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Prior to paradigm integration, the task is to resolve construct definitions of gF and WM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 April 2006

Damian P. Birney ,
David B. Bowman  and
Gerry Pallier
Damian P. Birney*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology (A18), University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006Australiahttp://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/damianb/
David B. Bowman*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology (A18), University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006Australiahttp://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/damianb/
Gerry Pallier*
Affiliation:
School of Psychology (A18), University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, 2006Australiahttp://www.psych.usyd.edu.au/staff/damianb/
*
damianb@psych.usyd.edu.au
davidb@psych.usyd.edu.au
gerryp@psych.usyd.edu.au
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Abstract

Blair's account, like the intelligence field in general, treats many distinct constructs as if they were practically interchangeable – this is not self-evident. Paradigm integration and rationalization of redundant nomenclature are important for the continued development of understanding. The prior task is to demonstrate where synonymity of constructs across paradigms occurs, and where it fails. We present arguments why this is the case.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 29 , Issue 2 , April 2006 , pp. 127
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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