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The Making of a Cold Warrior: Karl Gruber and Austrian Foreign Policy, 1945–1953

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 February 2009

Günter Bischof
Günter Bischof
Affiliation:
Associate Professor of History and Associate Director of the Eisenhower Center at the University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148;
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Extract

In the years 1945 to 1953, Karl Gruber exerted an influence over Austrian foreign policy at times resembling the dominant influence of a Kaunitz or a Metternich. But as a diplomatist Gruber did not come close to the finesse and shrewd sense of power that his two great predecessors possessed. Moreover, Gruber had to maneuver in less predictable domestic and international terrain. During his tenure in the Ballhausplatz, foreign policy wassubject to domestic partisan struggle as well as parliamentary control and public opinion. Furthermore, Austria no longer figured as a great power and was locked into the monumental Cold War struggle between East and West on the frontline of the superpower tensions. Gruber operated in an extremely hostile international environment. Instead of the traditional well-balanced nineteenth-century “concert of powers,” which had profited so much from Austrian professional statesmanship, the inexperienced Gruber faced the United States and the Soviet Union, which were in almost total control of international politics. The two superpowers were engaged in a gigantic ideological struggle, each striving for a preponderance of power. A small nation such as Austria was buffeted to and fro between the conflicts in Central Europe and could hardly escape the pull of the global “empires” fashioned at the time. The United States and the Soviet Union confronted each other in spiraling arms races (nuclear and conventional) and rigid alliance systems in an uneasy truce called the Cold War. In this context of a tight bilateral international system, even England and France—the former great powers reduced to the status of middling powers after the ignominious loss of their great colonial empires—had a difficult time holding on to their traditional influence in the international arena. Small powers like Austria were largely impotent, unless they fashioned for themselves some room to maneuver between the superpower blocs.

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Articles
Information
Austrian History Yearbook , Volume 26 , January 1995 , pp. 99 - 127
Copyright
Copyright © Center for Austrian Studies, University of Minnesota 1995

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References

1 The literature on the early Cold War, of course, is immense. For a powerfully coherent recent analysis with a comprehensive bibliography, see Leffler, Melvyn P., Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, Calif., 1992)Google Scholar. For an excellent symposium analyzing the origins of the Cold War with the pertinent literature, see Jones, Howard and Woods, Randall B., “Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East,” with commentaries by Rosenberg, Emily, Stephanson, Anders, and Bernstein, Barton J., Diplomatic History 17 (Spring 1993), 251–310CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the origins of the Cold War in Austria, see Bischof, Günter, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation: Austria in International Politics, 1940–1950” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989)Google Scholar.

2 On an attempt to define various stages in the Cold War chronology, see Halliday, Fred, The Making of the Second Cold War, 2nd ed. (London, 1986), 1–23Google Scholar.

3 The best survey of the Austrian occupation is still Rauchensteiner, Manfried, Der Sonderfall. Die Besatzungszeit in Österrech 1945 bis 1955 (Graz, 1979)Google Scholar. On American planning and early control, see also Witnah, Donald R. and Erickson, Edgar L., The American Occupation of Austria: Planning and Early Years (Westport, Conn., 1985)Google Scholar. For a recent collection of essays dealing with the theme of “tutelage” in the early occupation period, see Bischof, Günter and Leidenfrost, Josef, eds., Die bevormundete Nation. Österreich und die Alliierten 1945–1949 (Innsbruck, 1988)Google Scholar. For an excellent case study of Austrian maneuvers to ease occupation controls, see Tweraser, Kurt K., “Military Justice as an Instrument of American Occupation Policy in Austria, 1945–1950: From Total Control to Limited Tutelage,” Austrian History Yearbook 24 (1993): 153–78CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation.” For a critical analysis of my Gruber theses presented here, see Gehler's, Michael article, “‘Die Besatzungsmächte sollen schnellstmöglichst nach Hause gehen’. Zur Interessenpolitik des Auβenministers Karl Gruber 1945–1953 und zu weiterführenden Fragen eines kontroversiellen Forschungsprojekts,” Christliche Demokratie 11 (1995): 27–78Google Scholar.

5 For an admirable prosopographic study of the origins of the postwar Austrian foreign service and its ties to the Habsburg or Nazi era of many diplomats, see Rathkolb, Oliver, “Die Wiedererrichtung des Auswärtigen Dienstes nach 1945,” unpublished research report, Vienna, 1988Google Scholar (I am grateful to Oliver Rathkolb for furnishing me with a copy of this insightful study). All studies of Austrian foreign policy in the occupation era have concentrated on relations with the occupation powers, for obvious reasons. Important unpublished studies are Knight, Robert Graham, “British Policy towards Occupied Austria, 1945–1950” (D.Phil, diss., London University, 1986)Google Scholar; Wagnleitner, Reinhold, “Groβbritannien und die Wiedererrichtung der Republik Österreich” (D.Phil, diss.. University of Salzburg, 1975)Google Scholar; and Leidenfrost, Josef, “Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht und der Wiederbeginn des politischen Lebens in Österreich 1944–1947” (D.Phil, diss.. University of Vienna, 1986)Google Scholar. See also Sandner, Margit, Die französisch-österreichischen Beziehungen während der Besatzungszeit von 1947 bis 1955 (Vienna, 1983)Google Scholar; Eisterer, Klaus, Französische Besatzungspolitik in Österreich 1945–1946 (Innsbruck, 1992)Google Scholar; and Aichinger, Wilfried, Sowjetische Österreichpolitik 1943–1945 (Vienna, 1977)Google Scholar. Since the Austrian records are only now becoming available, there are no monographic studies on the inside workings of the Ballhausplatz in the Figl-Gruber era, none on Austria's relations with any of her neighbors, and none on economic diplomacy or Austrian public opinion. Crucial aspects of economic diplomacy are covered in Mähr, Wilfried, Der Marshallplan in Österreich (Graz, 1989)Google Scholar, and Einwitschlager, Arno, Amerikanische Wirtschaftspolitik in Österreich 1945–1955 (Vienna, 1986)Google Scholar. For a study on Austria's relations with her neighbors, see Tuma, Renate, “Das Problem der territorialen Integrität Österreichs 1945–1947. Unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Grenzproblematik mit Deutschland, der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn” (D.Phil, diss., University of Vienna, 1989)Google Scholar. There is a growing specialized literature on particular issues such as Austro-Italian relations and the South Tyrol issue, as well as Austro-German relations.

6 “Foreign Office” stands here for a complex institutional history. From April 27 to September 25,1945, an Office for Foreign Affairs (Amt für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) existed; as chancellor of the provisional government, Karl Renner administered it himself. From September 26 (after the Länderkonferenz) until December 20, 1945 (when the elected Figl government took over), Gruber was in charge of the Staatskanzlei—Auswärtige Angelegenheiten as an under-secretary of state in the Federal Chancellery. From December 20,1945, until the end of Gruber's tenure, he administered the Foreign Affairs Office in the Federal Chancellery (Bundeskanzleramt—Auswärtige Angelegenheiten) as a minister without portfolio. Only after July 31, 1959, did a separate Foreign Ministry come into being, headed by Bruno Kreisky. For a brief institutional overview, see Stourzh's, Gerald review of a volume of Foreign Office documents in Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 36 (1983): 434–40Google Scholar.

7 Gruber scholarship is deeply indebted to Michael Gehler for having unearthed obscure details of Gruber's youth; see his highly informative “Dr. Ing. Karl Gruber–Erster Landeshauptmann von Tirol nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit. Karl Gruber—Landeshauptmann und Auβenminister 1945–1953, ed. Höbelt, Lothar and Huber, Othmar, (Innsbruck, 1991), 11–70Google Scholar (here, 13–14).

8 Ibid., 15–18.

9 Ibid., 18–21. I am indebted to Michael Gehler for clarifying and fleshing out some details on Gruber's exact whereabouts and role in the resistance during World War II. Letter to author, August 2, 1993.

10 Gehler, “Gruber–Erster Landeshauptmann,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 21–26. On Gruber as resistance leader, see also Johannes Eidlitz, “Dr. Karl Gruber—Führer im Widerstand,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 185–94.

11 An American report summed it up pithily: “His rapid rise to the important position [of provincial governor] can be attributed in part to his resistance activities, in part to his command of the English language …, and in part to shrewd judgement, ability to make quick decisions, and good command of the art of bluff.” See Dowling to Dept. of State, Oct. 21, 1952, 763.00/10–2152, Record Group (RG) 59, National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.

12 A book-length biography on Gruber is not available. Michael Gehler is working on a badly needed monograph of Gruber's foreign policy, provisionally titled “Zwischen Westintegration und Neuträlist. Karl Gruber und die österreichische Politik 1945–1955.” For the most informative study of Gruber's early life and the beginnings of his political career in the Tyrol, see Gehler's “Gruber–Erster Landeshauprmann,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 11–70. See also Rauchensteiner, Der Sonderfall, 91–94, and the superficial sketch by Herzstein, Robert Edwin in Waldheim: The Missing Years (New York, 1988), 166–67Google Scholar. Gruber also wrote two volumes of memoirs: his controversial Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit. Der Sonderfall Österreich (Vienna, 1953), and Ein politisches Leben. Österreichs Weg zwischen den Diktaturen (Vienna, 1976), 7–59Google Scholar, which is more informative for his early career.

13 See the OSS-Report, “Political Development im Land Tirol,” by Sweet, Paul R., June 15, 1945, in Gesellschaft und Politik am Beginn der Zweiten Republik. Vertrauliche Berichte der US-Militäradministration aus Österreich in englischer Originalfassung ed. Rathkolb, Oliver (Vienna, 1985), 374–85Google Scholar. It may well be that the view of Gruber as a separatist was later largely a myth created by the Socialist party. Vice-Chancellor Adolf Schärf, for example, told an American interviewer in 1951, “Gruber's record in internal affairs reposed upon an irresponsible readiness in 1945 to set up an independent Western Austria.” See letter from Kidd to Williamson (with attached report on “Austrian Socialists”), May 17, 1951, 763.003/5–1751, RG 59, NA.

14 Michael Gehler claims that Gruber's “strict anti-Communism must not be mistaken for intransigent anti-Sovietism.” See his research report, “Karl Gruber. Reden und Dokumente 1945–1953: Motivationen, Zielsetzungen und Resultate eines Forschungsprojekts 1990/1991,” Zeitgeschichte 20 (11–12 1993): 382–402Google Scholar. It is doubtful whether such a distinction is very relevant in the early Cold War, which after all is defined by an undiscriminating hysteria over the specter of the “red menace,” which replaced fascism as the principal enemy of the West. Widespread anti-Bolshevism on the part of the Austrian population dates back at least to the danger of Soviet-style revolution after World War I; Hitler's propaganda found a fertile ground in Austria. After the Red Army engaged in a frenzy of raping and looting during the liberation of Eastern Austria (copying German military practice on the Eastern front), this deeply rooted anticommunism only intensified. See Hannl, Margarete, “Mit den ‘Russen’ leben. Besatzungszeit im Miihlviertel 1945–1955,” Zeitgeschichte 16 (1985): 147–66Google Scholar.

15 Gruber claimed after the war to have been an “avowed opponent of the Dollfuβ-Schuschnigg policies”; see Martin Herz interview with Gruber, Oct. 22, 1945, attached to the dispatch from Erhardt to Byrnes, Oct. 26, 1945, 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–2645, RG 59, NA. An earlier American report noted, “Little is known of Gruber's pre-war background other than that he played some role in the Socialist youth movement in his native Tyrol, a fact that implies a significant ideological avowal since the Tyrol was overwhelmingly clerical and Christian Socialist.” See Dowling to Dept. of State, Oct. 21, 1952, 763.00/10–2152, RG 59, NA. It appears as if even at this late date the American diplomats in Vienna had not caught on to Gruber's “conversion” to conservatism.

16 The strong continuity of postwar Austrian anti-Semitism becomes excessively clear in the recent research of a younger generation of gifted scholars. See Knight, Robert, ed., “lch bin dafür, die Sadie in die Länge zu ziehen”. Die Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945 bis 1952 über die Entschädigung der juden (Frankfurt am Main, 1988)Google Scholar; Albrich, Thomas, Exodus durch Österreich. Die jüdischen Flüchtlinge 1945–1948 (Innsbruck, 1986), 180–90Google Scholar; Rathkolb, Oliver, “Zur Kontinuität antisemitischer und rassistischer Vorurteile in Österreich 1945/1950,” Zeitgeschichle 16 (02 1989): 167–79Google Scholar; and the remarkably perceptive essay collection edited by Steininger, Rolf, Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust. Europa–USA–Israel (Vienna, 1994)Google Scholar. Like so many in his generation, Gruber was not entirely free of traditional Austrian anti-Semitism. His prejudices emerge in his correspondence with Raab in 1954 over Jewish restitution, where he mentions at one point: “The influence of the Jews [in the United States] must not be overestimated, but they are very influential in the highest positions of finance and the press.” In another letter he thanks Raab for defending him against attacks by “Jewish red propaganda.” Letters from Gruber to Raab, Oct. 23 and 29, 1954. I am grateful to Gottfried Heindl for furnishing me with copies of this correspondence in his possession.

17 Gehler, “Gruber—Erster Landeshauptmann,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 12–26.

18 On the politics of the early Austrian occupation and the “Chinese walls” between zones, see Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” chaps. 2–4.

19 Gehler, “Gruber—Erster Landeshauptmann,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 54–55. On the complex negotiations of zonal boundaries and the establishment of the postwar zonal divisions, see also Witnah and Erickson, American Occupation of Austria, chaps. 7, 9–10.

20 Rauchensteiner, Sonderfall, 119–27; and Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 215–91.

21 Gehler, “Gruber—Erster Landeshauptmann,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 50–59; Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 226–28; and Leidenfrost, “Amerikanische Besatzungsmacht,” 233–47. Schärf bad-mouthed Gruber with a less charitable version of his role in the Länderkonferenz: “The impressive young Gruber presented himself in Vienna in the summer of 1945, convinced the political leaders already in government [that is, the exclusively Eastern Austrian provisional Renner government] that he commanded extensive popular support in the western provinces and enjoyed the full confidence of the Americans, and talked his way into government before anyone took the trouble to check these overstatements. He has managed Austria's foreign affairs ever since.” See Dowling to Dept. of State, Oct. 21, 1952, 763.00/10–2152, RG 59, NA.

22 On the origins of postwar Austrian foreign policy and the reorganization of the Austrian Foreign Office, see Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 361–446; Rathkolb, “Wiedererrichtung”; and Fiesinger, Klaus, Ballhausplatz-Diplomatie 1945–1949. Reetablierung der Nachbarschaftsbeziehungen und Reorganisation des Auswärtigen Dienstes als Formen auβenpolitischer Reemanzipation Österreichs (Munich, 1993)Google Scholar. On the Moscow Declaration and Austria's international status during World War II, see Keyserlingk, Robert H., Austria in World War II: An Anglo-American Dilemma (Kingston and Montreal, 1988)Google Scholar. For an analysis of the historiography of the Moscow Declaration, see Bischof, Günter, “Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklärung nach dem 2. Weltkrieg,” Zeitgeschkhte 20 (11 1993): 345–66Google Scholar.

23 Bischoff, cited in Rathkolb, “Wiedererrichtung,” 115–16. For critical analyses of the “occupation theory” and Austria's curious notions of victimhood, see Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 533–35, and idem, “Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklarung”; see also Robert Knight, “Besiegt oder befreit? Eine volkerrechtliche Frage historisch betrachtet,” in Die bevormundete Nation, ed. Bischof and Leidenfrost, 75–92, and Knight, ed., Wortprotokolle, 34–41.

24 On Gruber as one of the “principal proponents of the Opfertheorie,” see also Michael Gehler, “Gruber. Reden und Dokumente,” 387–88.

25 The Gruber speech of March 11, 1946, was reported in Erhardt to Byrnes, Mar. 29, 1946, 863.00/3–2946, RG 59, NA.

26 Gruber, Karl, “Austria Infelix,” Foreign Affairs 25 (1947): 229–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and his speech reprinted in the New York Herald Tribune, Nov. 3, 1946,58. For further background on these two important programmatic statements, see also Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 415–20.

27 Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” chaps. 6–7, and idem, “Die Instrumentalisierung der Moskauer Erklärung,” 354–55.

28 Erhardt to Byrnes (with Herz interview), Oct. 26, 1945, 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–2645, RG 59, NA. On denazification, see also the outstanding collection of essays in Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley, and Rathkolb, Oliver, eds., Verdrängte Schuld, verfehlte Sühne. Entnazipzierung in Österreich 1945–1955 (Vienna, 1986)Google Scholar.

29 Mack to Foreign Office (FO), Mar. 20, 1946, FO 371/55256/C 3202, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London.

30 The Anglo-Soviet Cold War had been raging in Austria ever since the provisional Renner government was set up in late April 1945. For an assessment of the origins of these “Cold Wars” in Austria, see Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” chaps. 2–5 (esp. 90–116, 229–38, 332–39); and idem, “Mark Clark und die Aprilkrise 1946,” Zeitgeschichte 13 (April 1986): 229–52. On the importance the Western Allies attached to the maintenance of the coalition government for Austrian political stability, see also Rauchensteiner, Manfried, Die Zwei. Die Groβe Koalition in Österrich 1945–1966 (Vienna, 1987)Google Scholar.

31 Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,“ 333–37, 423–38; and Leidenfrost, “Amerikanische Besatzungsmacht,” 563–601.

32 The most solid recent study based on mainly British and Austrian documents is Steininger, Rolf, Los von Rom? Die Südtirolfrage 1945/46 und das Gruber-DeGasperi-Abkommen (Innsbruck, 1987)Google Scholar.

33 For a vicious attack on Gruber, see Golowitsch, Helmut and Fierlinger, Walter, Kapitulation in Paris, Enstehungsgeschkhte und Hintergrunde des Pariser Abkommens zwischen De Gasperi und Gruber vom 5. September 1946 (Nuremberg, 1990)Google Scholar. For a spirited rejoinder and a vigorous defense of Gruber, see Rolf Steininger, “Karl Gruber und die Südtirolfrage 1945/46,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 71–100; see also Friedl Volgger, “Karl Grubers groβe Leistung,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 195–209. For the French positions, see Eisterer, Klaus, “Die Südtirolfrage 1945/46 und die Besatzungsmacht in Tirol,” Zeitgeschichte 19 (1992): 267–78Google Scholar.

34 See Wodak's long memorandum to Schärf on the history of Austrian treaty negotiations of May 1952 in Wagnleitner, Reinhold, ed., Diplomatic zwischen Parteiproporz und Weltpolitik. Briefe, Dokumente und Memoranden aus dem Nachlaβ Walter Wodaks 1945–1950 (Salzburg, 1984), 963–64Google Scholar. From Schmid's first interview with Bevin it can be confirmed that the South Tyrol was at the top of the agenda; see Schmid to Gruber, Feb. 19, 1946, 110.501-pol/46, 110.502-pol/46, Box 6, Archives of the Republic (RA), Austrian State Archives, Vienna.

35 Schärf, Adolf, Österreichs Emeuerung 1945–1955. Das erste Jahrzehnt derzweiten Republik (Vienna, 1955), 132–33Google Scholar.

36 Steininger, Los von Rom, 61–77, 175–77.

37 Josef Leidenfrost, “Karl Gruber und die Westorientierung Österreichs nach 1945,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 101–19.

38 See the biographic sketch and analysis of Gruber's political orientation and character, Erhardt to Byrnes, Apr. 30, 1946, 863.00/4–3046, RG 59, NA.

39 Leidenfrost, “Gruber und die Westorientierung Österreichs,” 106.

40 The classic study is Stourzh's, GeraldGeschichte des Österreichischen Staatsvertrages 1945–1955. Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität, 3rd ed. (Graz, 1985)Google Scholar. See also Bader, William B., Austria between East and West, 1945–1955 (Stanford, Calif., 1966)Google Scholar, and Cronin, Audrey Kurth, Great Power Politics and the Struggle over Austria, 1945–1955 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1986)Google Scholar. For a recent, competent survey, see Steiner, Kurt, “Negotiations for an Austrian State Treaty,” in U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievement, Failures, Lessons, ed. George, Alexander et al. (New York, 1988), 46–82Google Scholar; see also Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” chaps. 8 and 10.

41 The Moscow CFM and Austrian treaty negotiations and the Clark-Gruber disagreements are covered in detail in Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation”, 562–619. Gruber's speech of May 7 before Parliament after his return from Moscow can be found in Csáky, Eva-Marie, ed., Der Weg zu Freiheit und Neutraliät. Dokumentation zur österreichischen Auβenpolitik 1945–1955 (Vienna, 1980), 140–49Google Scholar (quotation at 145). Comment by Marjoribanks (British deputy in Austrian treaty negotiations) is in minute of May 8, 1945, FO 371/63963/C 6705; see also Leidenfrost, “Gruber und die Westorientierung Österreichs,” 109–10.

42 Communist charges are cited in Leidenfrost, “Gruber und die Westorientierung,” 101–2, 111–14. See also Gruber, Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit, 162–75; and Rauchensteiner, Sonderfall, 204–5.

43 See Burrows and Hood minutes of May 2 and 5, 1947, PRO, FO 371/63962/C 6348.

44 Günter Bischof, “‘Prag liegt westlich von Wien’: Internationale Krisen im Jahre 1948 und ihr Einfluβ auf Österreich,” in Die bevormundete Nation, ed. Bischof and Leidenfrost, 315–45, and Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 684–726. On the origins of Western secret rearmament in the wake of the Czech coup, see also Bischof, “Österreich—ein ‘geheimer Verbundeter’ des Westens?” in Österreich und die europäische Integration. Aspekte einer wechselvollen Entwicklung 1945–1992, ed. Gehler, Michael and Steininger, Rolf (Vienna, 1993), 427–52Google Scholar.

45 Cronin, Great Power Politics, 68–94; idem, “Eine verpaβte Chance? Die Groβmächte und die Verhandlungen über den Staatsvertrag im Jahre 1949,” in Die bevormundete Nation, ed. Bischof and Leidenfrost, 347–70; and Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 727–821. On 1949 treaty diplomacy, see also the one-dimensional revisionist analyses by Ardelt, Rudolf G. and Haas, Hanns, “Die Westintegration Österreichs nach 1945,” Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 4 (1975): 379–99Google Scholar, and Haas, Hanns, “Österreich 1949. Staatsvertragsverhandlungen und Wiederbewaffnungsfrage,’ Jahrbuch für Zeitgeschichte 1978 (Vienna, 1979): 175–200Google Scholar.

46 Gruber apparently wrote most of his speeches himself. In his analysis of Gruber's speeches, Michael Gehler has stressed their uncompromising candidness; no occupation power was spared his tongue-lashings. See his “Gruber. Reden und Dokumente,” 384–85. Gehler's impressive edition of the most important Gruber speeches has just appeared; see Karl Gruber. Reden und Dokumente 1945–1953 (Vienna, 1994). Gehler had exclusive access to many of these speeches from Gruber's personal papers, and he has unearthed additional unpublished speeches in the Vienna Archiv der Republik; they will constitute a crucial tool for helping us define Gruber's political philosophy.

47 Letter, Williamson to Erhardt, Oct. 19, 1949, folder ”letters,” box 2, lot files, RG 49, NA.

48 See also Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” 749–51, 811–14. Michael Gehler has concluded that Gruber's attacks on the occupation powers—sometimes bordering on the abusive—pursued a dual strategy of both reminding the Allies that an endless occupation may have fateful consequences for Austrian domestic tranquility and reinforcing the sagging morale of the population. See “Gruber. Reden und Dokumente,” 387.

49 Mack letter to Harvey, May 31, 1946, FO 371/55146/C 6592. A summary of Wladyslav Tykocinski's August 1948 assessment, located in the Polish Foreign Ministry archives, has been made available to me by Wlodzimierz Borodziej, for which I am grateful. The report concluded, “His servility … makes the Foreign Minister a confidante of American policy in Central Eu-rope.”

50 For an analysis of the function of these themes in Gruber's speeches, see Gehler, “Gruber. Reden und Dokumente,” 389–90.

51 Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages, 71–81; Günter Bischof, “Österreich—ein ‘geheimer’ Verbündeter des Westens?” in Österreich und die Westintegration, ed. Gehler and Steininger; and Bischof, “Lost Momentum: The Militarization of the Cold War and the Demise of Austrian Treaty Negotiations, 1950–1952,” unpublished chapter of my forthcoming study, The Leverage of the Impotent: Austria in the First Cold War. On the close connection between the “putsch” and Western Austrian rearmament, see my “‘Austria Looks to the West’: Kommunistische Putschgefahr und Österreichs geheime Wiederbewaffnung und Westorientierung am Anfang der funfziger Jahre,” in Österreich in den Fünfzigem, ed. Steininger, Rolf, Albrich, Thomas, Eisterer, Klaus, and Gehler, Michael (forthcoming, Innsbruck, 1995)Google Scholar.

52 Bischof, “Lost Momentum.”

53 Günter Bischof, “Karl Gruber und die Anfänge des ‘Neuen Kurses’ in der österreichischen Auβenpolitik 1952/53,” in Für Österreichs Freiheit, ed. Höbelt and Huber, 143–84. On the short treaty, see also Gehler's, Michael essay based on rich new documentation from the Austrian archives, “Kurzvertrag für Österreich? Die westliche Staatsvertrags-Diplomatie und die Stalin-Noten von 1952,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 42 (1994): 243–78Google Scholar. On Gruber's U.N.initiative, see also Leidenfrost, Josef, “Die UNO als Forum für den österreichischen Staatsvertrag? Vom Wiener Appell 1946 bis zur Brasilien-Initiative 1952,” in Geschichte zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung. Gerald Stourzh zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. Brix, Emil, Fröschl, Thomas, and Leidenfrost, Josef (Graz, 1991), 261–75Google Scholar.

54 For quotations, see Caccia letter to Mallet, Mar. 31, 1950, FO 371/84901/C 2337; and Mallett minute, Dec. 21,1950, FO 371/84911/C 8140, PRO. For more detail, see Bischof, “Lost Momentum.”

55 This paragraph is based on two long dispatches, Dowling to Dept. of State (with enclosures), Oct. 21, 1952, 763.00/10–2152, and letter from Kidd to Williamson, with a long report on the “Austrian Socialists” attached, May 17, 1951, 763.003/5–1751, RG 59, NA. See also Schärf, Österreichs Emeuerung, 132–40. On Scharf, see also Stadler, Karl R., Adolf Schärf. Mensch–Politiker–Staalsmann (Vienna, 1982)Google Scholar.

56 On the policy of “peaceful coexistence,” see Oudenaren, John Van, Dëtente in Europe: The Soviet Union and the West since 1953 (Durham, N.C., 1991), 5–23Google Scholar; and Nove, Alec, Stalinism and After: The Road to Gorbachev (Boston, 1989), 117–24Google Scholar. On the “new look” and Eisenhower's fashioning of a nuclear strategy, see the superb study by Bundy, McGeorge, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), 236–357Google Scholar, and Ambrose, Stephen E., Eisenhower: The President (New York, 1984)Google Scholar.

57 Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages, 81–84; Bischof, “Gruber und die Anfänge des ‘Neuen Kurses,’” 154–61; and Bischof, , “Eisenhower, Dulles, and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–1955,” in Eisenhower: A Centennial Assessment, ed. Bischof, Günter and Ambrose, Stephen E. (Baton Rouge, La., 1995), 136–61Google Scholar.

58 Rauchensteiner, Sonderfall, 299–320; Steiner, Ludwig, “Die Auβenpolitik Julius Raabs als Bundeskanzler,” in Julius Raab. Eine Biographie in Einzeldarstellungen, ed. Brusatti, Alois and Heindl, Gottfried (Linz, 1986), 212–41Google Scholar; and Bischof, Günter, “Österreichische Neutraliät, die deutsche Frage und europäische Sicherheit 1953–1955,” in Die doppelte Einddmmung. Europäische Sicherheit und deutsche Frage in den Fünfzigem, ed. Steininger, Rolf, Weber, Jürgen, Bischof, Günter, Albrich, Thomas, and Eisterer, Klaus (Munich, 1993), 133–45Google Scholar.

59 On neutrality, see Bischof, “Österreichische Neutralität,” in Die doppelte Eindämmung, ed. Steininger et al., 146–54; Stourzh, Gerald, “The Origins of Austrian Neutrality,” in Neutrality, ed. Leonhard, Alan T. (Lanham, Md., 1988), 48ffGoogle Scholar.; and Stourzh, Geschichte des Staatsvertrages, 93–129.

60 Harrison minute, July 3, 1953, FO 371/103763/CA 1071/168, PRO.

61 Bischof, Günter, “The Western Powers and Austrian Neutrality, 1953–55,” Mitteilungen des Österreichischen Staatsarchivs 42 (1992): 368–93Google Scholar, and “Österreichische Neutraliát,” in Die doppelte Eindämmung, ed. Steininger et al., 154–66.

62 Thompson, to Dulles, , Oct. 8, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. 7/2: Germany and Austria (Washington, D.C., 1986), 1906–9Google Scholar (hereafter cited as FRUS, 1952–54); and Caccia to FO, June 25, 1953, and Harrison minute, July 3, 1953, both in FO 371/103763/CA 1071/164 and 168, PRO.

63 Letter from Caccia to Harrison, Oct. 21,1953, FO 371/103750/CA 1022/2. Anthony Eden, the British foreign minister, penciled in the margin: “I am only sorry that Sir H. Caccia has not told me before how long a view he took of Gruber. It would have saved me some trouble being polite to Gruber” (Oct. 24, 1953). Ludwig Steiner, a close associate of Raab's, has noted that Chancellor Raab felt the Soviets had categorized Gruber as “America's man.” See his “Auβenpolitik Raabs,” 216. Norbert Bischoff confirmed from Moscow that the Kremlin resented Gruber for his “hateful view” (gehässige Haltung) toward the Soviet Union. Quoted in Schilcher, Alfons, ed., Österreich und die Groβlmächte. Dokumente zur östeneichischen Auβenpolitik 1945–1955 (Vienna, 1980), 180–83Google Scholar. Alfred Maleta, the general secretary of the People's party, is convinced that the Soviets would not have signed a treaty with Gruber. Personal interview with Alfred Maleta, Vienna, May 27, 1986.

64 Gehler, “Gruber. Reden und Dokumente,” 390.

65 Erhardt to Byrnes (with attached Herz interview), Oct. 26, 1945, 740.00119 Control (Austria)/10–2645, RG 59, NA.

66 Gruber, Karl, “Austria Infelix,” 237, and “Austria Holds On,” Foreign Affairs 26 (1948): 482–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

67 Paradoxically, it was Western planning during World War II that had mapped out a prominent mission for Austria in the Danube region. See Keyserlingk, Austria in World War II, 94–121 and passim, and Bischof, “Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation,” chap. 1. For a concise summary of Austria's postwar foreign policy options, see Gerald Stourzh, “The Origins of Austrian Neutrality,” in Neutrality, ed. Leonhard, 37–42.

68 On Austria's growing Western orientation, see also Rathkolb, Oliver, “Austria and European Integration after World War II,” in Austria in the New Europe, ed. Bischof, Günter and Pelinka, Anton (New Brunswick, N.J., 1993), 42–61Google Scholar, and the essays in Gehler and Steininger, eds., Österreich und die europäische Integration.

69 Thompson to Dulles, Oct. 5, 1953, FRUS, 1952–54, 7/2, 1905–6. On the history of Austria and Western integration, see Michael Gehler, “Austria and European Integration: The History of an Ambivalent Development, 1945–1993,” unpublished paper; the various articles in Gehler and Steininger, eds., ÖSterreich und die europaische Integration; and the essays by Paul Luif, “Austrian Neutrality and the Europe of 1992,” and Oliver Rathkolb, “Austria and European Integration after World War II,” in Austria in the New Europe, ed. Bischof and Pelinka, 19–63.

70 Marjoribanks minute for Strang, Feb. 20, 1948, FO 371/70395/C 1485; see also the long exchange of minutes on the “Security of Austria” by Marjoribanks, Kirkpatrick, Strang, Sargent, and Bevin, Feb. 12 to 19, 1948, FO 371/70409/C 1546, PRO; and Knight, “British Policy,” 129–35, 197–215.

71 Caccia to FO, Feb. 10, 1950, FO 371/84898/C 1141.

72 Mallet memorandum, “Austria,” Feb. 2,1950, FO 371/84921/C 908, PRO; for more detali, see also Bischof, “Lost Momentum.”

73 Steininger, Rolf, The German Question: The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification (New York, 1990)Google Scholar.

74 Gehler, “Austria and European Integration.”

75 Letter from Allen to O'Neill, Nov. 29, 1951, FO 371/93600/CA 10318/1, PRO.

76 Gruber speech, Mar. 28, 1946, in Dokumentation, ed. Csäky 62–64; and Gehler, “Gruber. Reden und Dokumente.” The most insightful and complete analysis of the Austrians' changing views on neutrality is Stourzh, ÖSteneichischer Staatsvertrag, 93–129.