái, 6 vols. (Budapest:. Franklin-társulat, 1923–1937)Google Scholar, and are divided into two series which will be cited as Tisza or Tisza/Balogh respectively. Though some of Czernin's letters are included in the Összes Munkái, many remain unpublished. Whatever happened to Czernin's own papers—such as the diary he cites in his memoirs—I have been unable to determine. I have deliberately avoided citing the Austrian Red Book issued afterthe Romanian declaration of war because comparison of its documents with the originals indicates that many of them were substantially edited for publication. As Erwin Matsch has noted, much of Czernin's subsequent reputation was the fortuitous result of that editing job. See von Flotow, Ludwig, November 1918 auf dem Ballhausplatz, Erinnerungen Ludwigs Freiherrn von Flotow, des letzten Chefs des österreichisch-ungarischen auswärtigen Dienstes, 1895–1920, Matsch, Erwin, ed. (Vienna: H. Böhlaus Nachf., 1982), pp. 317–318.Google Scholar All other sources are cited in the footnotes, using English translations of works where these exist. Dates are given in common American usage, i.e., month-day-year. Finally, all emphasized material in the quotations in the text is from the original.
8 Berchtold to Franz Ferdinand, 9–17–13, Nachlaβ Franz Ferdinand, 9.
9 Czernin to Berchtold, 10–16–13, Berchtold Archive, 464/6. Czernin incorporated his conditions in an “agreement” which he drafted for Berchtold; this document, with Berchtold's marginal comments, is here also. It is printed in Hantsch, Hugo, Leopold Graf Berchtold, Grandseigneur und Staatsmann, 2 vols. (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1963), II, 495–496Google Scholar, note 51.
10 Hantsch, II, 496, note 51.
11 Czernin to Berchtold, 12–8–13, ÖUA, VII, 628.
12 Czernin to Berchtold, 3–11–14, ibid., 953.
13 Czernin to Berchtold, 3–25–14, ibid., 1001. The observations actually belonged to Aurel Popovici, but Czernin forwarded them to Vienna, saying that they corresponded entirely with his own.
14 Czernin to Berchtold, 9–19–14, PA I, 517, xlvii/7c.
15 Czernin to Berchtold, 3–11–14, ÖUA, VII, 955.
16 Czernin to Berchtold, 12–5–13, ibid., 609–614.
17 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 12–30–13, MKFF, 203/9.
18 Czernin to Bardolff, 1–6–14, MKFF, 203/9. The affair is briefly summarized in Williamson, Samuel R., “Influence, Power, and the Policy Process: The Case of Franz Ferdinand, 1906–1914,” The Historical Journal, XVII, 1974, 431–433.Google Scholar
19 Berchtold to Czernin, 1–24–14, PA XVIII, 47; Czernin to Berchtold, 1–25–14, ibid.
20 Czernin to Tisza, 1–28–14, Tisza Papers, 7/2.
21 Czernin to Berchtold, 2–1–14, Berchtold Archive, 464/6.
22 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 2–2–14, MKFF, 203/9.
23 Ibid.
24 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 2–4–14, Nachlaβ Franz Ferdinand, 13.
25 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 2–10–14, MKFF, 203/9.
26 Czernin to Berchtold, 3–11–14, ÖUA, VII, 952–953Google Scholar; Czernin, , In the World War, 91.Google Scholar
27 Czernin to Berchtold, 3–11–14, ÖUA, VII, 951–952.
28 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 4–20–14, Nachlaβ Frznz Ferdinand, 13; Czernin to Berchtold, 6–22–14, ÖUA, VIII, 176.
29 Czernin to Berchtold, 4–2–14, Berchtold Archive, 464/6.
30 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 5–16–14, Nachlaβ Franz Ferdinand, 13.
31 ibid.
32 Czernin to Berchtold, 6–22–14, ÖUA, VIII, 175.Google Scholar
33 Czernin to Berchtold, 4–2–14, ÖUA. VII, 1023Google Scholar; 4–26–14, ibid., 1093; 5–2–14, ÖUA, VIII, 6–7.Google Scholar Cf. Marghiloman on Waldthausen, Marghiloman, Alexandra, Note Politice, 5 vols. (Bucharest: Ed. Institutului de Arte grafice “Eminescu”, 1927), 1, 260.Google Scholar Marghiloman's text is in Romanian, but there are French translations of many of the entries.
34 Fellner, Fritz, “Die ‘Mission Hoyos’,” in Les Grandes Puissances et la Serbie à la Veille de la Première Guerre MondialeGoogle Scholar, Recueil des Travaux aux Assises Scientifiques Internationales, Assises Scientifiques de l'Académie Serbe des Sciences et des Arts 4, Classe des Sciences Historiques, no. 1 (Belgrade: Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, 1976), p. 412. Fellner prints a previously unpublished account of the July Crisis written by Hoyos after the war.
35 Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 4–11–14, Archive, Berchtold, 457.Google Scholar
36 Treutler to Zimmermann, 6–15–14, Lepsius, Johannes et al. , Die Groβe Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 40 vols. (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922–1927), XXXIX, 368.Google Scholar
37 Czernin to Berchtold, 4–2–14, ÖUA, VII, 1026.Google Scholar
38 Czemin to Berchtold, 6–22–14, ÖUA, VIII, 173–176.Google Scholar
39 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 2–4–14, 4–20–14, Nachlaβ Franz Ferdinand, 13.
40 Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 4–20–14 Nachlaβ Franz Ferdinand, 13.
41 Czernin to Berchtold, 4–10–14, ÖUA, VII, 1044Google Scholar; 6–17–14, ÖUM, VIII, 151Google Scholar;6–22–14, Berchtold Archive, 464/6.
42 Czernin to Berchtold, 7–29–14, ÖUA. VIII, 868.Google Scholar
43 Czernin to Tisza, 7–3–14, Tisza/Balogh Papers, 2/2.
44 Czernin to Berchtold, no date, Berchtold Archive, 464/6.
45 Steinacker, Edmund, Lebenserinnerungen (Munich: M. Schick, 1937), 231.Google Scholar
46 Czernin to Tisza, 7–8–14, Tisza Papers, 23/47.
47 Forgách to Mérey 7–16–14, Hantsch, II, 594.
48 Czernin to Berchtold, 7–8–14, Berchtold Archive, 464/6.
49 Czernin to Tisza, 8–18–14, Tisza Papers, 7/21.
50 Czemin to Berchtold, 9–4–14, PA I, 515, xlvii/7a.
51 Czemin to Burián, 8–21–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d.
52 Czemin to Burián, 4–1–15, PA I, 881, Krieg 6a. As Torrey argues in his article on the Romanian decision to intervene in 1916, cited above in note 6, this was not true; Bratianu always calculated that more was to be gained from the Entente than from the Central Powers and acted accordingly. But in practical terms the distinction made little difference, for he was not about to enter the war until he was sure the Monarchy was on the verge of final defeat.
53 Czernin to Berchtold, 9–13–14, PA I, 517, xlvii/7c.
54 Czernin to Berchtold, 9–25–14, 9–29–14, PA I, 517, xlvii/7c.
55 Tisza to Czernin, 9–7–14, Tisza, Összes Munkái, II, 126.Google Scholar
56 Czemin to Berchtold, 1–9–15, PAI, 519, xlvii/7d; Czernin memorandum, “Die Italienisch-Rumänische Frage,” 2–2–15, ibid.
57 Czernin to Burián, 7–17–15, PA I, 518, xlvii/7d.
58 Czemin to Tisza, 8–25–15, Tisza/Balogh Papers, 2/2.
59 Czernin to Burián, 2–15–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d.
60 Bunán to Czernin, 7–31–15, PA I, 518, xlvii/7d. In his memoirs, Czemin wrote that he favored cessions of territory only to get active Romanian cooperation in the war on the side of the Central Powers—not just to buy its continued neutrality (In the World War, 124Google Scholar). In actual fact, his position was more complex. He realized that except for Carp, no leader of the opposition was ready for immediate intervention; benevolent neutrality was for the moment all any of them was ready to give. Yet he was still ready to discuss territorial concessions with them. What he hoped for (or at least told Burián) was that their neutrality on Austrian terms would compromise Romania with the Entente and thus lead to Romanian cooperation with the Monarchy later.
61 Czemin to Berchtold, 11–22–14, Berchtold Archive, 464/6.
62 Czernin to Tisza, 4–2–15, Tisza/Balogh Papers, 2/2. Also in the Összes Munkái, III, 232–233, but with no date.Google Scholar
63 Czernin to Tisza, 5–3–15, Tisza, , Összes Munkái, III, 267.Google Scholar
64 Czernin to Tisza, 6–8–15, Tisza Papers, 10/27. The letter is printed in the Összes Munkái, III, 355Google Scholar, but with the omission of the above quotation.
65 Czernin to Tisza, 8–31–15, Tisza/Balogh Papers, 1/1. Cf. Marghiloman on the dissatisfaction of Bussche's own subordinates with his performance, Marghiloman, II, 101.
66 Czernin to Burián, 3–20–16, PA I, 520, xlvii/7g.
67 Czemin to Tisza, 8–31–15, Tisza/Balogh Papers, 1/1; Czernin to Burián, 9–4–15, 12–7–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d; Czernin to Burián, 2–4–16, PA I, 520, xlvii/7g.
68 Burián to Czernin, 12–15–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d.
69 Czernin to Tisza, 2–11–16, Tisza Papers, 17/36.
70 Czernin to Flotow, 6–21–16, Nachlaβ Flotow, 1.
71 Czernin to Burián, 6–28–16, PA I, 520, xlvii/7g.
72 Czemin to Flotow, 6–21–16, Nachlaβ Flotow, 1.
73 Czemin to Burián, 8–23–16, PA 1, 520, xlvii/7g; Bussche to Jagow, 8–25–16, Politisches Archiv of the Auswärtiges Amt, Bonn, Deutschland 128 Nr. 2 Geheim, Bd. 53. The Bavarian legation in Vienna attributed the surprise in many quarters of the Monarchy when the Romanian declaration of war finally came to a number of causes, including a private letter, received from Czernin a few days earlier, saying that the peak of the crisis had been passed (Hoffmann to Ludwig of Bavaria, 8–28–16, Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich, MA III, 2481/4). However, this author could find no copy of such a letter in the archives. Vienna knew of Romania's intentions in any case from the work of its intelligence service. On this, see Ronge, Max, Kriegs- und Industrie-Spionage, Zwölf Jahre Kundschaftsdienst (Zürich: Amalthea-Verlag, 1930), pp. 229–232.Google Scholar
74 von Hötzendorf, Franz Conrad, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, 1906–1918, 5 vols. (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1922–1925), V, 910–912.Google Scholar
75 Czemin to Berchtold, 1–9–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d.
76 Czernin to Burián, 9–4–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d
77 Ibid.
78 Czernin to Burián, 12–7–15, PA I, 519, xlvii/7d
79 Czernin memorandum, “Gedanken über die Beendigung des Krieges,” 7–6–16, PA 1, 497, xlvii/1c.
80 The memorandum is discussed in Meckling, 7–10; and Singer, 71–72.
81 Tisza to Czernin, 8–8–16, Tisza, , Összes Munkái, VI, 16–17Google Scholar; Czernin to Tisza, 8–11–16, ibid., 17.
82 Berchtold to Franz Ferdinand, 4–10–14, Nachlaβ Franz Ferdinand, 9.