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Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2012

Anna Dreber  and
David G. Rand
Anna Dreber
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden. anna.dreber@hhs.sehttp://sites.google.com/site/annadreber/
David G. Rand
Affiliation:
Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Harvard University and Department of Psychology, Harvard University,Cambridge, MA 02138. drand@fas.harvard.eduhttp://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~drand/
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Abstract

Guala argues that there is a mismatch between most laboratory experiments on costly punishment and behavior in the field. In the lab, experimental designs typically suppress retaliation. The same is true for most theoretical models of the co-evolution of costly punishment and cooperation, which a priori exclude the possibility of defectors punishing cooperators.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 35 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 24
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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